| Click on SIEPR Discussion paper number for abstract
and to download pdf file unless otherwise
noted |
|
Discussion
Papers
(arranged by author)
|
| A-C | D-H | I-L | M-Q
| R-S | T-Z |
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
06-001
Accounting for the Rise in Consumer Bankruptcies
Igor Livshits, James MacGee, and Michèle Tertilt
September 2006 |
SIEPR Discussion paper No. 99-13
Asset Allocation and Risk Allocation:
Can Social Security Improve its Future Solvency
Problem by Investing in Private Securities?
Thomas E. MaCurdy
January 2000
This paper examines the economics of investing
the central trust fund of Social Security
in private securities. We note that switching
from a policy of having the trust fund invest
solely in special issue Treasury bonds to
one where some of the portfolio holds common
stocks amounts to an asset swap. Such an
asset swap does not increase national saving,
wealth or GDP. We also show that it is far
from a sure thing in terms of improving
the finances of the Social Security system.
The asset swap is deemed successful if the
stock portfolio generates sufficient cash
to pay off the interest and principal of
the bonds and still have money left over.
It is deemed a failure otherwise. By using
historical data and a bootstrap statistical
technique, we estimate that the exchange
of ten or twenty year bonds for a stock
portfolio would worsen social security’s
finances roughly twenty to twenty-five percent
of the time. Further, failures are autocorrelated
meaning that if the strategy fails one year
it is extremely likely to fail the next.
Such high failure rates imply that the defined
benefit structure of benefits becomes less
credible with stocks in the trust fund.
Download this paper
(PDF).
|
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
04-029
Child Nutrition in India in the Nineties:
A Story of Increased Gender Inequality?
Alessandro Tarozzi and Aprajit Mahajan
May 2005 |
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
07-047
Pricing and Welfare in Health Plan Choice
M. Kate Bundorf Jonathan Levin and Neale Mahoney,
June 2008 |
|
SIEPR Discussion paper No. 490
Education and Saving: The Long-Term Effects
of High School Financial Curriculum Mandates
B. Douglas Bernheim, Daniel M. Garrett,
Dean M. Maki
June 1997
Over the last forty years, the majority
of states have adopted consumer education
policies, and a sizable minority have specifically
mandated that high school students receive
instruction on topics related to household
financial decision-making (budgeting, credit
management, saving and investment, and so
forth). In this paper, we attempt to determine
whether the curricula arising from these
mandates have had any discernable effect
on adult decisions regarding saving. Using
a unique household survey, we exploit the
variation in requirements both across states
and over time to identify the effects of
interest. The evidence indicates that mandates
have significantly raised both exposure
to financial curricula and subsequent asset
accumulation once exposed students reached
adulthood. These effects appear to have
been gradual rather than immediate--a probable
reflection of implementation lags.
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SIEPR Discussion paper No.
04-034
Hyperbolic Discounting and Uniform Savings Floors
Benjamin A. Malin
August 2005 |
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
02-033
Disagreement about Inflation Expectations
N. Gregory Mankiw, Ricardo Reis, and Justin Wolfers
June 2003 |
|
SIEPR Discussion paper No. 04-035
The Political Economy of Law:
Decision-Making by Judicial, Legislative, Executive and Administrative Agencies
Mat McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast
August 2005
|
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
05-002
China’s New Exchange Rate Policy: Will China
Follow Japan into a Liquidity Trap?
Ronald McKinnon
Sptember 2005 |
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
04-021
Exchange Rate or Wage Changes in International Adjustment?
Japan and China versus the United States
Ronald McKinnon
May 2005 |
|
SIEPR Discussion paper No. 487
The Syndrome of the Ever-Higher Yen,
1971-95: American Mercantile Pressure on
Japanese Monetary Policy
Ronald McKinnon, Kenichi Ohno,
Kazuko Shirono
May 1997
From August 1971 through to April 1995,
the yen ratcheted up against the dollar
because of mercantile pressure from the
United States, which was anxious to dampen
its eroding market shares in manufacturing
and burgeoning trade deficits. While temporarily
ameliorating political tensions arising
out of innumerable Japan-U.S. trade disputes,
these great yen appreciations imposed relative
deflation on Japan without correcting the
trade imbalance between the two countries.
Although resisting sharp yen appreciations
in the short run, the Bank of Japan validated
this syndrome of ever-higher yen by following
a dependent monetary policy that was deflationary
relative to that independently established
by the U.S. Federal Reserve System. The
appreciating yen was a forcing variable
in determining the Japanese price level.
After 1985, this resulted in great macroeconomic
instability in Japan including endaka fukyo
(high-yen-induced recessions) in 1986-87
and more severely in 1992-95. These recessions
further curtailed Japan's imports, thus
widening her trade surplus, and so further
aggravated American mercantilists.
This unfortunate cycle was (temporarily?)
suspended in the summer of 1995 only after
authorities in the U.S. Treasury finally
recognized that the Japanese macro-financial
system was on the verge of collapse. In
addition to suspending trade hostilities,
the American and Japanese governments collaborated
to drive the yen back down by almost 50
percent form its April peak. This permitted
the modest recovery of the Japanese economy
in 1996-97. But whether the syndrome of
the ever-higher yen is over, or is simply
in remission, remains to be seen.
|
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
03-032
A Flexible Economy? Entrepreneurship and Productivity in New Zealand
John McMillan
August 2004 |
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
03-030
How to Subvert Democracy:
Montesinos in Peru
John McMillan and Pablo Zoido
July 2004 |
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
02-041
Auctions versus Negotiations in Procurement:
An Empirical Analysis
Patrick Bajari, Robert McMillan and Steven Tadelis
July 2003 |
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
07-045
Beyond the Market Advisory Committee: Proceedings from a Workshop held at Stanford University, January 15, 2008
Charles D. Kolstad, Oren Ahoobim, Nick Burger, Corbett Grainger, and Shaun McRae
April 2008 |
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
06-042
A Test of Confidence Enhanced Performance: Evidence from US College Debaters
Jonathan Meer and Edward D. Van Wesep
July 2007 |
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
06-041
How Much do Real Estate Brokers Add? A Case Study
B. Douglas Bernheim and Jonathan Meer
August 2007 |
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
07-033
"Only Connect": Academic-Business Research Collaborations and the Formation of Ecologies of Innovation
Paul A. David, and J. Stanley Metcalfe
January 2008 |
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
07-026
Status, Relative Pay, and Wage Growth: Evidence from M&A
Illoong Kwon and Eva Meyersson Milgrom
April 2007 |
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
07-025
Cohort Effects in Wages and Promotions
Illoong Kwon and Eva M Meyersson Milgrom
December 2007 |
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
06-037
When Should Control Be Shared?
Eva M. Meyersson Milgrom, Paul Milgrom, and Ravi Singh
April 2007 |
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
05-021
Are Female Workers Less Productive Than Male Workers?
Trond Petersen, Vemund Snartland, and Eva M. Meyersson Milgrom
August 2006 |
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
05-020
Distributive Justice and CEO Compensation
Guillermina Jasso and Eva M. Meyersson Milgrom
August 2006 |
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
07-008
Simplified Mechanisms with Applications to
Sponsored Search and Package Auctions
Paul Milgrom
October 2007 |
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
06-037
When Should Control Be Shared?
Eva M. Meyersson Milgrom, Paul Milgrom, and Ravi Singh
April 2007 |
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
03-036
The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction
Lawrence M. Ausubel and Paul Milgrom
August 2004 |
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
03-035
Ascending Proxy Auctions
Lawrence M. Ausubel and Paul Milgrom
August 2004 |
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
03-034
The Clock-Proxy Auction:
A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, and Paul Milgrom
August 2004 |
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
03-008
Auctions, Matching and the Law of Aggregate
John William Hatfield and Paul Milgrom
January 2004 |
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
01-021
Getting To Work
Paul Milgrom
January 2002 |
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
01-020
Package Bidding: Vickrey Vs Ascending Auctions
Paul Milgrom and Lawrence M. Ausubel
January 2002 |
|
SIEPR Discussion paper No. 02-018
Invention under Uncertainty and
the Threat of Ex Post Entry
David A. Miller
February 2003
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 00-045
Learning the Silicon Valley Way
Gordon Moore and Kevin Davis
July 2001
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 06-044
Diverse Beliefs and Time Variability of Risk Premia
Mordecai Kurz and Maurizio Motolese
August 2007
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 06-003
Risk Premia, Diverse Belief and Beauty Contests
Mordecai Kurz and Maurizio Motolese
August 2006
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 03-001
Determinants of Stock Market Volatility and Risk Premia
Mordecai Kurz, Hehui Jin and Maurizio Motolese
October 2003
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 02-034
The Role of Expectations in Economic Fluctuations
and the Efficacy of Monetary Policy
Mordecai Kurz, Hehui Jin and Maurizio Motolese
Revised November 2003
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|
SIEPR Discussion paper No. 499
Wages, Skills and Technology in the United
States and Canada
Kevin M. Murphy, W. Craig
Riddell and Paul Romer
August 1998
Wages for more and less educated workers
have followed strikingly different paths
in the US and Canada. During the 1980’s
and 1990’s, the ratio of the earnings of
university graduates to high school graduates
increased sharply in the US but fell slightly
in Canada.
Katz and Murphy (1992) found that for the
US, a simple supply-demand model fit the
pattern of variation in the premium over
time. We find that the same model and parameter
estimates explain the variation between
the US and Canada. In both instances, the
relative demand for more educated labor
shifts out at the same, consistent rate.
Both over time and between countries, the
variation in rate of growth of relative
wages can be explained by variation in the
relative supply of more educated workers.
Many economists suspect that technological
change is causing the steady increases in
the relative demand for more educated labor.
If so, these data provide independent evidence
on the spatial and temporal variation in
the pattern of technological change. Whatever
is causing this increased demand for skill,
the evidence from Canada suggested that
increases in educational attainment and
skills can reduce the rate at which relative
wages diverge.
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 07-039
Brazilian Ethanol: A Gift or Threat to the Environment and Regional Development?
Sriniketh Nagavarapu
January 2008
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 03-017
Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations
and Endogenous Tradability
Kanda Naknoi
January 2004
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 07-029
A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings
B. Douglas Bernheim and Sita Nataraj
May 2007
|
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 04-030
Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men Compete too Much?
Muriel Niederle and Lise Vesterlund
June 2005
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 07-017
The Economic Significance of Executive Order 13422
Roger G. Noll
October 2007
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 06-046
Designing an Effective Program of State-Sponsored Human Embryonic Stem-Cell Research
Roger G. Noll
June 2006
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 06-035
Priorities for Telecommunications Reform in Mexico
Roger G. Noll
May 2007
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 06-016
BROADCASTING AND TEAM SPORTS
Roger G. Noll
February 2007
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 06-011
SPORTS ECONOMICS AT FIFTY
Roger G. Noll
November 2006
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 04-035
The Political Economy of Law:
Decision-Making by Judicial, Legislative, Executive and Administrative Agencies
Mat McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast
August 2005
|
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 04-028
The Politics and Economics of Implementing State-Sponsored Embryonic Stem-Cell Research
Roger G. Noll
June 2005
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 04-008
"Buyer Power" and Economic Policy
Roger G. Noll
March 2005
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 03-022
The Conflict Over Vertical Foreclosure
In Competition Policy And
Intellectual Property Law
Roger G. Noll
March 2004
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 02-043
The Organization of Sports Leagues
Roger G. Noll
August 2003
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 01-031
The Economics of the Supreme Court's Decision On Forward Looking Costs
Gregory L. Rosston and Roger G. Noll
August 2002
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 01-027
Federal R&D in the Anti-Terrorist Era
Roger G. Noll
July 2002
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 01-016
The Economics of Promotion and Relegation in Sports Leagues: The Case of English Football
Roger G. Noll
January 2002
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 01-015
The Economics of Baseball Contraction
Roger G. Noll
January 2002 Revised March 2003
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 01-013
Resolving Policy Chaos in High Speed Internet Access
Roger G. Noll
January 2002
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 99-032
Reforming Urban Water Systems in Developing
Countries
Roger G. Noll, Mary M. Shirley,
Simon Cowan
June 2000
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 99-031
Telecommunications Reform in Developing
Countries
Roger G. Noll
June 2000
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 492
Communications Policy in the Era of Choice
and Convergence with Reflections
on the Markle Foundation
Roger G. Noll and Monroe E.
Price
October 1997
In the 1960s, technological progress caused
the technologies of communications media
to begin to converge. Convergence enhanced
the prospects for competition in the media,
promising consumers more choices - but only
if histroically anticompetive policies could
be reversed. As the era of convergence with
choice was dawning, Lloyd Morrisett became
the President of the John and Mary Markle
Foundation, and immediately changed the
focus of the Foundation's program from medical
reserach to communications policy. This
essay traces both the history of technology
and policy in communications, and the closely
related activities of the foundation, during
the Morrisett presidency, from September
1969 to December 1997. As such, the essay
provides both an intellectual history of
policy research in communications and a
chronicle of how a relatively small but
well-managed foundation can have a major
impact in an important area of public policy.
|
|
SIEPR Discussion paper No. 495
Competition Policy in European Sports
after the Bosman Case
Roger G. Noll
June 1998
In the Bosman decision, the European Court
of Justice declared that the rules of international
football (soccer) governing the player market
violated the Maastricht Treaty by preventing
international competition for professional
athletes. The purpose of this paper is to
extend the logic of the Bosman decision
to other governance rules of European football,
including policies regarding broadcasting,
product licensing, and creating and expanding
professional leagues. The essence of the
argument is that growth in demand for sports
and the conversion of European television
from nationalized monopoly to privatized
competition has vastly increased the financial
incentive to create international football
leagues comprised of the best teams from
the existing national premier leagues. Thus
far, national and international football
organizations have resisted this movement,
but they are unlikely to be successful in
doing so. Hence, the relevant question is
to identify the various ways these international
leagues can be structured, and to apply
the principles of competition policy analysis
to evaluate them. The main conclusions are
that the European Union should, if possible,
promote multiple competing leagues rather
than a single, monopoly league, or if this
is not feasible, to prevent the single league
from monopolizing the sale of broadcasting
and licensing rights and the number or premier
league teams that will be permitted.
Download this paper
(PDF).
|
|
SIEPR Discussion paper No. 02-019
Does Earmarking Matter?
The Case of State Lottery Profits and
Educational Spending
Neva Kerbeshian Novarro
December 2002
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 487
The Syndrome of the Ever-Higher Yen,
1971-95: American Mercantile Pressure on
Japanese Monetary Policy
Ronald McKinnon, Kenichi Ohno,
Kazuko Shirono
May 1997
From August 1971 through to April 1995,
the yen ratcheted up against the dollar
because of mercantile pressure from the
United States, which was anxious to dampen
its eroding market shares in manufacturing
and burgeoning trade deficits. While temporarily
ameliorating political tensions arising
out of innumerable Japan-U.S. trade disputes,
these great yen appreciations imposed relative
deflation on Japan without correcting the
trade imbalance between the two countries.
Although resisting sharp yen appreciations
in the short run, the Bank of Japan validated
this syndrome of ever-higher yen by following
a dependent monetary policy that was deflationary
relative to that independently established
by the U.S. Federal Reserve System. The
appreciating yen was a forcing variable
in determining the Japanese price level.
After 1985, this resulted in great macroeconomic
instability in Japan including endaka fukyo
(high-yen-induced recessions) in 1986-87
and more severely in 1992-95. These recessions
further curtailed Japan's imports, thus
widening her trade surplus, and so further
aggravated American mercantilists.
This unfortunate cycle was (temporarily?)
suspended in the summer of 1995 only after
authorities in the U.S. Treasury finally
recognized that the Japanese macro-financial
system was on the verge of collapse. In
addition to suspending trade hostilities,
the American and Japanese governments collaborated
to drive the yen back down by almost 50
percent form its April peak. This permitted
the modest recovery of the Japanese economy
in 1996-97. But whether the syndrome of
the ever-higher yen is over, or is simply
in remission, remains to be seen.
|
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
05-011
Digital Information Network Technologies, Organizational Performance and Productivity
Alexandre Caldas, Paul A. David, and Orges Ormanidhi
December 2005 |
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 07-035
Economic Projections and Rules-of-Thumb for Monetary Policy
Athanasios Orphanides and Volker Wieland
February 2008
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 07-027
Why Media Regulation is so Tempting
Bruce M. Owen
January 2008
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 06-032
China’s Competition Policy Reforms:
The Antimonopoly Law and Beyond
Bruce M. Owen, Su Sun, Wentong Zheng
April 2007
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 06-015
The Net Neutrality Debate:
Twenty Five Years after United States v. AT&T and 120 Years after the Act to Regulate Commerce
Bruce M. Owen,
February 2007
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 04-010
Competition Policy in Emerging Economies
Bruce M. Owen,
April 2005
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 03-040
Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive Compatibility
Bruce M. Owen, Su Sun, Wentong Zheng
September 2004
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 03-027
Assigning Broadband Rights
Bruce M. Owen
May 2004
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 03-026
Confusing Success with Access:
“Correctly” Measuring Concentration of Ownership and Control in Mass Media and Online Services
Bruce M. Owen
May 2004
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 03-009
Imported Antitrust Law: Steel or Slag? A Review Essay
Bruce M. Owen
February 2004
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 03-003
Competition Policy in Latin America
Bruce M. Owen
November 2003
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 02-037
Local Broadband Access:
Primum Non Nocere or Primum Processi?
A Property Rights Approach
Bruce M. Owen and Gregory L. Rosston
July 2003
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 02-032
Legal Reform, Externalities and
Economic Development: Measuring the Impact of
Legal Aid on Poor Women in Ecuador
Bruce. M Owen and Jorge Portillo
May 2003 X
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 05-007
Anders Frederiksen and Odile Poulsen
February 2006
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 03-010
Robert Pozen, Sylvester J. Schieber, and John B. Shoven
January 2004
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 02-031
Regulatory Reform:
The Telecommunications Act of 1996
and the FCC Media Ownership Rules
Bruce. M Owen
March 2003
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 02-026
Coordinated Interaction and
Clayton §7 Enforcement
Stuart D. Gurrea and Bruce. M Owen
March 2003
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 01-009
Spectrum Allocation and the Internet
Bruce M. Owen and Gregory L. Rosston
December 2001
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 02-006
Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?
Paul Oyer
December 2002
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 02-005
Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options To All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories
Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer
December 2002
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 99-001
Measuring the Inflation of Parallel Currencies:
An Empirical Reevaluation Of the Second
Hungarian Hyperinflation
Beatrix Paall
June 2000
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 07-041
Stiff Competition: Vertical Relationships in Cremation Services
Lori Parcel
March 2008
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SIEPR Discussion paper No.
07-054
Be as careful of the company you keep as of the books you read. Peer effects in education and on the labor market
Giacomo DeGiorgi, Michele Pellizzari and Silvia Redaelli
August 2008 |
SIEPR Discussion paper No.
05-009
INCOME MOBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS IN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES
Niny Khor and John Pencavel
February 2006 |
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 04-036
A Life Cycle Perspective on Changes in Earnings Inequality Among Married Men and Women
John Pencavel
July 2005
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 03-028
Faculty Retirement Incentives
by Colleges and Universities
John Pencavel
May 2004
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 00-031
The Surprising Retreat of Union Britain
John Pencavel
March 2001
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 00-009
A Cohort Analysis of the Association
Between Work Hours and Wages Among Men
John Pencavel
November 2000
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 99-19
The Response of Employees to Severance
Incentives:
The University of California's Faculty,
1991-1994
John Pencavel
April 2000
In response to huge budgetary shortfalls
in the early 1990s, the University of California
offered its older and longer service employees
financial inducements to leave. This paper
analyzes the responses of UC's faculty to
three waves of buyout incentives. It is
estimated that an individual presented with
ten percent higher severance benefits has
a seven to eight percent higher probability
of quitting. However, quit probabilities
are very difficult to forecast with accuracy.
This casts doubt on arguments that maintain
that buyouts are superior to employer-initiated
layoffs as a mechanism to effect large employment
changes.
Download this paper
(PDF).
|
|
SIEPR Discussion paper No. 99-6
The Appropriate Design of Collective
Bargaining Systems: Learning from the Experience
of Britain, Australia, and New Zealand
John Pencavel
November 1998
The experiences of three countries -- Britain,
Australia, and New Zealand -- are drawn
upon to suggest how the legal framework
for collective bargaining ought to be designed
to bring forth unionism's most desirable
features. For most of the twentieth century,
these three countries have adopted quite
different regulatory postures: Australia
and New Zealand (until recently) intervened
extensively into the procedures for wage
determination and set up compulsory arbitration
tribunals to underpin wages; by contrast,
Britain's support of collective bargaining
was indirect. In all cases, however, this
regulation of collective bargaining complemented
other economic policies that contributed
to inferior economic performance, something
that has now been recognized in New Zealand
and Britain by reforms that have taken place
during the past two decades. The lessons
for economic policy are that superior macro-economic
performance is easier to attain when collective
bargaining is regulated not by an assortment
of mandates and constraints set down in
legal code, but by allowing managements
and workers to design bargaining protocols
that suit them and by promoting competition
in product and factor markets. In specifying
the framework of collective bargaining,
the state should not be partisan and should
encourage the resolution of disputes at
the level of the firm or place of work.
Download this paper
(PDF).
|
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 01-033
Does Income Inequality Lead to Consumption
Inequality? Evidence and Theory
Dirk Krueger and Fabrizio Perri
August 2002
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SIEPR Discussion paper No.
06-013
Are Burdensome Registration Procedures an
Important Barrier on Firm Creation? Evidence
from Mexico
David Kaplan, Eduardo Piedra, and Enrique Seira
December 2006 |
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 99-028
Intertemporal Choice and Consumption
Mobility
Tullio Jappelli and Luigi Pistaferri
August 2000
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 99-027
Superior Information, Income Shocks and
the Permanent Income Hypothesis
Luigi Pistaferri
August 2000
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 06-006
Mandatory versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
May 2006
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 05-016
Public Enforcement of Law
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
May 2006
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 05-005
Economic Analysis of Law
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
November 2005
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 05-004
The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
October 2005
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 04-009
A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
March 2005
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 03-038
Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe
A. Mitchell Polinsky
August 2004
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 03-037
The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable
A. Mitchell Polinsky
August 2004
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 03-004
Remedies For Price Overcharges:
The Deadweight Loss Of Coupons And Discounts
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
November 2003
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 99-12
Superior Information, Income Shocks and
the Permanent Income Hypothesis
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven
Shavell
July 1999
Public enforcement of law -- the use of
public agents (inspectors, tax auditors,
police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction
violators of legal rules -- is a subject
of obvious generate, the extent of compliance
with the income tax code, and the incidence
of theft, robbery and other crimes.
The earliest economically-oriented writing
in the subject of law enforcement dates
from the eighteenth century contributions
of Montesquieu (1748), Cesare Beccaria (1767),
and, especially Jeremy Bentham (1789), whose
analysis of deterrence was sophisticated
and economic scholarship until the late
1960s, when Gary S. Becker 1968 published
a highly influential article. Since then,
well over two hundred articles have been
written on the economics of enforcement.
The main purpose of our article is to present
the economic theory public enforcement of
law in a systematic and comprehensive way.
The theoretical core of our analysis (section
2 through 4) answers the following basic
questions: How much of society's resources
should be devoted to apprehending injuries?
If an injurer is caught, should the rule
of liability be strict or fault-based? Should
the form of the sanction be a fine, an imprisonment
term, or a combination of the two? At what
level should sanctions be set?
Download this paper
(PDF).
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 02-032
Legal Reform, Externalities and
Economic Development: Measuring the Impact of
Legal Aid on Poor Women in Ecuador
Bruce. M Owen and Jorge Portillo
May 2003
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 03-010
Improving Social Security’s Progressivity and Solvency With Hybrid Indexing
Robert Pozen, Sylvester J. Schieber, and John B. Shoven
January 2004
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 492
Communications Policy in the Era of Choice
and Convergence with Reflections
on the Markle Foundation
Roger G. Noll and Monroe E. Price
October 1997
In the 1960s, technological progress caused
the technologies of communications media
to begin to converge. Convergence enhanced
the prospects for competition in the media,
promising consumers more choices - but only
if histroically anticompetive policies could
be reversed. As the era of convergence with
choice was dawning, Lloyd Morrisett became
the President of the John and Mary Markle
Foundation, and immediately changed the
focus of the Foundation's program from medical
reserach to communications policy. This
essay traces both the history of technology
and policy in communications, and the closely
related activities of the foundation, during
the Morrisett presidency, from September
1969 to December 1997. As such, the essay
provides both an intellectual history of
policy research in communications and a
chronicle of how a relatively small but
well-managed foundation can have a major
impact in an important area of public policy.
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 482
Special Economic Zones as Catalysts for
Transition
John M. Litwack, Yingyi Qian
November 1996
One of the early strategic decisions in
Chinese reform was the establishment of
several special economic zones. These areas
received both relatively high levels of
investment and favorable tax treatment.
We interpret this strategy as an appropriate
response to two critical problems facing
the reformers at this time: (1) A limited
ability to commit due to the lack of institutions
to constrain the state from expropriation,
and (2) a political constraint to meet significant
basic requirements in social policy. The
interaction between these two problems can
cause the economy to be caught in a low-equilibrium
trap if limited resources are spread too
thinly. By concentrating resources in special
economic zones, this trap might be avoided
in at least some areas of the economy, which
could also eventually generate important
spillover effects elsewhere. Thus, in the
presence of important commitment and political
problems, special economic zones can serve
as catalysts for transition, despite the
resulting (inefficient) diversion of resources
and growth in regional inequality.
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SIEPR Discussion paper No. 03-014
Optimal Second Price Auctions with
Positively Correlated Private Values
and Limited Information
Dan Quint a
January 2004
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