Tariffs and trade: A turning point for globalization

In this episode of Econ To Go, Neale Mahoney sits down with Stanford trade economist Stephen Redding to unpack the sharp escalation of U.S. tariffs in 2025 and 2026, and what it signals for the global economy. Redding explains why the scale of recent changes stands out historically, and how trade policy is becoming more persistent and more weaponized, shaped by concerns around supply chains, geopolitical tensions and critical technologies.

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The conversation also explores what tariffs are designed to do — and why economists often view them as a blunt tool, with costs that ripple through consumers, firms, and global trade flows. Along the way, we explore several key themes, including:

• (01:24) The scale of recent tariff changes
• (04:55) When tariffs are used, and why
• (14:30) The economist’s view of tariffs
• (19:58) The benefits of trade and who is left behind
• (26:56) Rethinking policy and the path forward

Today’s guest, Stephen Redding, is the Kleinheinz Family Professor of International Studies and a professor of economics at Stanford University, as well as a senior fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research. His research focuses on international trade, economic geography, and the impact of globalization on local economies. To learn more about his work, explore these links:

• Stephen Redding website 

• The Economics of Tariffs 

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  Econ To Go brings Stanford economics into your everyday life — served with a side of coffee. Hosted by economist and director of the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR), Neale Mahoney, the show takes you on a walk across campus with leading thinkers as they unpack the ideas shaping our economy, public policy, and daily lives. Smart, curious, and conversational — it’s Stanford economics, to go.
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Season 1 EP05

Neale Mahoney: Tariffs have long been one of the most powerful and controversial economic policy tools. Governments use them to protect domestic industries, reshape supply chains, and respond to economic competition abroad. But right now, tariff policy is shifting so dramatically that economists are asking a bigger question, are we witnessing a fundamental change in the global trading system? Were even you surprised about the speed and magnitude of the tariffs we saw in 2025, or did you see the trend lines pointing in that direction?

Stephen Redding: I was expecting more tariffs in the second Trump administration, but I wasn't expecting quite the scale of the tariffs. So just the scale of the change in trade policy is historically very, very large relative to sort of some of the biggest experiments in the past.

Neale Mahoney: I'm Neale Mahoney, economist and Director of the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research. In this episode of "Econ to Go", I catch up with Stanford economist Steve Redding. Steve has spent years studying globalization, trade shocks and the way that economic forces reshape entire regions. In our conversation, he helps unpack this new wave of tariffs, how it compares to past moments, what tariffs are actually designed to do, and why economists worry they may be a blunt tool for solving today's geopolitical and economic challenges. So we're sitting here in early 2026, and tariffs have been making the headlines for almost 12 months now. How does this moment in time compare to, you know, other times when trade policy was front and center in the economic discourse?

Stephen Redding: Great question. I think the events of today are momentous and they compare to many episodes in history. Perhaps the closest parallel is the Smoot-Hawley tariffs of the 1930s where, again, there was a huge debate about those tariffs. The act was passed by Congress, but famously, 100 economists signed a letter lobbying against the tariffs. And today, you know, the change in tariffs that's occurred in recent times is around the same scale as the Smoot-Hawley tariffs. And so the kind of intensity of the debate today is I think parallel to that during the 1930s.

Neale Mahoney: Right, we talk about weather events like a, you know, every 10 year event or an every 100 year event. And with tariffs, we're having a sort of every century type event in the scale and the scope of tariff policy.

Stephen Redding: And I think also just not only in terms of the periodicity, but also in terms of sort of rethinking and stepping back. In the period after the Second World War, we had this ongoing process of globalization driven by falling trade barriers, trade policy barriers, improvements in technology. And then now we're at a standpoint where that process is starting to unravel a little bit and people are rethinking. And that's partly the result of rising distributional concerns within countries about the effect of globalization, and also heightening geopolitical tensions. And so I think it's sort of a key moment in time, thinking about these really big economic and political economy questions.

Neale Mahoney: And so no better time in the last century to be a trade economist than today.

Stephen Redding: Absolutely, that's what makes me so excited about the research I do every morning when I wake up. And I think it's a time where economists have a great opportunity to reshape that debate, to kind of bring the insights from economics to bear, to better inform the political debate. And so political actors can then be better informed by the underlying economics.

Neale Mahoney: These policies can be sticky sort of for political economy reasons. And does that lead you to think that even if, you know, the full extent of the current round of tariffs don't stick, that we are entering a new regime now with higher and sort of a broader set of products covered by tariffs moving forward?

Stephen Redding: I think so, yes, for two reasons. Firstly, for the reason you mentioned, that tariffs are sticky for political economy reasons, but then secondly, I think we're moving into a new era where there are rising geopolitical tensions. Those tensions raise a question as to how reliant you may want to be on sort of key suppliers for, say, advanced semiconductors. We're also at a stage where artificial intelligence is clearly a key technology in the future. And so I think many policy makers, not just here in the United States but around the world, are sort of thinking what is the best position to be on the trade-off between the benefits from specialization and economic trade versus the concerns about national security and resilience. So I think both for a stickiness reason and for these broader geopolitical tensions, I think we're in a world where some form of trade policy or industrial policy is gonna be around for a while.

Neale Mahoney: I completely agree that we're moving into a new regime on geopolitical concerns, and that a new set of policies are required to reduce our vulnerability and to build up critical industries. I think one question for you as a trade economist is how often and to what extent are tariffs the right policy when pursuing those objectives?

Stephen Redding: Trade economists would typically say there are sort of three reasons why tariffs are often a blunt policy instrument. The first of those reasons is that tariffs are a tax like any other tax, say, a consumption tax. But unlike a consumption tax, tariffs distort decisions of both producers and consumers. And so they tend to be a very distortionary tax relative to a consumption tax, which only distorts the decisions of consumers. That's the first point. Second point, that the tax base for tariffs is actually pretty small because it's the value of imports, which is around 10% of GDP. And so because of that small tax base, you need a very big tariff to generate the same amount of revenue as a consumption tax. And that's very distortionary. And then the third reason, which I think was the point that you were really highlighting is that if you believe the reason for walking back unbridled globalization is that you want to have key industries in the United States or key industries of the future in the United States, it's not obvious the best way to achieve that is a tariff. You might believe in an industrial policy, say some of the measures in the CHIPS Act or enacted recently in the United States, where you actually might want to just subsidize that industry. Then you'd get the security benefit of having the industry here in the United States, but you would not get the higher prices that tariffs bring with them.

Neale Mahoney: So I just want to go through each of those arguments one by one and make sure I'm following. The first point being that tariffs not only tax consumption goods, but they're also a tax on the inputs that US manufacturers and other producers use to produce their goods. And in doing so, they force those importers to change the way they produce output in ways that can be inefficient and can sort of throw sand in the gears of their regular production processes.

Stephen Redding: Absolutely, and I would actually sort of pick that into two strands. One strand is that when we think about tariffs, the statutory incidence, namely the person on which the tariffs fall by law, are the importers. So, the direct impact of the tariffs is falling on importers.

Neale Mahoney: So you're like an importer from China, you literally have to write the check to the US Treasury for the tariff amount.

Stephen Redding: Absolutely, but the key point there is that legal responsibility is not necessarily who ends up paying for the tax, the economic incidence of the tax. The tariff raises the price not just of imported goods, but also obviously of domestic substitutes for those goods. Because if the price of a foreign nail rises by 20%, a US firm that's producing exactly the same nail can also increase its prices. And so the tariff doesn't just fall on the importer, it also affects domestic prices. And so that affects consumers and producers here in the United States. And then the second point, which you really drew out very powerfully, is that the tariffs are not just a price on final products, but often a price on inputs that are used by US firms. For example, Harley-Davidson or Ford now has to pay more for steel inputs into their production process. And so that ends up raising the costs of a US firm. And so instead of actually benefiting the US producer, the US producer may actually lose from that because they face higher costs.

Neale Mahoney: So the second point you mentioned was that tariffs are a tax on a relatively small tax base, that only about 11% of our economy is imported goods which are tariffed. And so to raise a lot of revenue from a small base of goods, you need a really high tariff rate. And that really high tariff rate then becomes very distortionary relative to a law- a low, broadly applied tax.

Stephen Redding: Absolutely, the tariffs are a relatively small share of income and expenditure. So to raise the same amount of revenue as you would with a consumption tax, you need a much higher tariff rate. And that high tariff rate is very distortionary. And so that's typically one of the reasons why economists think tariffs are a relatively costly way of raising revenue. And so for example, that's why historically for most developed countries today, tariffs are a very small share of government revenue. If you could look very far back in the past, say in the early days of the American Republic, tariffs were actually a big share of government revenue. But that's partly because we didn't have the administrative capacity to levy other taxes such as income and consumption taxes.

Neale Mahoney: That's super interesting that historically, you know, countries that didn't have the capability to tax what was going on within their borders, you know, could still have you know, troops at the ports and could levy a tariff on imports. And now we're going back to this sort of historical tool which we don't really need anymore. The most famous example of a levy of a tax at a port I think happened in Boston, right? And there was a protest about it. And I guess as, you know, a Brit talking to an American, maybe you can remind me of this story.

Stephen Redding: Absolutely, there are great examples from history. The Boston Tea Party is exactly the case, where Americans were rising up against the taxation of imported goods coming into the port. There's also another parallel from the US past. So Thomas Jefferson actually, when he was the US president around the time of the 1812 war, to punish the British, he actually introduced an embargo on all trade. And so essentially, tried to take the United States back to a closed economy. And there's an economist, Douglas Irwin from Dartmouth College, who actually has a paper studying that episode in history. And he estimates that was roughly around a 5% of GDP cost to the United States at that time from that embargo.

Neale Mahoney: Lots of rationales have been put forward for this year's tariff regime. So let's go through them one by one. Tariffs raising revenue. Have they raised significant revenue? Enough, for example, for us to cut other taxes or to take material strides in terms of fixing our long-run budget trajectory?

Stephen Redding: They have raised substantial revenue, but yet it's still relatively small compared to the revenue raised by the federal income tax, and so it's still relatively minor.

Neale Mahoney: The second item you raised was protecting and revitalizing US manufacturing. Have we seen any evidence that they are starting to have those desired effects?

Stephen Redding: I've not seen very much evidence that they've led to large increases in manufacturing employment. In fact, there's a study on the tariffs of the first Trump administration by Aaron Flaaen and co-authors, which actually, if anything finds that they may have reduced manufacturing employment because of the fact that they not only raise prices in product markets, but they also raised prices of imported intermediate inputs.

Neale Mahoney: The third item was protecting the middle class.

Stephen Redding: Still early days, but so far there's not been a lot of evidence. I think there is a really big economic challenge there though that I think all politicians of all political parties are grappling with, which is that in the United States, we have seen regions such as former factory towns, former industrial areas in the United States, which have fallen on hard times. Some of that's due to trade, some of it's also due to technological changes such as artificial intelligence, computerization, automation. And I think looking ahead, there are a lot of really important policy questions there as to what is the right policy towards regions that have fallen on hard times, whether it's through trade or through technology.

Neale Mahoney: The last item was tariffs as a form of geopolitical leverage. Are we seeing tariffs having that effect?

Stephen Redding: So there, I think, there's a big debate in that in the period after the Second World War, the US was actually the leader in proposing what's called a rule-based international order. So that's setting up a set of rules and principles that guide how countries negotiate with one another over tariffs. And the big debate is to whether to continue with that model, which was created by the United States largely, or whether to move to a bargaining model where countries would actually get together individually, bilaterally, and bargain over tariffs. And the second Trump administration has very much proposed that bargaining approach, and it has in some cases been successful at reducing tariffs in foreign countries for US goods. Although of course, you know, tariffs in some trade partners such as the European Union were already pretty low. And so no matter how good we are at bargaining, it's actually pretty hard to reduce tariffs further because at least, you know, they were initially at quite a low level.

Neale Mahoney: The debate on valid rationales for tariffs aside, it's clear that what we're experiencing right now is extremely rare. This is a once in a century policy shock, a situation that trade economists can normally only theorize about. Over coffee, Steve shared what he's learned during this highly unusual moment.

Stephen Redding: One of the surprises that I've learned is that I would've expected the US tariffs to have much more of an impact in pushing down the prices of foreign exporters, in particular Chinese exporters, because the US is a large country relative to world markets. And so as its import demand falls, you'd expect exporter prices to fall. But in reality, all of the studies that have looked at the data find that most of the tariffs are actually being passed through to prices to either the US consumer or the US importer, wholesaler, distributor. And so there's been relatively little fall in prices of foreign exporter.

Neale Mahoney: Steve explained that in the first and the most recent round of tariffs, that this idea that foreigners would pay the tariffs is really not coming through in the data. I wanted to dig into this deeper. So there's been a news cycle about how tariffs have been less costly to Americans than economists originally expected. I guess I wanted to put the question to you, a trade economist, did we get it wrong in the aftermath of Liberation Day or did the policies change so much that we're correct in analyzing sort of the updated tariff regime?

Stephen Redding: I think broadly speaking, economists were correct and one way of seeing that is you actually see a large-scale reorientation of trade patterns following the tariffs. So there's been a major reorientation of US trade away from China towards other countries such as Vietnam and Cambodia. So it actually shows that the tariffs had big economic effects that actually volumes adjusted, import patterns adjusted. And of course, you know, there was a reason why we didn't initially import from Vietnam and Cambodia, namely that China was cheaper, and so that redirection of trade has an economic cost. We are moving to a higher-cost supplier. And so I think broadly speaking, economists were correct about that. But on the other hand, it's also been partly true that the policies have been walked back. So for example, one big area is that exemptions have been granted. Another big area is that, you know, some of the tariffs that were potentially levied between Canada and the US, if Canadian firms can prove that they're compliant with the US MCA agreement, then they're exempt from those tariffs. And we've seen a massive change there where initially, I think it's less than 15% of firms were compliant. Now it's over 85% of firms are compliant. But again, complying obviously puts a cost on the Canadian firms. There's a reason why they weren't compliant initially, namely it wasn't worth filling in the paperwork when the tariffs were low. Now the tariffs are very high, it's worth filling in the paperwork, but there's still a cost of filling in that paperwork. Another area which sort of comes up is obviously as the tariffs are imposed and we substitute away from suppliers affected by their tariffs, again, there's still an economic cost there.

Neale Mahoney: So to summarize, there were these massive tariffs announced in April. Those tariffs were rolled back. At the same time, the global economy is incredibly dynamic and trade patterns shifted, not costlessly, but in ways that reduced the tariff impact. And there were exemptions in the tariff regime that again, the dynamic global economy took advantage of and that reduced the impact of the tariffs.

Stephen Redding: Absolutely, that because the global economy is very dynamic, it can respond to those tariffs, reduce their impact, but it still means there is a real economic cost. And additionally, I think one point that I think is very important there is also the uncertainty. If you think about firms organizing their supply chains, it takes pretty big fixed investments to build a supply chain to decide where to source goods from. In a world where these tariffs are constantly changing, on the one hand that creates bargaining leverage and the US may be able to get a better deal by bargaining, but on the other hand, it creates uncertainty. And I think it's still the case that many US firms are still wondering exactly how to reorientate global value chains. We're in this world where we really don't know what trade policy is gonna be month to month precisely because of the exemptions and the changes in policy.

Neale Mahoney: Right, and so, you know, we've spoken about the rules-based international order. On the one hand, bargaining bilaterally can allow you to extract a better deal today. On the other hand, shifting to a world where there's ongoing bilateral bargaining is a world with immense uncertainty and that creates real costs for businesses that are deciding how to optimize their supply chains, whether or not to make investments.

Stephen Redding: Absolutely, and so one way of thinking about it might be by adopting bilateral bargaining, the US can get a bigger share of the pie because it's a big economy, it's a big player, but on the other hand, the danger is by engaging in that bargaining, you reduce the size of the pie for everybody because everybody can specialize less, get the benefits of trade less. And so it can end up actually that the US obtains less pie at the end of the day. It's got a bigger slice, but a bigger slice of a small pie.

Neale Mahoney: And everybody wants a bigger piece of pie.

Stephen Redding: Everybody loves pie.

Neale Mahoney: At the cafe, Steve and I got into one of the more significant effects of the current tariffs, the profound way they are reshaping relationships and economies around the world. Do you think in some sense the weaponizing of supply chains was you know, in hindsight like the inevitable sort of Achilles heel which would lead to, you know, the weaknesses of the rules-based international order? That there was so much pressure to have you know, the single sourcing, sort of efficient distribution networks, but then that gave people who could weaponize the choke points huge leverage.

Stephen Redding: You could argue, you know, that the success of globalization sowed the seeds of its own destruction or at least a pushback against globalization. And we now swing into an era where countries are, if anything, moving in the other direction. But of course, that raises the question how can we ensure that countries can get the benefits from trade without being vulnerable to being held up? And I think that's the really exciting question.

Neale Mahoney: Looking at the evolution of tariffs from the first Trump regime to the second Trump regime, how would you characterize the shift in the scale, the scope, the objectives of tariff policy?

Stephen Redding: One of the big changes you see is we moved to a world where tariffs are discriminatory. They vary across countries. So for example, the US administration sets one tariff for China, another tariff for Vietnam, a third tariff for the European Union. That's a really big break from the past. And under the rules-based order that the United States led the way in creating, countries mainly set the same tariff with all of their trade partners. When you let tariffs vary by country, that's precisely when they're very, very distortionary. And another reason why in the past we had the same tariff with all of our trade partners is it was part of this rule-based order where the United States agreed to lower its tariffs on its imports in return for foreign countries lowering tariffs on US exports. And so we gave other countries access to our market, but we at the same time got access to other countries' market. And so that principle helped us negotiate those tariffs and those were tariff negotiations that were actually reciprocal because the US was giving market access, allowing imports into the US market, but in return for gaining access into foreign countries' markets and increasing US exports.

Neale Mahoney: So what sorts of challenges are tariffs the right tool for?

Stephen Redding: So I think to make the case for tariffs, this would be the way to make the case. Trade creates benefits for the economy as a whole, but it creates both winners and losers. And the problem behind globalization in the period after the Second World War is that trade economists would typically say because there are winners and also losers, but the winners win by more than the losers lose, the winners should compensate the losers. And so the winners can compensate the losers and still be better off than before this increased trade. The problem is that didn't happen. And so if you wanted to create the case for tariffs, you have to argue we don't have other redistribution tools in order to compensate the people who've lost for trade. And so the tariff is sort of a second best way of trying to redistribute income towards those losers. But of course that raises a question, why aren't there other policies where we can compensate losers? And they could be losers from trade, they could be losers from technology. There are other ways to compensate those losers.

Neale Mahoney: Do you think that us as economists have spent too much time talking about the benefits of trade and not enough time focusing on the flip side of the coin, which is how do we put in place policies that protect the losers? And in doing so, and maybe we haven't been culpable, but maybe there is a teachable moment for us as a profession around helping steer policy in a positive direction.

Stephen Redding: I think something we've really learned as economists from the China shock and from recent decades is that in the past when we thought about the idea that trade creates winners and losers, we thought at the economy-wide level. So the losers might be, for example, a particular manufacturing industry, say textiles, which has been damaged by import competition. But the big thing we've learned recently is that those industries tend to be regionally concentrated. And so in the past, we never realized as much as we should have that the distribution that occurs through trade is often across regions. And so many regions in the United States, for example, furniture industry in West Virginia, were very heavily hit by the China shock, by international trade shocks. They're also very heavily hit by technology shocks because those industries are concentrated regionally. And so that's where I think we really need to focus the policy debate, is recognizing that regions are unevenly affected and what's the right policy to help those regions. And I think that's a really exciting research agenda. I'm really excited about being part of that dialogue.

Neale Mahoney: And that regional concentration in the harms matters. If 1% of people across America have their jobs disrupted over a decade, then they'll find jobs in the booming industries in their towns. But if 10% of regions have 10% of people have their jobs disrupted, so the same aggregate number of people, but it's highly concentrated, it's really hard for those areas to recover. And that's something we're learning in thinking about policies that address that problem seems like it should be high on our list of priorities as a profession.

Stephen Redding: That's a really great point. I'm really glad you made that, Neale. I think one of the things we lose sight of is that the US economy is incredibly dynamic. That each day, thousands of jobs are created, thousands of jobs are destroyed. The number of jobs destroyed through trade or technology, secular changes in technology, is actually pretty small relative to that constant churning of jobs. But the thing that's different about it, as you highlighted, is that the jobs destroyed by trade can be really concentrated in a region and it's very hard for that region to adapt. There's a lot of evidence that people don't move geographically. And so you can see entire communities lose their main source of income and begin to unravel. And that can have political ramifications. It obviously has very negative effects on society as a whole, not just economic, but culturally in terms of marriage rates, of displaced male workers, in terms of health outcomes and so on. And so I think that's an area where as economists we really need to engage with that debate, recognize the trade and technology shocks have these uneven effects geographically and think about what is the right way for policy to respond to that.

Neale Mahoney: It has, that insight has great implications for how we think about AI. Is AI going to be like the typical churn we see in labor markets, with thousands of people gaining and losing jobs a day, or is it gonna be concentrated in certain areas? And I don't know what AI has in store for us, but I think the lessons from trade will actually be hugely relevant as we face this new challenge.

Stephen Redding: Absolutely, that's a great question. I think that one of the things about AI that's really important, and it was also a feature of the China shock, is that it's very quick, unlike some technology shocks and trade shocks that play out very gradually over time. And when they occur gradually, it's much easier for society to adjust. The China shock happened relatively quickly. The AI shock is gonna happen even quicker. And so I think you can make a case that the labor market displacement from AI is potentially gonna be even bigger. What's interesting about the AI shock is it's potentially gonna affect different occupations. It's not obvious exactly who's gonna be hit by those.

Neale Mahoney: It could be us.

Stephen Redding: It could be traditionally high-skill workers at the high income, at the top of the income distribution. And so one of the things that I think is crucial for economists to study is how is AI gonna affect the income distribution? Is it gonna redistribute income towards the middle class or is it just gonna magnify and redistribute income away from the middle class? And again, there may be a role for policy to sort of think about how can we guide AI in a direction which enables everybody in society to benefit from this amazing, new technology.

Neale Mahoney: So, you know, suppose that, you know, you have your policy magic wand or you know, you're testifying to Congress and you're asked, you know, recognizing, you know, the geopolitical tensions we face, the de-industrialization issues we've had, what, you know, is Steve Redding's portfolio of policies that we should implement?

Stephen Redding: That's a tough question to answer, Neale, and I'm sure every economist would have a different set of policy proposals, but I think there are a couple of really key principles to keep in mind there. So one is the principle that we know that markets are very good at reallocating resources. And so the traditional perspective of an economist would be let's allow markets to work, that they're gonna enable resources to reallocate in a way that's efficient. And so that's always important to keep in mind. And so when we think about government policy, we should sort of think about, well, what are the areas where markets are failing, where markets are not gonna help us reallocate and respond to this shock? And I think there, you could point towards a couple of things. One is that there's a lot of evidence of what economists call agglomeration economies. That when a region is very heavily hit by trade, it not only affects the directed, affected industry, but also other industries, other people in that region. And so that's a potential market failure. And so there, you could make a case for place-based policy, potentially. So that could be one affected policy response. Another area where there could be a market failure is if you think about workers deciding what occupation, what to learn in college and in school, you make those decisions early in your life. You don't know what the economy's going to look like and it's very hard to insure against future shocks such as the China shock or such as artificial intelligence. And so there could be a role for a government, enabling constant reeducation and to help promote the reallocation of workers from negatively-affected industries towards other industries where there are positive opportunities.

Neale Mahoney: So when you talk to people, what is the debate right now?

Stephen Redding: The really big debate here is is international trade good or bad? Or should we have tariffs that limit international trade? And the really important point here is that it's possible for all countries around the world to benefit from trading with one another. That trade is not necessarily win-lose, but it's potentially win-win. Of course, that doesn't mean that countries always gain from trade. There can be circumstances where trade can have negative distribution effects. It creates winners and losers within countries. There can be other settings where you may want to have policies that depart from completely free trade. But that's the really big debate, is trade win-win, win-lose, and what is the right policy to adopt towards that?

Neale Mahoney: Steve, I'm delighted that you've joined us at Stanford and thank you so much for an engaging conversation.

Stephen Redding: Thank you so much for inviting me to talk today. I'm so excited about being here at Stanford and I think this just illustrates there's so many of these really important research questions that we need to make progress on and deepen our understanding of. And I'm really excited about interacting here with everyone at Stanford and thinking and researching about this set of issues.

Neale Mahoney: Proponents frame tariffs as a straightforward way to protect domestic industries and strengthen national security. But as Steve explains, tariffs rarely work in such a simple way. Tariffs can reshuffle supply chains, raise costs for businesses and consumers. And once they're in place, they can be difficult to unwind. But understanding those consequences is essential for policy makers as they navigate a rapidly changing global economy. I wanna thank Steve Redding for joining me in this conversation and I wanna thank all of you for listening. I'm Neale Mahoney, and "Econ to Go" is where we bring Stanford economics into your everyday life. If you enjoyed this episode, subscribe or follow wherever you get your podcasts. We've got more smart, curious conversations coming your way from the Stanford University campus.