The Program on Market Design promotes research into the structure and operation of different kinds of markets. Market Design scholars have studied the mechanisms for distributing a wide array of resources, ranging from electric power and slots on the radio spectrum to public school assignments and jobs for doctors. Researchers look at what makes markets efficient and how policymakers can help them function better. Program scholars have special expertise in two market systems: auctions, in which prices are set by competitive bidding; and matching markets, such as those for jobs and schools, in which two sides are brought together based on hard-to-measure factors such as quality and skill in addition to cost. Market Design scholars have served as advisors in setting up advanced auction and matching market operations that take advantage of emerging electronic technologies.
Current Sponsored Projects
- Heterogeneous effect of residency matching and prospective payment on labor returns and hospital scale economies | | Feb 2015
- Can Health Insurance Competition Work? Evidence from Medicare Advantage | | Dec 2014
- Are Dynamic Vickrey Auctions Practical?: Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction | | Sep 2014
- Consumer Price Search and Platform Design in Internet Commerce | | Aug 2014
- Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets | | Apr 2013