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Industry honors

Our Econ To Go podcast is a Gold winner at the 2026 Signal Awards in the education category and has won gold and silver w3 Awards, too! Catch up on season 1 here and stay tuned for season 2 coming soon in November.

Publication

Public Procurement vs. Regulated Competition in Selection Markets

A common approach to markets with adverse selection is to regulate competition to minimize inefficiencies, while preserving consumer choice among firms. We study the role of procurement auctions—leading to sole provision by the winning firm—as an alternative market design. Relative to regulated competition, auctions affect product variety, quality, markups, and remove cream-skimming incentives. We develop a framework to study this comparison and apply it to individual health insurance in the US. We find that procurement auctions would increase consumer welfare in most markets, mainly by limiting inefficiencies from adverse selection and market power, and by increasing quality.

Author(s)
José Ignacio Cuesta
Pietro Tebaldi
Publication Date
August, 2025