Program on Market Design

Paul Milgrom, Co-Director
Muriel Niederle, Co-Director


The Program on Market Design, led by economics professors Paul Milgrom and Muriel Niederle, promotes research and intellectual exchange among scholars doing empirical, theoretical, and experimental research into the ways that the rules of an auction, exchange, or other markets affect performance. The program draws on Stanford faculty members’ experience as advisors in setting rules for electricity, radio spectrum, and timber auctions, as well as their participation in recent attempts to establish new kinds of electronic markets. The program sponsors periodic conferences and provides research support for faculty and students.

Publications

Simplified Mechanisms with Applications to Sponsored Search and Package Auctions
Paul Milgrom, October 2007
When Should Control Be Shared?
Paul MilgromEva Meyersson MilgromRavi Singh, April 2007

Projects

Divisible Good Auctions with Constrained Bidding: Theory, Empirics and Test for Common Values, 3/1/08 - 2/28/11 PI: Jakub Kastl

Market Design, 3/1/07 - 2/28/10 PI: Paul Milgrom

CAREER: Market Design and the Limits of Markets, 4/1/04 - 3/31/10 PI: Jonathan D. Levin