TRADING IN FRAGMENTED MARKETS

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Abstract

We study fragmentation of equity trading using a model of imperfect competition among exchanges. In the model, increased competition drives down trading fees. However, additional arbitrage opportunities arise in fragmented markets, intensifying adverse selection. Due to these opposing forces, the effects of fragmentation are context-dependent. To empirically investigate the ambiguity in a single context, we estimate key parameters of the model with order-level data for an Australian security. At the estimates, the benefits of increased competition are outweighed by the costs of multi-venue arbitrage. Compared to the prevailing duopoly, we predict the counterfactual monopoly spread to be 23% lower.

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I Introduction

Equity markets have become increasingly fragmented over the past ten to fifteen years. During that period, a surge of new exchanges and alternative trading systems entered and attracted volume that had previously been concentrated on primary venues. Illustrative is the decline in the NYSE’s share of the volume of NYSE-listed stocks, from 82% in June 2004 to 27% in June 2018 (Angel, Harris and Spatt, 2015; CBOE, 2018).

This proliferation of trading venues and the accompanying dispersion of trades were actively encouraged by the SEC through Reg NMS to promote “vigorous competition among markets” (SEC, 2005). The intuition that investors benefit from competition should resonate with any economist. But there is also a drawback to spreading out trade across markets: fragmentation may create opportunities for fast traders to extract rents by arbitraging across venues. We capture this tradeoff in a tractable and estimable multi-exchange model of limit order book trading. We show that depending on factors such as the arrival rate of information, the strength of the private transaction motives of investors, their arrival rate to the market, and the strength of market frictions, the introduction of new exchanges can either increase or decrease the transaction costs faced by investors.

We then employ the Australian market for an empirical application of the model. Using order-level data to estimate the parameters of our model, we find that investors are worse off in the prevailing duopoly than they would be under a monopoly exchange. We find support for this conclusion from a natural experiment in which a technical issue forced one of the two Australian exchanges to shut down for a day.

Section III develops the model. A security’s shares are traded in limit order books on multiple exchanges. Its fundamental value is public information and evolves stochastically. Exchanges operate trading platforms and earn profits from trading fees. High-frequency traders (HFTs) may trade for profit through arbitrage or liquidity provision. Investors arrive stochastically with private trading motives and are differentiated along two dimensions. First, they differ in the strength of their private motive to transact. Second, they differ in their propensity to substitute among venues for a given price difference. In particular, we do not require every investor to trade at the exchange that offers the best price, which may be thought of as a reduced form representation of some market friction.¹ Such frictions

¹Our motivation for considering a model with this feature is that not every trade takes place at the best price in our data. Indeed, 8.9% of trades that occur when exchanges offer different prices take place at the exchange with the worse price (cf. section V.D). Moreover, the estimated model implies a cross-price elasticity (percentage change in investor demand at one exchange given a 1% increase in the other exchange’s
might stem from several sources, including the difficulty of monitoring prices in real time and agency problems between an investor and the broker who routes his orders.

In section IV, we analyze the model’s equilibrium to explore the effect of fragmentation on transaction costs as measured by the cum-fee spread: the quoted bid-ask spread plus twice the take fee (the take fee is levied by the exchange on the party that initiates the trade). In practice, this quantity is a significant component of the transaction costs of equity trading, and in the model it is a sufficient statistic for welfare. Henceforth, we use “spread” as shorthand for the cum-fee spread unless otherwise specified.

Two forces give rise to a spread in this model: (i) the market power of exchanges, and (ii) adverse selection stemming from a race to react to information. Regarding the second force, although information is publicly observable, adverse selection arises if a liquidity provider is unable to cancel mispriced quotes before they are exploited by arbitrageurs. A change in the number of venues affects the magnitude of each of these two forces, and consequently affects the equilibrium spread through two opposing channels. First, an increase in the number of exchanges reduces the spread through the “competition channel.” Intuitively, exchanges have less market power when there are more of them. Consequently, each charges a lower trading fee, which results in a lower spread, *ceteris paribus*. Second, an increase in the number of exchanges raises the spread through the “exposure channel.” Intuitively, investor order flow is more fragmented with more exchanges, forcing liquidity providers to deepen the aggregate book in response, which exposes them to more adverse selection and results in a larger spread, *ceteris paribus*. Theory is silent on the net effect of fragmentation, since either the competition channel or the exposure channel can dominate.

This theoretical ambiguity is consistent with the diversity of findings that have been reached by an old and extensive empirical literature, of which some papers report a positive association between fragmentation and liquidity while others report the reverse. Most of those studies leverage variation in market structure to determine the effects of fragmentation in a given setting, but a different approach is needed to ascertain the effects of fragmentation settings where identifying variation is unavailable, and to that end, our approach may be a viable alternative. To illustrate, we use an Australian security for an empirical application.

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spread) of only 0.8 (cf. section VI.B). Both figures suggest the presence of significant market frictions.

2Fragmentation also increases aggregate depth in the models of Dennert (1993) and van Kervel (2015), due to similar forces. Moreover, that aggregate depth grows with the number of trading venues is a stylized fact that has been empirically detected both in general (Boehmer and Boehmer, 2003; Fink, Fink and Weston, 2006; Foucault and Menkveld, 2008) and in the specific context of Australia (He, Jarnecic and Liu, 2015; Aitken, Chen and Foley, 2017).
In section V, we discuss the Australian market and our data. This setting is a natural fit for the model because it is particularly simple, featuring just two exchanges: ASX and Chi-X. For the analysis, we use order-level data on STW, an ETF tracking the S&P/ASX 200 index. The sample covers trading on both exchanges over 80 trading days in 2014.

In section VI, we turn to estimation. The parameters are identified via the response of order flow to variation in prices at ASX and Chi-X, together with the average level of the spread. We then use the estimated model to conduct counterfactual analysis, by comparing the current duopoly outcome to what would prevail under a monopoly. We find that the counterfactual monopoly spread would be 23% lower than the duopoly spread of 2.88¢. Thus, the exposure channel dominates the competition channel in the case of STW. Although these findings pertain to only one security in Australia, they do emphasize that unbridled competition among trading platforms can be harmful to investors.

Finally, in section VII, we conduct a separate, out-of-sample analysis of a natural experiment in which Chi-X experienced a technical issue and halted its trading for the remainder of the day, leaving ASX as the only exchange in operation. The STW spread on ASX is significantly lower on the day of the Chi-X shutdown than on the surrounding days, as well as relative to an unaffected control group. This effect is consistent with the exposure channel postulated by the model, and its magnitude is in line with the estimates. Thus, this event provides additional support for the model’s prediction that STW spreads would be lower under a monopoly than the prevailing duopoly. Moreover, the model’s success in forecasting the result of this natural experiment leads us to speculate that it may be a useful methodological tool for predicting the effects of fragmentation more broadly. Such a tool might be particularly useful to regulators, who often need to decide rule changes that will shape fragmentation. In addition to regulating the entry of new venues, a related issue currently in debate is whether issuers of thinly-traded stocks should be able to suspend Unlisted Trading Privileges for their securities, thereby reducing the number of exchanges at which they are traded (U.S. Treasury, 2017; SEC, 2019).

II Related Literature

Theory. An early model of competition among electronically-linked limit order book markets is that of Glosten (1994). He demonstrates that in an idealized, frictionless setting, the
liquidity of the aggregate market is invariant to the degree of fragmentation.\textsuperscript{3} Our model, in contrast, allows for frictions that may prevent investors from trading at the best available price, so that Glosten’s invariance result does not apply. Rather, liquidity depends on the degree of fragmentation in two ways: \textit{(i)} the competition channel, via which fragmentation intensifies competition on trading fees, thereby improving liquidity; and \textit{(ii)} the exposure channel, via which fragmentation increases the number of arbitrage opportunities, thereby amplifying adverse selection and harming liquidity. In consequence, our paper connects to two branches of the literature on the relationship between liquidity and fragmentation.

First, our paper relates to models in which fragmentation may improve liquidity by enhancing competition. Earlier models focus on competition among market makers (Mendelson, 1987; Dennert, 1993; Bernhardt and Hughson, 1997; Biais, Martimort and Rochet, 2000). However, as modern markets permit virtually free entry into market making, more recent work focuses on competition among venues themselves (Colliard and Foucault, 2012; Chao, Yao and Ye, 2019; Pagnotta and Philippon, 2018). Similar to our competition channel, they find that fragmentation may induce exchanges to lower their fees. Second, our paper relates to models in which fragmentation may harm liquidity by altering the opportunities available to informed traders (Chowdhry and Nanda, 1991; Dennert, 1993). Similar to our exposure channel, they find that adverse selection intensifies when more markets operate in parallel.

Our primary theoretical contribution lies in developing a framework that combines these two forces into a single tractable and estimable model.

Also connected are other papers that, although they do not deal with fragmentation, model trading in the presence of adverse selection from privately informed traders (e.g. Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985), as well as work illustrating that similar forces arise in limit order books even when information is public (e.g. Foucault, 1999; Budish, Cramton and Shim, 2015; Aït-Sahalia and Sağlam, 2017a,b). We build primarily upon the model of Budish et al. (2015), which we extend in several ways. For instance, exchanges in our model strategically set trading fees in competition for investors, and these fees constitute a source of transaction costs in addition to adverse selection.

**Empirics.\textsuperscript{4}** The effects of fragmentation in financial markets have been studied using a diverse set of empirical strategies, including cross-section and panel regression, matched sample analysis, as well as studies of entry events, consolidation events, cross-listing events,

\textsuperscript{3}Budish, Lee and Shim (2019) prove a similar result in a setting where exchanges strategically set trading fees and charge for speed technology (i.e., co-location and data access).

\textsuperscript{4}See appendix B.A for a more detailed description of the empirical papers cited here.
and rule changes. Taken together, the findings of this literature are extremely heterogenous:

- Many of these studies find positive associations between fragmentation and liquidity (Branch and Freed, 1977; Hamilton, 1979; Neal, 1987; Cohen and Conroy, 1990; Battalio, 1997; Mayhew, 2002; Weston, 2002; Boehmer and Boehmer, 2003; De Fontnouvelle, Fishe and Harris, 2003; Fink et al., 2006; Nguyen, Van Ness and Van Ness, 2007; Foucault and Menkveld, 2008; Chlistalla and Lutat, 2011; O’Hara and Ye, 2011; Menkveld, 2013). Particularly relevant to our paper are He et al. (2015) and Aitken et al. (2017), who also study the Australian market, finding liquidity to improve on average in conjunction with the 2011 entry of Chi-X.

- Others find negative associations between fragmentation and liquidity (Bessembinder and Kaufman, 1997; Arnold, Hersch, Mulherin and Netter, 1999; Amihud, Lauterbach and Mendelson, 2003; Hendershott and Jones, 2005; Bennett and Wei, 2006; Gajewski and Gresse, 2007; Nielsson, 2009; Bernales, Riarte, Sagade, Valenzuela and Westheide, 2017).

- Some others find an inverted-U relationship, in which liquidity is maximized under moderate degrees of fragmentation (Boneva, Linton and Vogt, 2016; Degryse, de Jong and van Kervel, 2015). Similarly, Haslag and Ringgenberg (2017) also find a nuanced association: fragmentation benefits liquidity for large stocks but harms it for small stocks.

The diversity of these findings indicates that the effects of fragmentation are highly context-dependent. We contribute by proposing a model to explain the role of context. Moreover, the model may also serve as a tool for predicting the effect of fragmentation in a given context.

## III Model

A single security is traded at one or more exchanges by two categories of traders: investors and HFTs. The timing is as follows. First, exchanges set make and take fees. Second, trading occurs over an interval of continuous time $[0, T]$.

**Security.** The fundamental value of the security at time $t$, $v_t$, is public information, and it evolves as a compound Poisson jump process with arrival rate $\lambda_j \in \mathbb{R}_+$. Positive and negative jumps of size $\sigma \in \mathbb{R}_+$ occur with equal probability.

**Exchanges.** $X$ exchanges each operate a separate limit order book with continuous prices and divisible shares. Order types include limit, cancellation, immediate-or-cancel, and market orders. Orders are processed sequentially in the usual way. If multiple orders arrive simultaneously, then ties among traders are broken uniformly at random (e.g., by random
Exchanges are horizontally differentiated, which we model by assuming that they are metaphorically located at equally spaced points around a circle of unit length, as in Salop (1979). The location of exchange $x$ is denoted $l_x$. Exchange $x$ sets make and take fees $\tau_{x,\text{make}} \in \mathbb{R}$ and $\tau_{x,\text{take}} \in \mathbb{R}$, which are collected, respectively, from the passive and aggressive parties of each trade that occurs on the exchange. Negative fees correspond to rebates. Trading fees are chosen once and for all before trading commences at time zero.

**Investors.** Investors arrive at a Poisson rate $\lambda_i \in \mathbb{R}_+$ with a two-dimensional type $(\tilde{l}, \tilde{\theta})$. The first component, $\tilde{l}$, is an independent draw from $U[0,1]$ and denotes a position on the aforementioned circle. The second component, $\tilde{\theta}$, is an independent draw from $U[-\theta, \theta]$ and denotes a private value for trading one share of the security.

Let $b_{x,t}$ and $a_{x,t}$ denote, respectively, the cum-fee bid and ask at exchange $x$ at time $t$. Investors are restricted to market orders. By submitting a market order for $y \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$ shares to exchange $x \in \{1, \ldots, X\}$, an investor who arrives at time $t$ obtains utility

$$u_t(y, x|\tilde{\theta}) = \mathbb{1}(y = 1)(v_t + \tilde{\theta} - a_{x,t}) + \mathbb{1}(y = -1)(b_{x,t} - v_t - \tilde{\theta})$$

Yet, investors do not necessarily act to maximize utility—although the model permits that case. Instead, the aforementioned investor chooses $y$ and $x$ to maximize

$$\hat{u}_t(y, x|\tilde{l}, \tilde{\theta}) = u_t(y, x|\tilde{\theta}) - 2\alpha \cdot d(\tilde{l}, l_x)^2,$$

where $d(l, l') = \min(|l - l'|, 1 - |l - l'|)$ yields the distance between two points on the circle. That investors do not always act to maximize their utility could be thought of as the result of an unmodeled market friction. Investors are heterogeneously affected by this friction, owing to their different locations on the circle. The parameter $\alpha$ governs the extent of this friction. One possibility is $\alpha = 0$, in which case frictions vanish and investors are utility maximizers. In the other extreme, as $\alpha$ grows large, investors become increasingly likely to choose the exchange closest to them on the circle, without regard for the terms of trade.

Such market frictions might stem from several sources: difficulties associated with moni-

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5 An exchange’s location should be interpreted metaphorically, as representing its non-price characteristics (e.g., available order types, latency, ownership). Note that we model neither the entry game of exchanges nor their location game but rather solve for equilibrium under a fixed number of equally-spaced exchanges.

6 For the baseline analysis, we assume that investors do not split their orders, with each investor trading at a single exchange and a single point in time. Nevertheless, appendix F.D demonstrates that the model’s equilibrium remains intact even if investors can split their orders across exchanges (albeit not across time).
toring prices in real time, the agency problem between an investor and the broker who routes orders, etc. Of course, the strength of such frictions could be modulated by regulation (e.g., trade-through protection, as in the U.S.) and enforcement thereof.

As noted, investor/broker conflicts of interest constitute a potential source of frictions. For example, a broker might be tempted to route an order to an exchange with an inferior price if it would pay him a rebate.\(^7\) This explanation is less applicable to this paper’s eventual empirical application in Australia, where there are no such rebates. More germane to that setting are the following possibilities: (i) checking prices at all exchanges might require a broker to make technological investments or costly effort; (ii) a broker might have an ownership stake in a certain exchange, which could introduce a financial incentive to route orders there;\(^8\) or (iii) a broker might have a non-pecuniary preference for a certain exchange, perhaps due to its speed and infrastructure, order types offered, or relationship capital. These latter explanations appear especially plausible in the context of Australia, which, unlike the U.S., does not have an order protection rule (cf. appendix B.B).

**High-frequency traders.** There is an infinite number of HFTs. Each trades to maximize her own profits.

**Assumptions.** The parameters of the model satisfy the following conditions:

\(A1. \lambda_j \leq \lambda_i / X\)

\(A2. \sigma > \theta.\)

\(A3. \lambda_i \left(1 - \frac{1}{\theta} \frac{\sum \lambda_j}{2}\right) \geq \lambda_j X \left(\sigma - \frac{\sum \lambda_j}{2}\right),\) where \(\sum\) is defined in terms of the parameters as follows:\(^9\)

\[
\Sigma \equiv \begin{cases} 
\theta \left(1 + \frac{\lambda_j}{\lambda_i}\right) & \text{if } X = 1 \\
\theta + \frac{4\alpha}{X^2} - \sqrt{\theta^2 + \frac{16\alpha^2}{X^4} - \frac{8\alpha \theta \lambda_j}{X \lambda_i}} & \text{if } X \geq 2
\end{cases}
\]

A1 requires the per-exchange arrival rate of investors to exceed the arrival rate of jumps in the value of the security. Thus, it ensures that episodes of adverse selection are sufficiently infrequent. A2 requires the magnitude of information about the security to exceed the

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\(^7\)Related, rebates influence how brokers route retail non-marketable limit orders (Battalio, Corwin and Jennings, 2016) and institutional orders (Battalio, Hatch and Sağlam, 2018), sometimes at the cost of execution quality.

\(^8\)Consistent with the operation of such frictions, Anand, Samadi, Sokobin and Venkataraman (2019) show that brokers obtain a lower execution quality when routing client orders to alternative trading systems that they own.

\(^9\)As lemma 1(i) establishes, A1 implies \(\Sigma \in \mathbb{R}\), so that this is a well-defined inequality.
magnitude of investors’ private trading motives. Thus, it implies that any increase in the
spread will crowd out more liquidity-based trades from investors than information-based
trades from HFTs.\textsuperscript{10} A3 requires that if $\Sigma$ is the cum-fee spread prevailing at all exchanges,
then the resulting payments by investors exceed the arbitrage profits of HFTs. To understand
why it is needed, an analogy is to oligopolistic price competition with fixed costs, where a
symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists only if (i) fixed costs are not too large, (ii) price
competition is not too intense, and (iii) the market is not too small. In the current setting,
adverse selection plays the role of fixed costs. The parameters $\sigma$, $\lambda_j$, and $X$ determine the
magnitude of adverse selection, and A3 prevents them from being too large; $\alpha$ determines the
intensity of competition among exchanges, which cannot be too small; $\lambda_i$ and $\theta$ determine
the available gains from trade, which also cannot be too small.

IV Equilibrium

This section describes the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the model, then
discusses how the equilibrium depends on the parameters. Throughout, the focus is on the
cum-fee spread: the spread plus twice the take fee. This is the appropriate quantity because
it measures the transaction costs borne by investors. As such, it is a sufficient statistic for
the welfare implications of the model—an increase affects welfare in two ways: (i) gains from
trade decline since some marginal investors may cease to trade, and (ii) there are transfers
away from the inframarginal investors who continue to trade.

IV.A Equilibrium Description

We solve the model by backward induction: first characterizing equilibrium trader be-
behavior for given fees, then taking those outcomes as given to identify equilibrium fee choices.
An intuitive description of equilibrium strategies is below, and we defer to the proofs of
propositions 1 and 2 in appendix A for a complete treatment.

We first discuss the case of a monopoly exchange, extending to the oligopoly case later
in the section. In equilibrium, HFTs sort into two roles as in Budish et al. (2015). One
plays the role of “liquidity provider,” establishing quotes of one share at both the bid and
the ask and maintaining them so that the mid price tracks the value of the security. The
remainder play the role of “sniper,” attempting to trade whenever information arrivals create

\textsuperscript{10}Similar assumptions also appear in Glosten (1994) (Assumption 2) and Biais et al. (2000) (that $v'(\theta) \geq 0$).
mispricings in the quotes of the liquidity provider. They also ensure the spread is such that the liquidity provider earns zero profits, as in Bertrand competition.

After each jump, HFTs race to react: the liquidity provider to cancel her mispriced quotes and the snipers to exploit them. Each race results in a tie, which is broken uniformly at random. Because an infinite number of HFTs assume the sniper role in equilibrium, the liquidity provider loses each race. Thus, sniping is one cost in the liquidity provider’s zero-profit condition. A second cost is the make fee of the exchange. Revenue derives from investors: each transacts if his private value $\tilde{\theta}$ exceeds half the spread, and the liquidity provider earns that half spread from every such trade.

This zero-profit condition determines the spread. Inducting backwards, the monopolist exchange sets make and take fees to maximize expected revenue. The key tradeoff is that while higher fees generate more revenue per trade, they also induce larger spreads, which crowd out some investor trades and reduce volume. Proposition 1 characterizes the (cum-fee) spread induced by the optimal fee choice.

**Proposition 1.** With a single exchange ($X = 1$), there exists a SPNE with spread

$$s^* = \theta \left(1 + \frac{\lambda_j}{\lambda_i}\right).$$

Equation (3) illustrates the two sources of the spread in this model: adverse selection and exchange market power. First, liquidity providers use the spread to offset the costs of adverse selection, which arises when they lose the race to react to public information. Thus, the spread depends on the relative arrival rates of information and investors, $\lambda_j/\lambda_i$, which governs the degree of adverse selection. Second, the exchange takes into account that fewer investors will trade at a wider spread. Thus, the spread also depends on $\theta$, which governs the price elasticity of demand. Indeed, absent adverse selection, it satisfies the classic Lerner condition, which equates the markup to the inverse of the demand elasticity.

The oligopoly case is similar to the monopoly case, with the main difference being that investors choose not only whether to trade but also where. As before, HFTs sort into two roles. One per exchange plays the role of liquidity provider, maintaining quotes of one share at the bid and one share at the ask, while the remainder play the role of sniper.

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11In the model, the liquidity provider races against an infinite number of other HFTs, and therefore loses the race with probability one. If there were instead $N$ HFTs, she would lose with probability $\frac{N-1}{N}$, so that her zero-profit condition would be approximately the same provided $N$ is large. And indeed, HFTs are quite numerous in practice. The Australian market is representative: 550 HFTs were active in 2012 (ASIC, 2013).
While a monopolist exchange is constrained only by the own-price elasticity of investors (higher fees might lead investors not to trade), an oligopolist exchange must also consider cross-price elasticities (higher fees might lead investors to trade instead at other exchanges). Taking these tradeoffs into account, exchanges set their trading fees in a simultaneous move game. We focus our analysis on the symmetric equilibrium of this game, and proposition 2 characterizes the resulting equilibrium (cum-fee) spread.

**Proposition 2.** With multiple exchanges \((X \geq 2)\), there exists a SPNE with spread

\[
s^* = \theta + \frac{4\alpha}{X^2} - \sqrt{\theta^2 + \frac{16\alpha^2}{X^4} - \frac{8\alpha\theta\lambda_j}{X\lambda_i}}. 
\]

As in the monopoly case, the oligopoly spread is influenced by \(\theta\) and \(\lambda_j/\lambda_i\). Yet in addition there is now also a role for \(X\), the number of exchanges, as well as \(\alpha\), which governs the strength of market frictions affecting the exchange choices of investors. One reason for the presence of these two parameters is that they interact with the prevailing spreads to determine the number of investors who choose to trade at a given exchange: (i) if \(X\) increases, then each exchange obtains a smaller share of investor trades at equal spreads, and (ii) if \(\alpha\) increases, then each exchange’s share of investor trades becomes less responsive to its spread. As a result, these parameters affect the tradeoffs exchanges face when they set trading fees, and in turn, the equilibrium spread as well.

The remainder of this section describes the derivation of the monopoly and oligopoly spreads via backward induction from the zero-profit condition of the liquidity provider. The discussion focuses on the the ask side of the book, but the bid-side version is analogous. At any instant, one of two things may affect the ask-side profits of a liquidity provider: an investor may arrive with a motive to buy, or the value of the security may jump upward. We begin with investor arrivals. Investors with a motive to buy arrive at the rate \(\lambda_i/2\). In the case of an oligopoly, when the cum-fee ask is \(a_x\) on an exchange \(x\) and \(a_{-x}\) on the others, \(x\) is the preferred exchange of such an investor with probability \(\left[\frac{X}{2\alpha} (a_{-x} - a_x) + \frac{1}{X}\right]_0^1\); in the case of a monopoly, it is always the preferred exchange. Conditional on the investor preferring exchange \(x\), he trades with probability \(\left[1 - \frac{a_x - v}{\theta}\right]_0^1\). Thus, investors buy at exchange \(x\) at

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\[12\text{We use the notation } [\cdot]_0^1 \text{ to denote truncation to the unit interval: } [x]_0^1 \equiv \max(0, \min(1, x)).\]
the rate $\frac{\lambda_i}{2} \left[ 1 - \frac{a_x - v}{\theta} \right]_0^1$ in the case of a monopoly and

$$\frac{\lambda_i}{2} \left[ \frac{X}{2\alpha} (a_{-x} - a_x) + \frac{1}{X} \right]_0^1 \left[ 1 - \frac{a_x - v}{\theta} \right]_0^1$$

in the case of an oligopoly. From each of these trades, the liquidity provider earns $a_x - v$, and must pay the make fee $\tau_{x, \text{make}}$ to the exchange. Next, we consider jumps in the value of the security. Upward jumps arrive at the rate $\lambda_j/2$. Conditional on such a jump occurring, the liquidity provider at exchange $x$ will lose $\sigma + v - a_x$ to a sniper and must also pay the make fee $\tau_{x, \text{make}}$ to the exchange. Combining all this, the zero-profit conditions that determine the liquidity provider’s ask are, respectively for the monopoly and oligopoly cases,

$$\frac{\lambda_i}{2} \left[ 1 - \frac{a_x - v}{\theta} \right]_0^1 (a_x - v - \tau_{x, \text{make}}) = \frac{\lambda_j}{2} (\sigma + v - a_x + \tau_{x, \text{make}})$$

$$\frac{\lambda_i}{2} \left[ \frac{X}{2\alpha} (a_{-x} - a_x) + \frac{1}{X} \right]_0^1 \left[ 1 - \frac{a_x - v}{\theta} \right]_0^1 (a_x - v - \tau_{x, \text{make}}) = \frac{\lambda_j}{2} (\sigma + v - a_x + \tau_{x, \text{make}})$$

Conditional on exchange $x$ setting the fees $\tau_{x, \text{make}}$ and $\tau_{x, \text{take}}$, the liquidity provider on exchange $x$ quotes to satisfy the appropriate zero-profit condition. That is, if $a_x$ is the zero-profit cum-fee ask, then she sets the quoted ask $\hat{a}_x = a_x - \tau_{x, \text{take}}$.

Taking the above behavior of liquidity providers as given, each exchange $x$ sets fees to maximize its profits, which are the product of $\tau_{x, \text{make}} + \tau_{x, \text{take}}$ with the volume it processes. The resulting equilibrium spread is as described in proposition 1 for the case of a monopoly. For oligopolies, we focus on symmetric equilibria, in which the same total fee is set by each exchange. In such equilibria, cum-fee quotes are identical across exchanges, and trades at prices inferior to those available elsewhere never occur on path. Nevertheless, such trades might occur off path—if exchanges were to set different total fees, then the resulting spreads would differ as well. The parameter $\alpha$ determines the rate at which such trades would take place in those off-path events, and through that, it plays an important role in determining the equilibrium fee and, in turn, the equilibrium spread, which is characterized by proposition 2.

### IV.B The Effect of Fragmentation

In the model, it is theoretically ambiguous how the spread (and hence welfare) depends upon the number of exchanges. The ambiguity is caused by two opposing channels.
Fragmentation may reduce the spread through the competition channel. Intuitively, exchanges have less market power when they have more competitors and must therefore reduce their trading fees to retain investors. All else equal, lower fees induce a lower spread.

But fragmentation may raise the spread through the exposure channel. First observe that frictions fragment the order flow of investors: for a given profile of quotes, some investors might trade at one exchange while others would opt for another. Liquidity providers cannot then predict where the next investor will seek to trade, and to cater to him, they must therefore quote at every exchange, so that aggregating across venues, they quote more depth than he will actually demand. Quoting less than one share at any given exchange would mean foregoing some profitable trades with investors. Next, consider an increase in the number of exchanges. Investor order flow becomes even more fragmented, and aggregate depth increases further. In the model, depth in fact grows linearly. Therefore, whenever the security value moves away from current prices, more shares are exposed to the resulting mispricing, amplifying adverse selection. All else equal, the spread rises as liquidity providers quote wider to compensate.

We illustrate with two cases of the model. First consider the limit as $\alpha$ diverges to infinity, which is to say that investors do not condition their choice of exchange on prices. For both the monopoly and oligopoly cases, the spread is $s^* = \theta (1 + X \lambda_j / \lambda_i)$, which is increasing in $X$. The reason is that if investors do not respond to prices, then multiple exchanges are a collection of isolated monopolists. Yet additional exchanges provide snipers with more opportunities to trade on a given piece of information, which increases adverse selection. Intuitively, the competition channel is shut down, so that the exposure channel dominates.

Second, consider the case in which $\lambda_j = 0$, which is to say that the fundamental security value is constant. In that case, the monopoly spread is $\theta$, which exceeds the duopoly spread of $\theta + \alpha - \sqrt{\theta^2 + \alpha^2}$, and the spread decreases still further as $X$ increases beyond two. The reason is that adverse selection does not increase with the number of exchanges, as no adverse selection exists when information never arrives. Yet additional exchanges intensify price competition, resulting in smaller trading fees and hence smaller spreads. Intuitively, the exposure channel is shut down, so that the competition channel dominates.\(^{13}\)

Our empirical application primarily focuses on the comparison between monopoly and

\(^{13}\)Note that equation (4) in proposition 2 suggests the spread converges to zero as $X$ diverges. But this should not be interpreted to mean that the competition channel always dominates in the limit. The reason is that A3 may be violated at large values of $X$, and we would not expect the symmetric equilibrium characterized by the proposition to prevail in such cases. Rather, we might expect an asymmetric outcome in which a subset of the exchanges exit until A3 can be satisfied.
duopoly for which we obtain the following corollary of propositions 1 and 2.

**Corollary 3.** \( s^*_\text{monopoly} \leq s^*_\text{duopoly} \) if and only if 
\[
\theta \left( \frac{\lambda_j^2}{\lambda_i^2} - 1 \right) + 2\alpha \frac{\lambda_j}{\lambda_i} \geq 0.
\]

An implication is that a given shock to fragmentation might produce differing effects in the cross-section, raising spreads for some securities and reducing them for others.\(^{14}\) Security-specific policies on fragmentation might therefore be preferable to a one-size-fits-all approach.

**IV.C Comparative Statics**

The spread varies monotonically in three of the remaining parameters: \( \alpha, \lambda_i, \) and \( \lambda_j.\)\(^{15}\)

The following result is standard and intuitive.

**Proposition 4.** The equilibrium spread is (i) weakly increasing in \( \alpha, \) (ii) weakly decreasing in \( \lambda_i, \) and (iii) weakly increasing in \( \lambda_j. \)

The parameter \( \alpha \) determines the strength of market frictions that distort the exchange choice of investors. If these frictions become stronger (an increase in \( \alpha \)), then fee competition is muted and the spread increases as a result. The arrival rates of investors and of information, \( \lambda_i \) and \( \lambda_j, \) affect transaction costs by modulating adverse selection. If investors arrive more frequently (an increase in \( \lambda_i \)), then the liquidity provider faces less adverse selection, since she trades with relatively more investors and fewer snipers. She therefore sets a smaller spread. The reverse is true if information arrives more frequently (an increase in \( \lambda_j \)).

**V Empirical Application**

We employ the Australian market for an empirical application of the model. This section lays the groundwork for that exercise by discussing industry background, describing the datasets, and defining the variables constructed from the data for use in estimation.

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\(^{14}\)The corollary also has more nuanced implications. For example, since the condition exhibits single-crossing in \( \lambda_i, \) the corollary indicates that, *ceteris paribus*, fragmentation is more likely to be beneficial when \( \lambda_i \) is higher. Thus, if large-cap stocks attract more investors than their small-cap counterparts, this result might provide a theoretical foundation for the empirical results of Haslag and Ringgenberg (2017).

\(^{15}\)There is, however, no monotone comparative static with respect to \( \theta, \) which determines the strength of the private transaction motive of investors.
V.A Industry Background

Two exchanges currently operate in Australia: the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) and Chi-X Australia (Chi-X). The baseline make and take fees charged by ASX are each 0.15 bps of the value of the trade (ASX, 2016), with larger fees applying to certain advanced order types. For Chi-X, make and take fees are, respectively, 0.06 bps and 0.12 bps of the traded value (Chi-X, 2011). Over the main sample period, the daily value of trades in the Australian cash market (i.e., equity, warrant and interest-rate market transactions) averaged AUD 4.8 billion (ASX, 2014), or roughly two percent of the U.S. market at the time.

The Australian market is a natural fit for the model because it is particularly simple and self-contained. In particular, (i) there are just two exchanges, with independent ownership, (ii) there are limited overlaps with foreign markets in terms of trading hours and securities, and (iii) off-exchange trading is less relevant than in many other jurisdictions (e.g., the U.S.), largely due to a minimum price improvement rule and a prohibition against payment for order flow. Additional details regarding the Australian market are discussed in appendix B.B.

Our analysis focuses on a single security: the exchange-traded fund SPDR S&P/ASX 200 FUND (STW),\(^{16}\) which is a natural object of focus for three reasons. First, STW is a very significant security, not only because it is Australia’s largest ETF but also because it tracks the benchmark index for the Australian market. Second, STW’s broad exposure parallels the model’s assumption that information is purely public. While certain traders may be likely to possess private information about individual stocks, such information is relatively less significant for broad composites.\(^{17}\) Third, STW’s relatively large average spread parallels the model’s assumption that prices are continuous. For many other thickly-traded securities, the bid-ask spread is often one tick, in which case constraints imposed by discrete prices loom large. But discrete prices are less salient if the spread is larger. Fourth, STW is not internationally cross-listed. As foreign and domestic fragmentation likely differ in their effects, international cross-listings would complicate the interpretation of our findings.

Thus, our framework seems reasonably appropriate for modeling the trading of STW in the Australian market. But its suitability for other applications may depend on the context.

\(^{16}\)As of June 2014, STW had $2.3B under management, with 45M units on offer. The fund consisted of 205 constituents, with a weighted average market capitalization of $54M (State Street, 2014).

\(^{17}\)Although private information is a primary driver of volatility in individual stocks (French and Roll, 1986; Barclay, Litzenberger and Warner, 1990), its empirical significance seems to be smaller for ETFs (Tse and Martinez, 2007). Moreover, Subrahmanyam (1991) provides a model which explains that.
V.B Data

We have order-level data from both ASX and Chi-X. In each case, the data are a complete historical record of messages broadcast by the exchange, which market participants can access in real time. Appendix B.C details the data and the steps required to process it.

The ASX data cover the trading days of February through June 2014. The Chi-X data span only February through May. From the sample, we drop two days that were affected by data issues.\(^{18}\) Our main analysis requires data from both exchanges and therefore uses the 80 remaining days of February through May. We further focus on 10:30 through 16:00 during each day.\(^{19}\) A supplemental, out-of-sample analysis in section VII uses ASX data on the 20 trading days in the month of June. Figure 1 plots the close price and traded volume of STW for February through June of 2014. Aside from a rally early in February, the price remains fairly stable in the neighborhood of $51. Volumes are somewhat more volatile.

Figure 1: Price and Traded Volume (STW, 2014)

Trading statistics for STW: Feb 3, 2014–June 30, 2014. Price is the close price as announced by ASX. Volume includes all trading in the Australian market, in thousands of contracts. Data are from Bloomberg.

Table 1 presents statistics summarizing trading activity in STW. During our main sample, 169,930 contracts per day were traded on average across the Australian market. Our analysis focuses on a subset of trades that we call *lit book volume*, which consists of on-exchange trades during the continuous session in which the passive order had been visible. (See appendix B.C for details.) Of total STW volume, 72.3% is traded in the lit book of ASX and 16.5%  

---

\(^{18}\)One of those days is February 11, on which there were known issues with the ASX feed (Chi-X, 2014a). The other day is May 2, for which our record of the ASX feed is incomplete.

\(^{19}\)On ASX, the continuous trading session for STW begins at a random point in the interval \([10:08:45, 10:09:15]\) and ends at 16:00. On Chi-X, the continuous trading session begins at 10:00 and ends at 16:12. We limit attention to continuous trading between 10:30 and 16:00 to ensure a balanced panel and to avoid contamination from the opening and closing auctions at ASX.

---
in the lit book of Chi-X. The remaining 11.2% includes (i) the ASX opening and closing crosses, (ii) off-exchange trading (e.g., crossing systems, block trades, and internalization), and (iii) on-exchange trading in which the passive order had not been visible.

Table 1 also presents statistics on the messages in the ASX and Chi-X feeds that pertain to STW. The number of total messages is comparable across the two exchanges. But, owing to differences in the amount of volume traded, the ratio of total messages to trade messages tends to be much higher at Chi-X than at ASX. Finally, table 1 also displays statistics pertaining to the volatility of STW (based on one-second returns) and price movement (based on daily returns).

Table 1: Summary Statistics for Trading of STW

Summary statistics for trading of STW throughout our sample of 80 trading days. “Lit book” refers to traded volume in which the passive order had been visible; “other” volume is calculated by subtracting that from the total volume as obtained from Bloomberg. “Number of messages” and “message to trade ratio” are calculated from the feeds. “Volatility” is based on one-second returns (computed using the average of all four cum-fee quotes) between 10:30 and 16:00. “Price movement” is the absolute value of the daily return, computed using ASX open and close prices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>st. dev.</th>
<th>quartile 1</th>
<th>median</th>
<th>quartile 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>traded volume (1,000 contracts)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASX lit book</td>
<td>122.90</td>
<td>84.92</td>
<td>72.06</td>
<td>96.11</td>
<td>143.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASX other</td>
<td>10.52</td>
<td>19.20</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>10.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-X lit book</td>
<td>28.00</td>
<td>20.85</td>
<td>15.66</td>
<td>22.32</td>
<td>33.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-X other</td>
<td>8.51</td>
<td>18.33</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>169.93</td>
<td>100.41</td>
<td>109.26</td>
<td>139.58</td>
<td>178.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of messages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASX</td>
<td>19,350</td>
<td>5,010</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>19,053</td>
<td>21,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-X</td>
<td>17,711</td>
<td>6,175</td>
<td>13,040</td>
<td>16,400</td>
<td>19,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>message to trade ratio</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASX</td>
<td>66.97</td>
<td>27.21</td>
<td>49.12</td>
<td>62.01</td>
<td>77.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-X</td>
<td>320.77</td>
<td>209.47</td>
<td>181.48</td>
<td>268.42</td>
<td>376.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>volatility (bps)</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>price movement (bps)</td>
<td>32.13</td>
<td>26.84</td>
<td>11.86</td>
<td>26.24</td>
<td>41.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V.C Trade Classification

Our empirical approach requires identifying which of the trades in our sample correspond to the investor-initiated trades of the model. To that end, we recall that in the model, investor trades occur in isolation from other trades. In contrast, sniper trades occur in clusters:
taking place on both exchanges simultaneously and in the same direction. Leveraging this distinction, we use isolated trades and clustered trades as empirical proxies for the investor and sniper trades of the model, respectively. 20 Specifically, we classify a lit book trade as *isolated* if no other trade in the same direction occurs within a certain cutoff on either exchange. 21 In the baseline, we set this cutoff to one second. Remaining lit book trades are classified as *clustered.* 22 Note that this classification does not rely on trader-level information (which we do not possess), but can be computed from publicly available order-level data.

A potential concern is classification error, which could arise if the distinction between isolated and clustered trades differs from the sharp dichotomy predicted by the model. We address this in two ways. First, figure 2 illustrates that the predicted dichotomy is, in fact, not far from the truth. For each trade, we compute the length of time to the nearest trade in the same direction on either exchange; the figure plots the empirical distribution of this variable. Many trades are within 50 milliseconds of another trade, beyond which is a long tail. The amount of classification error must then be relatively limited because only a small fraction of trades lie between any two candidate cutoff points. In particular, for only 12.3% of trades is the nearest trade in the same direction between 50 milliseconds and 2 seconds away. Second, appendix D.A demonstrates that our results are robust to alternative choices of the cutoff used to classify trades as isolated or clustered.

**V.D Direct Evidence of Market Frictions**

A key feature of the model is its allowing for frictions that might affect the exchange choices of investors. If investors in practice often fail to trade at the best price, then it stands to reason that these frictions must be strong. This provides a direct and model-free way to assess the strength of these frictions, which we pursue here before turning to estimation. In this section, we demonstrate that, for trades taking place when prices differ at Chi-X and ASX (so that a single “best price” exists), a significant fraction of them occur at the exchange offering the worse price, which indicates that these frictions are indeed strong.

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20 Appendix E.D shows clustered trades to be better predictors of subsequent price movements than isolated trades, which further supports isolation as a proxy for the liquidity-motivated investor trades of the model.

21 Note that a single marketable limit order might trigger multiple execution messages if it is matched with multiple resting orders. We treat such cases as a single trade.

22 van Kervel (2015) uses essentially the same classification scheme, proxying for the fraction of fast traders with the percentage of market orders that arrive in clusters. A difference is that he uses a 0.1 second cutoff, whereas we use a 1 second cutoff in our baseline specification. Nevertheless, appendix D.A shows that a 0.1 second cutoff leads to similar results.
For each lit book trade of STW that occurred on ASX or Chi-X between 10:30 and 16:00 of a day in the main sample, we compute the difference in timestamps to the nearest other such trade in the same direction on either exchange. The figure plots the distribution of these differences in 50 millisecond bins.

![Figure 2: Distribution of Time Gaps Between Trades](image)

For this analysis, we focus on isolated trades, which are empirical proxies for the investor trades of the model.\textsuperscript{23} We observe the price obtained for every isolated trade (gross of take fees).\textsuperscript{24} Similarly, we can infer the price that would have been obtained had one instead traded the same volume at the same time on the other exchange.\textsuperscript{25} We then determine which exchange or exchanges featured the best price for a trade of that size at the time (the lowest price for isolated buys, the highest price for isolated sells), and we compare that to the exchange on which the trade actually occurred. Results are tabulated in table 2.

As the table indicates, many trades occur on exchanges offering inferior prices. Aggregating across buys and sells, 9,698 of the 14,767 isolated trades in our main sample occur when the two exchanges offer different prices. And of those, 8.9\% occur on the exchange with the worse price. The magnitude of this frequency suggests that frictions are an empirically important determinant of exchange choice, and it motivates our development of a model that

\textsuperscript{23}Note that a trader accessing liquidity at multiple venues (as with an intermarket sweep order) might rationally trade at an exchange featuring a worse price, but he would also trade at the exchange with the better price at essentially the same time. Thus, our classification algorithm would label such trades as clustered, and they would be omitted from the analysis in this section. In summary, given our focus on isolated trades, such multi-venue trading strategies cannot rationalize the frequency with which trades occur at inferior prices.

\textsuperscript{24}Note that a marketable order may execute against multiple resting orders and even “walk the book” by executing against orders resting at different price levels. Following footnote 21, we would consider this as a single trade and compute the price of that trade by aggregating across the individual executions.

\textsuperscript{25}In some cases, it would have been infeasible to trade the same volume at the counterfactual exchange, due to insufficient depth. We then classify the counterfactual exchange as offering an inferior price.
Table 2: Exchange Choice for Isolated Trades, Number of Trades

Classification of isolated trades by prevailing quotes at the two exchanges. Columns count the following cases: (1) the trade occurs at the exchange with strictly better price, (2) the trade occurs at the exchange with strictly inferior price, (4) the trade occurs when prices are the same.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>different price</th>
<th>identical price</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>best price</td>
<td>inferior price</td>
<td>subtotal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUY</td>
<td>4,533</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>4,974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELL</td>
<td>4,299</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>4,724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUY or SELL</td>
<td>8,832</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>9,698</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

allows for them.\textsuperscript{26,27} Moreover, as the strength of these frictions is parametrized in the model by $\alpha$, this evidence also indicates that we should expect a relatively high value for $\alpha$ when we estimate the model in section VI. Finally, although this analysis points to considerable frictions, it is silent as to their micro-foundations. As discussed in section III, there exist several potential sources.

V.E Variables Used in Estimation

For the estimation, we discretize time into one-second intervals. For each second during our main sample (10:30 to 16:00 for 80 trading days in 2014), we construct variables pertaining to the cum-fee prices that prevailed and to the trades that took place.

**Prices.** The cum-fee bid and ask prevailing at exchange $x$ at the beginning of second $t$ are denoted $b_{x,t}$ and $a_{x,t}$. These are calculated from the quoted bid and ask by adjusting for take fees: 0.15 bps and 0.12 bps of the value of the trade for ASX and Chi-X, respectively.\textsuperscript{28} To denote cum-fee spreads, we use $s_{x,t} = a_{x,t} - b_{x,t}$.

**Trades.** The indicators $buy_{x,t}$ and $sell_{x,t}$ evaluate to unity if an isolated trade (cf. section V.C) that is an aggressive buy or, respectively, sell occurs on exchange $x$ in second $t$.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{26}In fact, the above analysis might actually understate these frictions by failing to fully consider the potential for order splitting. A more stringent benchmark for evaluating execution quality would be to compare against the price that could have been obtained by splitting orders across exchanges in an optimal way.

\textsuperscript{27}One potential concern is that these results might be alternatively explained by misaligned time stamps. However, industry contacts have indicated that this is unlikely to be the case. Additionally, we have conducted a number of unreported robustness checks to alleviate this concern.

\textsuperscript{28}Letting $\hat{b}_{x,t}$ and $\hat{a}_{x,t}$ denote the quoted bid and ask: $b_{\text{ASX},t} = 0.999985\hat{b}_{\text{ASX},t}$; $a_{\text{ASX},t} = 1.000015\hat{a}_{\text{ASX},t}$; $b_{\text{Chi-X},t} = 0.999988\hat{b}_{\text{Chi-X},t}$; $a_{\text{Chi-X},t} = 1.000012\hat{a}_{\text{Chi-X},t}$.

\textsuperscript{29}Though not used in our main text analysis, we also define the indicator $clustered_t$, which evaluates to unity if a clustered trade occurs in second $t$.
Summary statistics. Table 3 presents summary statistics for seven key variables: the cum-fee spreads at ASX and Chi-X, indicators for isolated buys and sells at ASX and Chi-X, and an indicator for clustered trades. For each variable we report the mean and standard deviation over the sample. Spreads at ASX and Chi-X are very similar, albeit slightly smaller and more volatile at ASX. Reflecting ASX’s incumbent position, isolated buys and sells are relatively more frequent there. Finally, these isolated trades are somewhat more frequent, in aggregate, than trades we classify as clustered.

Table 3: Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Estimation

An observation is a second between 10:30 and 16:00 in one of the 80 trading days in the sample \( (N = 1,584,000) \). For each exchange \( x \), \( s_x \) is the cum-fee spread, measured in cents and evaluated at the start of each second. The indicators \( \text{buy}_x \) and \( \text{sell}_x \) evaluate to unity for seconds in which an isolated buy or, respectively, sell occurs; a lit book trade is isolated if no other lit book trade in the same direction occurs on either exchange within one second before or after. Remaining lit book trades are clustered; the indicator \( \text{clustered} \) evaluates to unity for seconds in which such a trade occurs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( s_{\text{ASX}} )</th>
<th>( s_{\text{Chi-X}} )</th>
<th>( \text{buy}_{\text{ASX}} )</th>
<th>( \text{buy}_{\text{Chi-X}} )</th>
<th>( \text{sell}_{\text{ASX}} )</th>
<th>( \text{sell}_{\text{Chi-X}} )</th>
<th>( \text{clustered} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>2.80865</td>
<td>2.94904</td>
<td>0.0038</td>
<td>0.00097</td>
<td>0.00356</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td>1.02835</td>
<td>0.7482</td>
<td>0.06151</td>
<td>0.03117</td>
<td>0.05955</td>
<td>0.0316</td>
<td>0.04466</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VI Estimation and Counterfactual Analysis

First, we describe how variation in the data is used to identify and estimate key parameters. We then discuss the estimates and use them to predict the counterfactual monopoly spread.

VI.A Empirical Strategy

Four parameters require estimation. Three govern the demand system of investors: \( \lambda_i \), their arrival rate; \( \theta \), the strength of their private transaction motive; and \( \alpha \), the strength of market frictions that distort their choice of exchange. The fourth parameter is \( \lambda_j \), the arrival rate of information, which affects the amount of adverse selection.

Identification. The identification argument has two parts. First, \( \alpha \), \( \theta \), and \( \lambda_i \) are identified by how the arrival rates of isolated buys and sells at ASX and Chi-X fluctuate with variation in prices. Intuitively, \( \alpha \) is identified by the cross-price elasticity, \( \theta \) by the own-price elasticity, and \( \lambda_i \) by the frequency of isolated trades. Second, given values for these three parameters, the duopoly spread is monotone in \( \lambda_j \) (cf. proposition 4). Thus, the spread identifies \( \lambda_j \).
Estimating equations. Equation (5) in section IV.A states the arrival rate of investor buys as a function of the prevailing asks. In the duopoly case, its empirical analogue for each exchange $x$ and second $t$ is

\[
\text{buy}_{x,t} = \frac{\lambda_i}{2} \left[ \frac{1}{2} + \frac{a_{-x,t} - a_{x,t}}{\alpha} \right]_0^1 \left[ 1 - \frac{a_{x,t} - v_t}{\theta} \right]_0^1 + \varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{buy}}
\]

where $\varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{buy}}$ is an error term whose mean, conditional on the quotes, is assumed to be zero. In the model, investor arrivals follow a Poisson process. The error term captures deviations of this random process from its mean, as well as any unmodeled determinants of trade. Likewise, we obtain the following for investor sells

\[
\text{sell}_{x,t} = \frac{\lambda_i}{2} \left[ \frac{1}{2} + \frac{b_{x,t} - b_{-x,t}}{\alpha} \right]_0^1 \left[ 1 - \frac{v_t - b_{x,t}}{\theta} \right]_0^1 + \varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{sell}}
\]

where $\varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{sell}}$ is an error term with zero conditional mean. Since we do not observe $v_t$, we proxy it with the average mid price \((b_{\text{ASX},t} + b_{\text{Chi-X},t} + a_{\text{ASX},t} + a_{\text{Chi-X},t})/4\) in both (8) and (9).

Finally, proposition 2 provides an expression for the duopoly spread. Its empirical analogue for each exchange $x$ and second $t$ is

\[
s_{x,t} = \theta + \alpha - \sqrt{\theta^2 + \alpha^2 - \frac{4\alpha \theta \lambda_i}{\lambda_i}} + \varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{spread}}
\]

where $\varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{spread}}$ is an error term with zero expectation. Note that the model does not suggest a reason for why the spread should vary around its mean. Nevertheless, spreads do display a limited amount of variation in the data. There are a number of potential explanations for short-term deviations from this long-run pricing equation. First, we have assumed that the parameters of the model are constant over time. While this seems accurate as a first approximation, small deviations may arise in practice, which would induce variation in the spread. Second, we have assumed that all agents are risk-neutral. In practice, liquidity providers are likely to be either risk averse or constrained in their ability to take on inventory, in which case they may vary their quotes based on their net positions. We assume further that the data generation process is stationary and weakly dependent.
**Estimation procedure.** We estimate the parameters using systems nonlinear least squares on equations (8), (9), and (10) by minimizing the objective

\[
Q_T(\alpha, \theta, \lambda_i, \lambda_j) = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{x \in \{\text{ASX}, \text{Chi-X}\}} \left( \varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{buy}} \right)^2 + \left( \varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{sell}} \right)^2 + \left( \varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{spread}} \right)^2.
\]

Consistency of this procedure is formally proven in appendix B.D. Standard errors are computed using a non-overlapping block bootstrap procedure. See appendix B.E for further details on the implementation of estimation and the computation of standard errors.

**VI.B Parameter Estimates**

Table 4 reports the estimation results. The point estimate of \(\alpha\) of 7.34¢ implies that an exchange attracts every investor in the market only if it offers prices at least 3.67¢ better than its competitor. This considerably exceeds the average half-spread of 1.44¢, which indicates that market frictions significantly distort the exchange choices of investors. Moreover, the null hypothesis of frictionless routing (i.e., \(\alpha = 0\)) is rejected at all common significance levels. The estimate of \(\theta\) of 1.53¢ means that the average magnitude of private transaction motives among investors (i.e., \(\theta/2\)) is 53% of the average half-spread, which indicates that transaction costs crowd out a substantial number of potential investor trades. Finally, the estimates of \(\lambda_i\) and \(\lambda_j\) indicate that investors arrive 2.2 times more frequently than information.\(^{30}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(\alpha)</th>
<th>(\theta)</th>
<th>(\lambda_i)</th>
<th>(\lambda_j)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>point estimate</td>
<td>7.33504***</td>
<td>1.52817***</td>
<td>0.00172***</td>
<td>0.00078***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>standard error</td>
<td>(1.06129)</td>
<td>(0.15127)</td>
<td>(0.00022)</td>
<td>(0.00012)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To illustrate the elasticities implied by the estimated model, note that if quotes are symmetric about the value of the security, then investors arrive at an exchange \(x\) at the rate

\[
\lambda_i \left[ \frac{s_x - s_x}{\alpha} + \frac{1}{2} \right] \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\theta} \frac{s_x}{2} \right].
\]

Evaluated at the estimates, the elasticity with respect to \(s_x\) is -17.1, while the elasticity with respect to \(s_{-x}\) is 0.8. The relatively high own-price elasticity

\(^{30}\)In the model, adverse selection has one source: public information about fundamentals. In reality, adverse selection has other sources as well, including public information about order flow (which would be relevant to a risk-averse liquidity provider) and private information. The presence of these additional sources might drive up the spread and, given our estimation procedure, also be contributing to the estimate of \(\lambda_j\).
is due to the spread falling on the highly elastic portion of the linear demand schedule, and the relatively low cross-price elasticity reflects the presence of considerable market frictions.

VI.C The Effect of Fragmentation

In our model, it is theoretically ambiguous whether fragmentation benefits investors. This is because the competition channel (i.e., additional exchanges intensify price competition) and the exposure channel (i.e., additional exchanges intensify adverse selection) act in opposite directions. Nevertheless, the estimates from the previous section can be used to resolve this theoretical ambiguity for the case of Australia and STW.

We first consider the effect of a reduction in the number of exchanges. Under the prevailing duopoly regime, the average spread observed in the data is 2.88¢. Using proposition 1, our estimates imply that in the counterfactual of a monopoly, the spread would be 2.22¢, or 22.9% lower. Moreover, the monopoly spread is lower than the duopoly spread in each of the 200 bootstrap replications. Two features of the Australian market might contribute to why the exposure channel appears to outweigh the competition channel: (i) the lack of an order protection rule, as the presence of one might counteract market frictions and strengthen the competition channel, and (ii) the relatively small natural base of investors, which suggests high adverse selection and a strong exposure channel.

In principle, the estimates could also be used to consider the effects of counterfactual increases in the number of exchanges. According to the estimated model, three or more exchanges could not operate simultaneously without market breakdown because A2 and A3 cannot simultaneously hold with $X \geq 3$. However, one reason for interpreting this prediction with caution is that exchanges in practice have revenue sources beyond trading fees. Although such additional revenue streams may be strategically orthogonal to the trading fee decision, and hence to our previous conclusions, they would imply that A3 might be more than is needed to ensure simultaneous profitability of all exchanges.

VII Natural Experiment: Chi-X Shutdown

Our estimates imply that the spread of STW would be substantially lower if, instead of two exchanges, the Australian market were to have only one. To provide additional support for this conclusion, we study a natural experiment in which Chi-X shut down for a day, leaving ASX as the only operating exchange. Because the shutdown was short and unantici-
pated, ASX did not strategically alter its fees in response. Thus, this episode constitutes an isolated test of the exposure channel of the model and offers an opportunity to quantify its magnitude. Consistent with the predictions of the model, the STW spread is substantially smaller on that day than on the surrounding days, as well as relative to an unaffected control group. Combining these results with a back-of-the-envelope quantification of the competition channel, we find a net effect on par with the estimates of the previous section.

The Chi-X shutdown has several advantages as a natural experiment with which to test the predictions of the model. First, the shutdown was unanticipated and exogenous. Second, its occurring within weeks of the end of our estimation sample means that the underlying parameters are more likely to resemble those prevailing during the estimation sample than if we had used an episode several years prior or hence (e.g., Chi-X’s 2011 entry).

VII.A Event Description

On June 16, 2014, a technical issue caused Chi-X to halt their trading at 11:08 (Chi-X, 2014b), leaving ASX as the only exchange in operation until Chi-X resumed trading the next morning. The issue arose due to a small change Chi-X had made in its handling of certain orders. That change was implemented with an error, which, when noticed, prompted the shutdown. Hence, the shutdown was exogenous to trading activity. Indeed, June 16 (the “monopoly day”) appears similar to other trading days in June 2014 (the “duopoly days”) in terms of volume, message flow, volatility, and price movement. As table 5 illustrates, the monopoly day is within one standard deviation of the duopoly mean for each statistic.$^{31}$

VII.B Analysis

To corroborate the conclusions of our structural estimation, we investigate how the spread of STW is affected by this shock to fragmentation. To that end, we compute the ASX cum-fee spread prevailing at the beginning of every second between 11:08 and 16:00 of every trading day in June 2014. We use 11:08 because that was the time at which Chi-X shut down.

We then regress the STW spread on an indicator for June 16, 2014. In our baseline specification, the sample consists of all seconds between 11:08 and 16:00 in all twenty trading days in June 2014. The results, reported in column (1) of table 6, indicate that the monopoly

$^{31}$While not an outlier, the monopoly day’s volume is relatively low. But this does not drive our findings: appendix E.B shows our results survive even if we control for volume or estimate only on low-volume days.
Table 5: Summary Statistics for Trading of STW, June 2014

Summary statistics for trading of STW for all 20 trading days in June 2014. “Lit book” refers to traded volume in which the passive order had been visible. Total volume for Australia is obtained from Bloomberg. “Number of messages” and “message to trade ratio” are calculated from the ASX feed. “Volatility” is based on one-second returns (computed using the average of the ASX cum-fee quotes) between 10:30 and 16:00. “Price movement” is the absolute value of the daily return, computed using ASX open and close prices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>monopoly day</th>
<th>duopoly days (June 2014, (N = 19) days)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mean</td>
<td>st. dev.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>volume (1,000 contracts)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASX lit book</td>
<td>121.65</td>
<td>160.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>123.84</td>
<td>197.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of messages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASX</td>
<td>20,941</td>
<td>17,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>message to trade ratio</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASX</td>
<td>85.82</td>
<td>76.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>volatility (bps)</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>0.354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>price movement (bps)</td>
<td>17.60</td>
<td>41.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

day is associated with a statistically significant 28.0% reduction in the average spread. (See appendix E.A for more details on the shift in the spread distribution.)

A potential concern is that this reduction in the spread is attributable to forces other than the shock to fragmentation. For instance, a similar effect might obtain from diminished information arrival or heightened retail trader activity. To the extent that such forces are correlated with day of the week or with time of the year, we can control for them by repeating the above analysis on different subsamples. In column (2) of table 6, we focus only on Mondays. In columns (3) and (4), we shorten the event window around the monopoly day, to 3 and 5 trading days, respectively. In each case, we obtain qualitatively similar results, which suggests that the finding is indeed driven by fragmentation.

As a second means of ruling out alternative explanations, we introduce a control group of eight securities. Like STW, these are ETFs with exposure to Australian equities that were traded on ASX in June 2014, but unlike STW, they were not also traded on Chi-X. (See appendix B.F for more details on the selection of this group.) Using this control group, we pursue a difference-in-differences approach, thereby to isolate the effects of the change in the number of venues on which STW was traded from those of any market-wide shocks that may have influenced trading conditions on the day of the shutdown. Results are reported in column (5) of table 6 and are again qualitatively similar.

Our model not only predicts a reduction in the spread on the monopoly day but also
specifies the channel for that effect: short-lived adverse selection. In the model, eliminating an exchange concentrates uninformed order flow on the remaining venue and reduces adverse selection there. To test this prediction, we compute the adverse selection of a trade as the signed return over the subsequent 10 seconds (or 5 minutes). As expected, adverse selection is on average lower on the monopoly day. Averaging across all trades, the 10 second (5 minute) adverse selection is 0.785 bps (1.398 bps), compared to an average of 1.757 bps (2.240 bps) on duopoly days. This evidence supports the mechanism underlying the exposure channel, and in so doing provides additional backing for our modeling approach.

VII.C Discussion

In the model, the full equilibrium effect of subtracting an exchange is determined by the magnitudes of both the competition and the exposure channels. That spreads are on average 28.0% smaller on the monopoly day is consistent with the large exposure channel predicted by the model. However, our analysis does not speak to the competition channel: because the shutdown was unexpected and short-lived, ASX did not alter its fees in response. Therefore, this figure can be interpreted only as an upper bound on the net effect.

A rough estimate of the magnitude of the competition channel might be derived from the July 2010 fee change made by ASX in response to the announcement that Chi-X would enter the following year: a reduction from 0.56 to 0.30 bps. Multiplying this 0.26 bps change by the closing price of STW on the monopoly day ($51.23) yields 0.133¢. Under the assumption that fee changes are passed through one-for-one into the spread, we can interpret this figure as the magnitude of the competition channel. Adding it to the −1.127¢ estimate from column (1) of table 6, which we interpret as the magnitude of the exposure channel, suggests a net effect of −0.994¢. This would equate to a 24.7% decrease from the average spread on duopoly days, very much in line with the 22.9% reduction predicted by the model.

Although the identification strategy underlying our analysis is strong, a potential concern is that trader behavior on the day of the shutdown might not reflect long-run behavior in a monopoly environment. For instance, certain traders, knowing the shutdown to be temporary, might have withdrawn from trading on that day, whereas they would adapt over the long run to a permanent change in the number of venues. Nevertheless, several factors mitigate this worry. First, that the spread narrows on the monopoly day suggests liquidity providers, at least, did not withdraw. Second, private conversations with industry

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32The adverse selection of a trade is computed as $q(m_{t+\Delta} - m_t)/m_t$ where $q = 1$ for a buy and $q = -1$ for a sell, $m_t$ is the mid price just before the trade, and $m_{t+\Delta}$ is the mid price $\Delta$ time units thereafter.
Table 6: ASX spreads, Australian Equity ETFs, June 2014

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The dependent variable is the cum-fee spread in cents prevailing on ASX at the beginning of the second. An observation is a pair: a second between 11:08 and 16:00 in June 2014 and a security traded on ASX. STW × Monopoly is an indicator for June 16, 2014 and STW. Samples for the respective columns are: (1) all trading days in June 2014 and STW, (2) all Mondays in June 2014 and STW, (3) all trading days from June 6 until June 23 and STW, (4) all trading days from June 11 until June 19 and STW, (5) all trading days in June 2014 and the securities STW, IOZ, ISO, MVW, QOZ, SSO, VAS, VLC, and VSO. Coefficients are estimated by ordinary least squares. Standard errors are clustered by 120 second blocks on each trading day. STW Duopoly Mean is the average of the dependent variable for STW, non-monopoly observations. Change (Percent) is the estimate relative to the STW duopoly mean.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STW × Monopoly</td>
<td>-1.127***</td>
<td>-0.981***</td>
<td>-1.069***</td>
<td>-0.882***</td>
<td>-1.036***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0567)</td>
<td>(0.0901)</td>
<td>(0.0673)</td>
<td>(0.0818)</td>
<td>(0.0643)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STW Duopoly Mean</td>
<td>4.023</td>
<td>3.877</td>
<td>3.965</td>
<td>3.777</td>
<td>4.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change (Percent)</td>
<td>-28.02</td>
<td>-25.31</td>
<td>-26.97</td>
<td>-23.34</td>
<td>-25.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Day × Hour Fixed Effects: NO NO NO NO YES
Security Fixed Effects: YES YES YES YES YES
Control Group: NO NO NO NO YES
Observations: 350400 70080 192720 122640 3153600

participants in Australia and the U.S. indicate that traders are well-equipped to deal with such contingencies and have no need to withdraw.\textsuperscript{33} Third, total volume for STW on the day after the shutdown was only 88,953 contracts, the lowest value for the entire month of June. This is at odds with the theory that traders withdrew on the monopoly day: in that case, one would expect larger volumes on the following day as the displaced trades materialize.

In spite of the aforementioned caveats, this natural experiment supports the model’s prediction that STW spreads would be lower in a monopoly. Moreover, these results might be interpreted as a proof of concept for the model, suggesting that our approach could be a valid way of ascertaining the effects of fragmentation in other contexts.

\textsuperscript{33} Consistent with this, a similar episode that occurred in the U.S. one year later had almost no impact on trading (WSJ, 2015), despite a primary venue, NYSE, shutting down in that case.
VIII Potential Concerns

The model omits several important features of financial markets. Some omissions prove to be without consequence: appendix F shows our conclusions persist in a variety of extensions. Nevertheless, other omissions could have import.

One potential concern is our focus on symmetric equilibria, which could limit the extent to which our model is a good fit for our chosen empirical application as well as for other potential applications. While ASX and Chi-X are reasonably symmetric with respect to some key variables (e.g., spreads, message traffic), symmetry fails to hold in other respects. For example, ASX handles more volume and also charges higher fees.

A second limitation is that our model and estimation focus on only a single security. We emphasize that the effects of fragmentation depend on many factors (e.g., those corresponding to the parameters of our model). Thus, although our analysis predicts that fragmentation leads to larger spreads in the case of STW and Australia, we would not wish to imply that it always has this effect. For instance, other studies of the Australian market (He et al., 2015; Aitken et al., 2017) have linked fragmentation to smaller spreads. Those results may differ from ours because they apply to an earlier point in time (around the 2011 entry of Chi-X) and a different set of securities (S&P/ASX 200 constituents). Related is that our single-security model is incapable of capturing cross-security substitution patterns. An interesting direction for future work would be to expand this framework to a multi-security setting.

Third, the model makes quite stark parametric assumptions. In particular, we assume a linear demand framework, and we assume that both investors and information arrive at constant and exogenous rates. Though restrictive, these assumptions can be thought of as first-order approximations, which facilitate tractability and closed-form derivations.

Fourth, while the model allows for some forms of heterogeneity among investors—in the strength of their private transaction motives and in their susceptibility to market frictions—it does not allow for heterogeneity in other dimensions. For example, the model does not

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34 We consider extensions involving (i) inventory constraints, (ii) operation costs for liquidity providers and exchanges, (iii) richer evolution processes for the security value, (iv) across-exchange order splitting, (v) short-lived private information, (vi) successful order cancellation, and (vii) stochastic horizon times.

35 Thus, alternative (though perhaps less parsimonious) models that permit asymmetries might yield better fits. One possibility would be to relax the assumption that investors are uniformly distributed on the circle. Another would be to allow for a mass of investors without access to the smaller exchange, as in Foucault and Menkveld (2008). Though this latter modeling choice may have been appropriate for their 2004–2005 data, it seems less suitable for modern trading: essentially all traders now have easy access to all exchanges.
permit differences in either the volume that investors seek to trade or in their patience for spreading trades over time. With such heterogeneity, the spread would cease to be a sufficient welfare statistic as it is in our model, since the spread quantifies transaction costs only for small trades. Moreover, such heterogeneity might also extend to concerns with the empirical classification of clustered trades as information-motivated, since a large but uninformed investor might initiate simultaneous trades on multiple exchanges.

Finally, the model necessarily falls short of incorporating every potential channel through which fragmentation might affect market quality. Some such omissions seem without much loss. For instance, while network externalities were the focus of many early analyses of fragmentation (e.g. Pagano, 1989), they are less significant in the electronically-linked trading environments of today. But other channels absent from our model do remain important. For example, the competitive benefits of fragmentation might not be limited to the price dimension: fragmentation could induce some exchanges to improve their speed (as in Pagnotta and Philippon, 2018) or technological services (as in Cespa and Vives, 2019). Further, fragmentation together with maker-taker pricing, allows liquidity providers to compete on a finer price grid, which could reduce the spread of the aggregate book (as in Chao et al., 2019). On the other hand, fragmentation increases costs of communication (as in Mendelson, 1987), and fixed costs are also required to establish new venues. While our focus on two channels has the advantage of yielding a parsimonious and tractable model, it would also be valuable to develop a richer model that incorporates some of these other elements.

IX Conclusion

This paper provides a tractable and estimable model that captures several first-order aspects of the interaction between fragmentation and liquidity. The model features two countervailing forces: (i) the competition channel, whereby adding more exchanges induces lower fees and therefore smaller spreads; and (ii) the exposure channel, whereby adding more exchanges induces more adverse selection against liquidity providers and therefore larger spreads.

The parameters of the model are identified from data by the average spread, together with how the incidence of certain trades depends upon prevailing prices. We also demonstrate a procedure for estimating these parameters. For an empirical application, we use data pertaining to the trading of an Australian ETF. Our estimates imply the existence of significant market frictions, suggesting the competition channel to be limited in magnitude
and outweighed by the exposure channel. Indeed, at the estimates, traders of the ETF would fare better under a monopoly than under Australia’s prevailing duopoly. To corroborate the approach, we show this prediction to align with that of a separate analysis conducted in the same setting but based on exogenous variation in the number of venues. We submit that our approach can be useful when rule changes affecting fragmentation have to be decided, especially in the absence of sufficient identifying variation in market structure.

References


A Proofs

Lemma 1. Letting $\Sigma$ be defined as in A3, (i) $\Sigma \in \mathbb{R}$, (ii) $\Sigma \frac{\sigma}{2} \leq \theta$, and (iii) $\Sigma \frac{\sigma}{2} \geq \frac{X\theta\lambda_j}{\lambda_i}$, and (iv) if $X \geq 2$, then $\theta^2 + \frac{16\alpha^2}{X^2} - \frac{8\alpha\theta\lambda_j}{X\lambda_i} > 0$.

Proof of lemma 1. To prove the first claim, notice that by A1,

$$\theta^2 + \frac{16\alpha^2}{X^2} - \frac{8\alpha\theta\lambda_j}{X\lambda_i} \geq \theta^2 + \frac{16\alpha^2}{X^2} - \frac{8\alpha\theta}{X^2} = \left(\theta - \frac{4\alpha}{X^2}\right)^2 \geq 0,$$

which therefore implies that $\Sigma \in \mathbb{R}$. The proof of the second claim has two parts. First, if $X = 1$, then the result follows directly from A1. Second, if $X \geq 2$, then by A1,

$$\theta + \frac{4\alpha}{X^2} - \sqrt{\theta^2 + \frac{16\alpha^2}{X^2} - \frac{8\alpha\theta\lambda_j}{X\lambda_i}} \leq \theta + \frac{4\alpha}{X^2} - \sqrt{\theta^2 + \frac{16\alpha^2}{X^2} - \frac{8\alpha}{X^2}} = \theta + \frac{4\alpha}{X^2} - \left|\theta - \frac{4\alpha}{X^2}\right| \leq 2\theta.$$

To prove the third claim, note that by plugging A2 into A3, we must have $\lambda_i \left(1 - \frac{1}{\theta^2}\right) \frac{\sigma}{2} > \lambda_j X\left(\theta - \frac{\sigma}{2}\right)$, which can be manipulated to yield $\left(\frac{\sigma}{2} - \theta\right)\left(\frac{\sigma}{2} - \frac{X\theta\lambda_j}{X\lambda_i}\right) < 0$. In light of the second claim, the first factor must be negative, which implies that the second factor must be positive. In light of the proof of the first claim, proving the third claim reduces to deriving a contradiction from the combination of $X \geq 2$ and $\theta = \frac{4\alpha}{X^2}$. If this is the case, then $\Sigma = 2\theta$. Plugging that into A3 yields $0 \geq \lambda_j X(\sigma - \theta)$, which contradicts A2.

Proof of proposition 1. The proof proceeds in two parts. First we describe equilibrium strategies, and second we show that no player has a profitable deviation.

Part 1 (description): Let $s^*$ be defined as in the proposition: $s^* = \theta \left(1 + \frac{\lambda_i}{\lambda_j}\right)$. The strategy of the exchange is to set a make fee $\tau_{\text{make}}^*$ and a take fee $\tau_{\text{take}}^*$ such that

$$\tau_{\text{make}}^* + \tau_{\text{take}}^* = \frac{\lambda_i \left(1 - \frac{1}{\theta^2}\right) \frac{s^*}{2} - \lambda_j \left(\sigma - \frac{s^*}{2}\right)}{\lambda_i \left(1 - \frac{1}{\theta^2}\right) + \lambda_j}.$$ 

Note that A3 ensures this total fee will be nonnegative. We do not specify the individual fees, as only the total fee will be relevant for the subsequent analysis.\(^{36}\)

\(^{36}\)In other words, equilibrium pins down only the total fee $\tau_{\text{make}}^* + \tau_{\text{take}}^*$, but not the exact decomposition.
An investor who arrives at time $t$ with type $(\tilde{l}, \tilde{\theta})$ behaves as specified: choosing a quantity $y \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$ to maximize $\tilde{u_i}(y, \tilde{l}, \tilde{\theta})$. Thus, it remains to specify the strategies of the HFTs. One HFT plays the role of “liquidity provider.” A second HFT plays the role of “enforcer.” The remaining HFTs (infinitely many) play the role of “snipers.”

To define the strategy of the liquidity provider, we consider the following polynomial in $s$, where we use $\tau = (\tau_{\text{make}}, \tau_{\text{take}})$ to denote the fees set by the exchange:

$$
\pi(s|\tau) := \lambda_i \left(1 - \frac{\tau_{\text{make}}^2}{\theta^2}\right) \left(\frac{s}{2} - \tau_{\text{make}} - \tau_{\text{take}}\right) + \lambda_j \left(\frac{s}{2} - \tau_{\text{make}} - \tau_{\text{take}} - \sigma\right).
$$

The polynomial $\pi(s|\tau)$ represents, roughly speaking, the profits that would accrue to the liquidity provider if the spread were $s$ and trading fees were given by $\tau$. There are two cases. First, if $\tau$ is such that no value of $s \in [0, 2\theta]$ is a root of $\pi(s|\tau)$, then the liquidity provider never quotes. Otherwise, let $s(\tau)$ be defined implicitly as the smallest such root.\(^3\)

In that case, the liquidity provider acts as follows. At time zero, she submits to the exchange a limit order to buy one share at $\hat{b}_0 = v_0 - \frac{s(\tau)}{2} + \tau_{\text{take}}$ and a limit order to sell one share at $\hat{a}_0 = v_0 + \frac{s(\tau)}{2} - \tau_{\text{take}}$.\(^3\) If one of her standing limit orders is filled at a time when $v_t$ has not jumped, then she immediately submits an identical order to replace it. If $v_t$ jumps, then she immediately submits to the exchange the following orders: (i) cancellations for her limit orders, (ii) a limit order to buy one share at $\hat{b}_t = v_t - \frac{s(\tau)}{2} + \tau_{\text{take}}$, and (iii) a limit order to sell one share at $\hat{a}_t = v_t + \frac{s(\tau)}{2} - \tau_{\text{take}}$.\(^3\)

The strategy of the enforcer is as follows. She never submits any orders unless the liquidity provider is observed to have deviated, in which case the enforcer begins to take the actions that were prescribed for the liquidity provider.

The strategy of a sniper is as follows. If $v_t$ jumps upward (downward), then she immediately submits to the exchange an immediate-or-cancel order to buy (sell) at the price $v_t + \sigma - \tau_{\text{take}} (v_t - \sigma + \tau_{\text{take}})$.

\textbf{Part 2 (verification):} It can be shown that $s(\tau^*) = s^*$. We now argue that if all other players behave as specified, then the liquidity provider has no profitable deviations. The arguments are similar to those in Budish et al. (2015, proof of Proposition 1). By lemma 1(ii), $s^*/2 \leq \theta$, and by A2, $s^*/2 < \sigma$. Thus, if the liquidity provider sets a spread $s \leq s^*$, then her flow profits are $\pi(s|\tau^*)$. These profits are zero at $s^*$, since $\pi(s|\tau^*)$ is defined as a root of $\pi(s|\tau^*)$, in particular the smallest root. Moreover, since $\pi(s|\tau^*)$ is a concave, second-order polynomial, profits must be negative at spreads $s < s^*$. Thus, it is not profitable to deviate by setting thereof. Thus, a variety of fee structures are consistent with the model, including: (i) those in which both sides pay a fee, as is the case in Australia, (ii) “maker-taker” fee structures in which makers receive a rebate while takers pay a fee and (iii) “inverted” fee structures in which takers receive a rebate while makers pay a fee. The same observation applies to the oligopoly equilibrium characterized by proposition 2. The decomposition cannot, however, be completely arbitrary: it is infeasible to have a take fee that exceeds half the cum-fee spread (for then the quoted spread would be negative). This is the reason for requiring $\tau_{\text{take}} < s^*/2$.

\(^3\)Thus, $s(\tau) = \tau_{\text{make}} + \tau_{\text{take}} + \theta \left(1 + \frac{\lambda_i}{\lambda_j}\right) \sqrt{(\tau_{\text{make}} + \tau_{\text{take}})^2 - 2\theta(\tau_{\text{make}} + \tau_{\text{take}}) \left(1 + \frac{\lambda_i}{\lambda_j}\right) + 2\theta \lambda_i (\theta - 2\sigma) + \theta^2 \left(1 + \frac{\lambda_i^2}{\lambda_j^2}\right)}$.

\(^3\)The resulting cum-fee spread is $s(\tau)$. It depends on the make and take fees only through their sum.

\(^3\)For any continuous time variable $X_t$, we use $X_{t^*}$ to denote $\lim_{s \to t^*} X_s$ and $X_{t^*}$ to denote $\lim_{s \to t^*} X_s$. 

2
a smaller spread. It is also not profitable to deviate by setting a larger spread, since the
enforcer would then undercut her, and she would receive none of the benefits (from investor
orders), but might receive adverse selection costs (from sniper orders). Finally, it is also not
profitable to deviate by quoting more than a single unit at either the bid or the ask, since her
benefits would be the same (only one unit at each is needed to satisfy investor demand) but
her costs would increase (since more units are exposed to adverse selection from snipers).

We now argue that the snipers and the enforcer have no profitable deviations. The
arguments are also similar to those in Budish et al. (2015, proof of Proposition 1). They
also earn zero profits in the equilibrium, and it therefore remains to show that none of them
possesses a deviation that would yield positive profits. It is also not profitable to attempt to
provide liquidity at a smaller spread than the liquidity provider, since that would result in
negative expected profits for the same reason as above. It is also not profitable to attempt to
provide liquidity at the same spread as the liquidity provider, since these quotes have the
same adverse selection costs (from sniper orders) that the liquidity provider faces in
equilibrium but only half the benefits (from investor orders), and would therefore result in
negative expected profits. Finally, it is not profitable to attempt to provide liquidity at a
larger spread than the liquidity provider, since these orders would receive none of the benefits
(from investor orders), but might receive adverse selection costs (from sniper orders).

We finally argue that the exchange has no profitable deviations. Given the behavior of
the traders, the profits of the exchange are zero for the case in which the liquidity provider
does not quote. In the other case, the profits of the exchange are

\[ (\tau_{\text{make}} + \tau_{\text{take}}) \left[ \lambda_j + \lambda_i \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\theta} s(\tau) \right) \right], \]

which, using the fact that \( s(\tau) \) is a root of \( \pi(s|\tau) \), can be shown to equal

\[ \lambda_i \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\theta} s(\tau) \right) \frac{s(\tau)}{2} + \lambda_j \left( \frac{s(\tau)}{2} - \sigma \right). \]

The above expression is a concave function of the spread, \( s(\tau) \), which is maximized when
\( s(\tau) = s^* \). Since \( s(\tau^*) = s^* \), the exchange has no profitable deviations to other fee structures
under which the liquidity provider quotes. Furthermore, by A3, this yields nonnegative
profits for the exchange, so the exchange also has no profitable deviations to fee structures
for which the liquidity provider does not quote.

\[ \square \]

**Proof of proposition 2.** The proof proceeds in two parts. First we describe equilibrium
strategies, and second we show that no player has a profitable deviation.

**Part 1 (description):** Let \( s^* \) be defined as in the proposition: \( s^* = \theta + \frac{4\alpha}{X^2} - \sqrt{\theta^2 + \frac{16\alpha^2}{X^2} - \frac{8\alpha^2\lambda_j}{X\lambda_i}} \).

The strategy of each exchange \( x \) is to set a make fee \( \tau^*_{x,\text{make}} \) and a take fee \( \tau^*_{x,\text{take}} \) such that

\[ \tau^*_{x,\text{make}} + \tau^*_{x,\text{take}} = \frac{\lambda_i \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\theta} s^* \right) s^* - \lambda_j X \left( \sigma - \frac{s^*}{2} \right)}{\lambda_i \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\theta} s^* \right) + \lambda_j X}. \]
Thus, if the liquidity provider at exchange $\pi$ at exchange $x$ quotes a spread $s_x$, this establishes the claim. In addition, it can be shown that $s_x$ is a root of $\pi(s_x|\tau_x)$, so it remains only to be shown that it is the smallest root. To begin, note that since $\tau^*_x,make + \tau^*_x, take \geq 0$ and $\sigma > \theta$, it follows that $\pi(2\theta|\tau^*_x) < 0$. In addition, by lemma 1(ii), $s^* \leq 2\theta$. Because $\pi(s_x|\tau^*_x)$ is a third-order polynomial in $s_x$ with a positive leading coefficient, we conclude from these facts that it has three roots and that $s^*$ is not the largest of those. In addition, it can be shown that $\pi'(s^*|\tau^*_x) \geq 0$, which means that $s^*$ cannot be the middle root. This establishes the claim.

We now argue that if all other players behave as specified, then the liquidity provider at exchange $x$ has no profitable deviations. By lemma 1(ii), $s^*/2 \leq \theta$, and by A2, $s^*/2 < \sigma$. Thus, if the liquidity provider at exchange $x$ sets a spread $s_x \leq s^*$, then her flow profits are $\pi(s_x|\tau^*_x)$. These profits are zero at $s^*$, since $s^*$ is defined as a root of $\pi(s_x|\tau^*_x)$, in particular the smallest root. Moreover, since $\pi(s_x|\tau^*_x)$ is a third-order polynomial with a positive leading coefficient, profits must be negative at spreads $s_x < s^*$. Thus, it is not profitable to deviate by setting a smaller spread. That other types of deviations are not profitable can be argued as in the proof of proposition 1. And that the other HFTs also have no profitable deviations can similarly be argued as in the proof of proposition 1.
We now argue that the exchange has no profitable deviations. Given the behavior of the traders and other exchanges, the profits of exchange $x$ are zero for the case in which the liquidity provider at exchange $x$ does not quote. For the case in which the liquidity provider does quote, the profits of exchange $x$ are

$$ (\tau_{x,\text{make}} + \tau_{x,\text{take}}) \left( \lambda_j + \lambda_i \left[ \frac{X}{2\alpha} \left( \frac{s^*}{2} - \frac{s(\tau_x)}{2} \right) + \frac{1}{X} \right] \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\theta} \frac{s(\tau_x)}{2} \right) \right), $$

which, using the fact that $s(\tau_x)$ is a root of $\pi(s_{x|\tau_x})$, can be shown to equal

$$ \lambda_i \left[ \frac{X}{2\alpha} \left( \frac{s^*}{2} - \frac{s(\tau_x)}{2} \right) + \frac{1}{X} \right] \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\theta} \frac{s(\tau_x)}{2} \right) \frac{s(\tau_x)}{2} + \lambda_j \left( \frac{s(\tau_x)}{2} - \sigma \right). $$

Note that when the liquidity provider does quote, she sets a spread in the domain $[0, 2\theta]$. We claim that the spread $s(\tau_x) = s^*$ maximizes the above expression on this domain. It can be shown that $s^*$ is a critical point of the expression. Note also that by A3 the expression is nonnegative at $s^*$. Moreover, the expression is negative at $2\theta$ (the first term in the last factor is zero at $2\theta$, and the second term is negative, since $\sigma > \theta$ by A2). In addition, by lemma 1(ii), $s^* \leq 2\theta$. Because the expression is a third-order polynomial in $s(\tau_x)$ with a positive leading coefficient, we conclude from these facts that $s^*$ must be the unique local maximum. It therefore remains only to show that the expression is not larger at either endpoint. We have already argued that the expression is nonnegative at $s^*$ and negative at $2\theta$. It is also negative at 0, which establishes the claim.

Since $s(\tau^*_x) = s^*$, the exchange has no profitable deviations to other fee structures under which the liquidity provider quotes. Furthermore, by A3, this yields nonnegative profits for the exchange, so the exchange also has no profitable deviations to fee structures for which the liquidity provider does not quote.

\[\Box\]

**Proof of corollary 3.** We begin by establishing that $\alpha \geq \frac{\theta \lambda_j}{\lambda_i}$. Suppose to the contrary that $\alpha < \frac{\theta \lambda_j}{\lambda_i}$. Note that this can be the case only if $\frac{\lambda_i}{\lambda_j} > 0$. Then because $s^*_{\text{duopoly}}$ is weakly increasing in $\alpha$ (cf. proposition 4), we obtain

$$ s^*_{\text{duopoly}} \leq \theta + \frac{\theta \lambda_j}{\lambda_i} - \sqrt{\theta^2 + \frac{\theta^2 \lambda_j^2}{\lambda_i^2} - \frac{4 \theta^2 \lambda_j^3}{\lambda_i^3}} = \theta \left( 1 + \frac{\lambda_i}{\lambda_j} - \sqrt{1 - \frac{3 \lambda_j^2}{\lambda_i^2}} \right). $$

On the other hand, lemma 1(iii) implies that $s^*_{\text{duopoly}} \geq \frac{4 \theta \lambda_j}{\lambda_i}$. These two requirements are consistent with each other only if $\frac{4 \theta \lambda_j}{\lambda_i} \leq \theta \left( 1 + \frac{\lambda_i}{\lambda_j} - \sqrt{1 - \frac{3 \lambda_j^2}{\lambda_i^2}} \right)$, or equivalently,

$$ 1 - 3\frac{\lambda_j}{\lambda_i} \geq \sqrt{1 - 3 \left( \frac{\lambda_j}{\lambda_i} \right)^2}. $$

(12)

By A1, we have $\frac{\lambda_j}{\lambda_i} \leq \frac{1}{2}$. And as observed above, we also have $\frac{\lambda_j}{\lambda_i} > 0$. For such values, (12) cannot be satisfied, and we obtain the desired contradiction.
By propositions 1 and 2, \( s^*_{\text{monopoly}} \leq s^*_{\text{duopoly}} \) if and only if \( \theta \left( 1 + \frac{\lambda_j}{X_i} \right) \leq \theta + \alpha - \sqrt{\theta^2 + \alpha^2 - \frac{4\alpha\theta\lambda_j}{X_i}} \).

Rearranging, we obtain \( \alpha - \frac{\theta\lambda_j}{X_i} \geq \sqrt{\theta^2 + \alpha^2 - \frac{4\alpha\theta\lambda_j}{X_i}} \). We have shown above that \( \alpha \geq \frac{\theta\lambda_j}{X_i} \). Thus, we can square both sides to conclude that \( s^*_{\text{monopoly}} \leq s^*_{\text{duopoly}} \) if and only if \( \alpha^2 - \frac{2\alpha\theta\lambda_j}{X_i} + \frac{\theta^2\lambda_j^2}{X_i} \geq \theta^2 + \alpha^2 - \frac{4\alpha\theta\lambda_j}{X_i} \), which, when rearranged, yields the desired condition. \( \square \)

**Proof of proposition 4.** In the case of a monopoly \( (X = 1) \), the claims follow straightforwardly from the derivatives of the expression for \( s^* \) given in proposition 1 with respect to those parameters. We therefore focus below on the case of an oligopoly \( (X \geq 2) \). In this case, the claims follow from the derivatives of the expression for \( s^* \) given in proposition 2 with respect to those parameters. To establish this, we first compute these derivatives:

\[
\frac{\partial s^*}{\partial \lambda_i} = -\frac{4\alpha\theta\lambda_j}{X_i^2 \sqrt{\theta^2 + \frac{16\alpha^2}{X_i^4} - \frac{8\alpha\theta\lambda_j}{X_i}}}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial s^*}{\partial \lambda_j} = \frac{4\alpha\theta}{\lambda_i X \sqrt{\theta^2 + \frac{16\alpha^2}{X_i^4} - \frac{8\alpha\theta\lambda_j}{X_i}}}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial s^*}{\partial \alpha} = \frac{4\theta\lambda_j}{X_i^2} - \frac{16\alpha^2}{X_i^4} + \frac{4}{X_i^7} \sqrt{\theta^2 + \frac{16\alpha^2}{X_i^4} - \frac{8\alpha\theta\lambda_j}{X_i}} - \frac{8\alpha\theta\lambda_j}{X_i}
\]

The derivatives with respect to \( \lambda_i \) and \( \lambda_j \) have the desired sign. To sign the derivative with respect to \( \alpha \), we reason from A1, which says \( \lambda_i \geq X\lambda_j \). This implies \( \frac{16\theta^2}{X_i^4 X_j^2} (\lambda_i^2 - X^2\lambda_j^2) \geq 0 \). Equivalently, \( \frac{16}{X_i^4} \left( \theta^2 + \frac{16\alpha^2}{X_i^4} - \frac{8\alpha\theta\lambda_j}{X_i} \right) \geq \left( \frac{16\alpha}{X_i^4} - \frac{4\theta\lambda_j}{X_i} \right)^2 \). This implies \( \frac{4}{X_i^7} \sqrt{\theta^2 + \frac{16\alpha^2}{X_i^4} - \frac{8\alpha\theta\lambda_j}{X_i}} \geq \frac{16\alpha}{X_i^4} - \frac{4\theta\lambda_j}{X_i} \). Thus, we conclude \( \frac{\partial s^*}{\partial \alpha} \geq 0 \). \( \square \)

**B Additional Details**

Appendix B.A summarizes in greater detail the empirical literature on fragmentation that was mentioned in section II. Appendix B.B describes the structure of the Australian market in greater detail. Appendix B.C describes our ASX and Chi-X data in greater detail and explain the steps required to process it. Appendix B.D establishes consistency of our estimation procedure. Appendix B.E describes our implementation of the estimation procedure. Appendix B.F provides details about our selection of the control group used for our analysis of the natural experiment described in section VII.
B.A  Empirical Literature on Fragmentation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paper</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Branch and Freed (1977)</td>
<td>NYSE and AMEX securities (1974)</td>
<td>cross section</td>
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B. Negative association between fragmentation and liquidity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Data</th>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
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</thead>
</table>

C. Mixed association between fragmentation and liquidity

<table>
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<th>Data</th>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boneva et al. (2016)</td>
<td>UK equities (2008–2011)</td>
<td>panel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B.B  Industry Background

This appendix describes additional details of the Australian market, including the regulatory environment, the microstructure of ASX and Chi-X, and the off-exchange trading environment.\textsuperscript{40}

**Market Integrity Rules.** The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) regulates the Australian market under the Market Integrity Rules (ASIC, 2011). In most respects, these rules are similar to Reg NMS and Reg ATS, their counterparts in the U.S.\textsuperscript{40}Other recent studies of the Australian market include He et al. (2015) and Aitken et al. (2017), both of which we have discussed in the text. In addition, Foley and Putniņš (2016) and Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2015) also study Australia, although they focus primarily upon dark trading.

\textsuperscript{40}
However, one notable difference lies in the definition of best execution. For a retail client, ASIC’s guidance is that best execution is based on total consideration, typically interpreted as the best average price.\(^{41}\) (This is in contrast to the U.S., where the order protection rule requires the best marginal price, at least for the top of the book.) For wholesale clients, ASIC’s guidance is that best execution can also include factors such as speed. Another notable difference is that payment for order flow is not allowed in Australia.\(^{42}\) There is also a minimum price improvement rule: trades that take place outside of pre-trade transparent order books must receive price improvement (although there are exceptions for block trades, large portfolio trades, and times outside of trading hours).\(^{43}\) A consequence of both of these aforementioned facts is that the proportion of retail order flow that executes on exchanges is greater in Australia than in the U.S.

Other relevant aspects of the Market Integrity Rules include a requirement that markets synchronize their clocks to within 20 milliseconds of UTC,\(^{44}\) a requirement that visible orders have priority over hidden orders at the same price,\(^{45}\) and a mandated minimum tick size (which, for equities priced above two dollars, is 1 cent).\(^{46}\)

To cover the costs of market supervision, ASIC imposes fees on market participants. Some of these fees are activity-based, which are calculated on the basis of the market share of trading activity and messaging activity at ASX and Chi-X.

**ASX.** ASX is the larger and older of Australia’s two extant exchanges, having been formed in 1987. It is operated by ASX Limited, which is a publicly traded company. ASX conducts opening and closing auctions. However, the majority of trading takes place in the intervening continuous session. During this session, ASX operates a transparent limit order book called TradeMatch. ASX TradeMatch features pre-trade anonymity for equities, although not for ETFs. In 2011, ASX introduced a second book, PureMatch, which offers fewer functionalities but faster speeds. However, PureMatch failed to attract any significant volume.

Beyond standard limit orders, ASX TradeMatch also offers the following advanced order types: (\(i\)) iceberg orders, where at least 500 shares must be displayed, (\(ii\)) undisclosed orders, in which the precise quantity is not disclosed, provided that the value of the order exceeds $0.5 million, and (\(iii\)) tailor-made combination orders, which can be used for multi-leg transactions.\(^{47}\)

**Chi-X.** Chi-X is the smaller and newer of Australia’s two exchanges. Like ASX, it is located in Sydney. Chi-X entered the Australian market in 2011. During the sample period, the exchange was operated by a subsidiary of Chi-X Global Holdings LLC, which was privately owned by a consortium of major financial institutions including BofA Merrill Lynch, GETCO

\(^{41}\)Rule 3.1.1.  
\(^{42}\)Rule 7.5.1.  
\(^{43}\)Rule 4.1.1.  
\(^{44}\)Rule 6.3.1.  
\(^{45}\)Rule 4.1.7.  
\(^{46}\)Rule 6.4.1.  
\(^{47}\)Details on these order types, as well as other aspects of the ASX operating rules are available at ASX (2016).
LLC, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Nomura Group, Quantlab Group LP, and UBS. Chi-X Global has made similar entries into other markets, including Europe, Canada, and Japan.\(^{48}\) Fewer securities are traded on Chi-X than on ASX, and in addition, Chi-X does not perform a listing function. Chi-X offers neither an opening auction nor a closing auction, but just a single limit order book. There is pre-trade anonymity for all securities.

Like ASX, Chi-X offers standard limit orders, as well as iceberg orders and undisclosed orders (but does not offer combination orders). Unlike ASX, Chi-X offers pegged orders, which can reference the bid, ask, or mid price of the national best bid and offer (NBBO). Also unlike ASX, Chi-X allows the placement of completely hidden orders, which interact with visible orders in the book. Chi-X permits broker preferencing for these hidden orders, which allows brokers to cross with their own orders regardless of time priority (yet with regard to price and visibility priority). Chi-X also allows brokers to specify a minimum executable quantity for their orders.\(^{49}\)

In addition, Chi-X also offers market on close orders, which are fully hidden and trade continuously with each other throughout the day at the ASX closing price (both before and after that price is determined).

**Other trading.** While the ASX and Chi-X books serve as the main trading venues in Australia, there also exist several other modes of trading, including crossing systems, block trading, and internalization. The largest crossing system is CentrePoint, which is operated by ASX. CentrePoint trades take place at the prevailing TradeMatch mid price, and the venue features full pre-trade anonymity (ASX, 2012a). Other functionalities include (i) the ability to specify a minimum executable quantity, (ii) broker preferencing, and (iii) sweep orders, which allow for simultaneous access of CentrePoint and TradeMatch.

Excluding CentrePoint, twenty other crossing systems, with sixteen separate operators, were active at the beginning of our sample (ASIC, 2016). By the end of our sample, those numbers had fallen to eighteen crossing systems and fifteen operators. The largest of these crossing systems are those operated by Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, and Citigroup (ASIC, 2015). These crossing systems account for just 2.4% of total equity market turnover (ASIC, 2015). Additionally, they are not required to provide fair access, and many are accessible by only a small number of traders.

Block trades comprise the majority of off-exchange trading. The minimum size requirement for a block trade is $0.2 million, $0.5 million, or $1 million, depending upon the category of the security in question. Unlike smaller off-exchange trades, which, under the Market Integrity Rules, must receive price improvement relative to the NBBO, block trades can be negotiated at any price.

\(^{48}\)Chi-X Global has sold all their exchanges since then, although the exchanges continue to operate. In particular, Chi-X Europe was sold to Bats Global Markets in 2011, Chi-X Canada was sold to Nasdaq in 2015, and both Chi-X Australia and Chi-X Japan were sold to private equity firm JC Flowers in 2016.

\(^{49}\)Details on the operating rules of Chi-X are available at Chi-X (2013).
B.C Data

The raw data are binary encoded files, which constitute the feeds of ASX and Chi-X: “ITCH – Glimpse” (ASX, 2012b) and “Chi-X MD Feed” (Chi-X, 2012), respectively. The outbound feeds of both exchanges are based on NASDAQ’s proprietary ITCH protocol. These data are a complete historical record of the information that market participants observe in real-time for a fee. Every trading day is recorded in a separate file, within which messages are recorded chronologically.

These messages are sufficient to construct the lit book at each exchange at any point in time and also to identify all trades that take place in the lit book. Two steps of processing are necessary to obtain that information: message parsing and order book reconstruction. We implement routines to do both using the high-performance computing system Blacklight at the Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center, as part of an allocation at XSEDE (Extreme Science and Engineering Discovery Environment).

Message parsing. Every message is binary encoded using MoldUDP64, a networking protocol that allows efficient and scaleable transmission of data. A message is read in as a message block. The first two bytes of the block specify the length of the message, therefore revealing where the message ends and the next begins. The third byte specifies the message type. The interpretation of the remainder of the message depends on the message type. See table 7 for examples of the information embedded in several common message types.

Every second, a timestamp message is broadcast. Other message types include add orders, cancellations, and executions of existing orders. Those messages specify the time, in nanoseconds, relative to the previous timestamp message, as well as any incremental changes to the lit book.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{50}Rather than transmit, for example, the current bid and ask prices, only incremental changes to the book are broadcast. This is to ensure high-performance for latency-sensitive traders.
Table 7: Examples of ASX Message Data Formats

A sample of ASX message specifications (ASX, 2012b). The length of a field is measured in number of bytes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Message Type</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timestamp Message</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message Type</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>“T”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Numeric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Add Order Message</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message Type</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>“A”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timestamp – Nanoseconds</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Numeric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order ID</td>
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<td>Numeric</td>
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<tr>
<td>Order Book ID</td>
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<td>Numeric</td>
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<tr>
<td>Side (Buy or Sell)</td>
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<td>Alpha</td>
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<tr>
<td>Order Book Position</td>
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<tr>
<td>Price</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Order Delete Message</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message Type</td>
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<td>“D”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timestamp – Nanoseconds</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Numeric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order ID</td>
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<td>Numeric</td>
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<td>Order Book ID</td>
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<td>Side (Buy or Sell)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Side (Buy or Sell)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Order book reconstruction. To reconstruct the limit order books, we follow the detailed instructions in ASX (2012b, section 2.9) and Chi-X (2012, section 5). We outline the steps below. Each message conveys only an incremental change. Therefore, reconstructing the lit order book for a given day and security requires re-running the message broadcast in chronological order beginning at market open and replicating the matching process used by the exchange. When an add order arrives, it is added to the book at the limit price that it specifies. In case of a cancellation, the active order in question is removed. Finally, in the event of an execution, the affected order is removed or its quantity is adjusted. The time series of inside quotes can then be computed by reading off the bid and ask that prevail after the processing of each message.

Lit book volume. The exchange feeds distinguish between two types of trades. First are on-exchange trades in which the passive order had been visible (either a fully visible order or the visible portion of an iceberg order). Our analysis focuses solely on these trades, which we call lit book volume.51 As discussed in section V.B, the remainder includes (i) trading in the ASX opening and closing crosses, (ii) off-exchange trading (e.g., trading in crossing systems, block trades, and internalization), and (iii) on-exchange trades in which the passive order

---

51In the ASX feed, these are the trades associated with “E” or “C” messages (ASX, 2012b, section 2.6.2), and in the Chi-X feed, these are the trades associated with “E” messages (Chi-X, 2012, section 5.3).
had not been visible (either a fully hidden order, the hidden portion of an iceberg order, or an undisclosed order).

**B.D Consistency**

This appendix establishes consistency of the nonlinear least squares (NLS) estimation procedure described in section VI.A. While we assume that, conditional on the quotes, both $\varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{buy}}$ and $\varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{sell}}$ have mean zero, it would not be correct to make the same assumption for $\varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{spread}}$. Therefore, consistency of our estimation procedure does not follow immediately from the standard arguments that typically establish consistency of NLS. Nevertheless, consistency is restored by two special features of the model. First, $\lambda_j$ is excluded from equations (8) and (9). Second, we have the following property related to equation (10): for $(\hat{\alpha}, \hat{\theta}, \hat{\lambda}_i)$ in a neighborhood of $(\alpha, \theta, \lambda_i)$, $\hat{\theta} + \alpha - \sqrt{\theta^2 + \alpha^2 - 4\alpha\theta\lambda_j}/\lambda_i$ is an injective function of $\lambda_j$ in a neighborhood of $\lambda_j$, which contains a neighborhood of $\theta + \alpha - \sqrt{\theta^2 + \alpha^2 - 4\alpha\theta\lambda_j}/\lambda_i$ in its range.

**Proposition 5.** Assuming that the data generation process is as described in section VI.A, where the parameters satisfy A1, A2 and A3, the NLS estimation procedure described in section VI.A is consistent for those parameters.

**Proof.** Define

$$Q_T(\alpha, \theta, \lambda_i, \lambda_j) = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{x \in \{ASX, Chi-X\}} \left( \varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{buy}} \right)^2 + \left( \varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{sell}} \right)^2 + \left( \varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{spread}} \right)^2$$

and

$$\tilde{Q}_T(\alpha, \theta, \lambda_i) = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{x \in \{ASX, Chi-X\}} \left( \varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{buy}} \right)^2 + \left( \varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{sell}} \right)^2,$$

where $\varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{buy}}$, $\varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{sell}}$, and $\varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{spread}}$ are as defined implicitly by equations (8), (9), and (10), respectively. The NLS estimates are then a selection

$$(\hat{\alpha}, \hat{\theta}, \hat{\lambda}_i, \hat{\lambda}_j) \in \arg \min_{\alpha, \theta, \lambda_i, \lambda_j} Q_T(\alpha, \theta, \lambda_i, \lambda_j).$$

Define also

$$\bar{s} = \frac{1}{2T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{x \in \{ASX, Chi-X\}} s_{x,t}.$$

Finally, define

$$\tilde{Q}_T^* = \left\{ (\hat{\alpha}, \hat{\theta}, \hat{\lambda}_i, \hat{\lambda}_j) \left| \begin{array}{l} (\hat{\alpha}, \hat{\theta}, \hat{\lambda}_i) \in \arg \min_{\alpha, \theta, \lambda_i} \tilde{Q}_T(\alpha, \theta, \lambda_i), \\ \text{and} \hat{\lambda}_j = \frac{\lambda_j}{\delta} \left( 2\bar{s}\tilde{s} + 2\hat{\theta}\bar{s} - \bar{s}^2 - 2\hat{\alpha}\hat{\theta} \right) \end{array} \right\}.$$

With these definitions in hand, we complete the proof by establishing two claims.
Claim 1: Any selection \((\tilde{\alpha}, \tilde{\theta}, \tilde{\lambda}_i, \tilde{\lambda}_j) \in \tilde{Q}_T^*\) is consistent for \((\alpha, \theta, \lambda_i, \lambda_j)\).

Proof of claim: By the assumptions imposed upon \(\varepsilon_{\text{buy}}^{x,t}\) and \(\varepsilon_{\text{sell}}^{x,t}\), the usual arguments for consistency of NLS establish that

\[
(\tilde{\alpha}, \tilde{\theta}, \tilde{\lambda}_i) \overset{p}{\to} (\alpha, \theta, \lambda_i).
\]

Standard arguments also imply

\[
\tilde{s} \overset{p}{\to} \theta + \alpha - \sqrt{\theta^2 + \alpha^2 - \frac{4\alpha \theta \lambda_j}{\lambda_i}}.
\]

Thus, the continuous mapping theorem yields

\[
\tilde{\lambda}_j \overset{p}{\to} \lambda_j.
\]

Claim 2: The NLS estimates \((\hat{\alpha}, \hat{\theta}, \hat{\lambda}_i, \hat{\lambda}_j)\) converge almost surely, and hence in probability, to \(\tilde{Q}_T^*\).

Proof of claim: First note that

\[
Q_T(\hat{\alpha}, \hat{\theta}, \hat{\lambda}_i, \hat{\lambda}_j) = \tilde{Q}_T(\hat{\alpha}, \hat{\theta}, \hat{\lambda}_i) + \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{x \in \{\text{ASX,Chi-X}\}} \left( s_{x,t} - \hat{\theta} - \hat{\alpha} + \sqrt{\hat{\theta}^2 + \hat{\alpha}^2 - \frac{4\hat{\alpha} \hat{\theta} \lambda_j}{\lambda_i}} \right)^2
\]

\[
\geq \min_{\alpha, \theta, \lambda_i} \tilde{Q}_T(\alpha, \theta, \lambda_i) + \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{x \in \{\text{ASX,Chi-X}\}} (s_{x,t} - \bar{s})^2.
\]

(13)

A parameter vector \((\hat{\alpha}, \hat{\theta}, \hat{\lambda}_i, \hat{\lambda}_j)\) achieves the lower bound (13) only if both of the following conditions hold:

\[
(\hat{\alpha}, \hat{\theta}, \hat{\lambda}_i) \in \arg \min_{\alpha, \theta, \lambda_i} \tilde{Q}_T(\alpha, \theta, \lambda_i)
\]

\[
\hat{\theta} + \hat{\alpha} - \sqrt{\hat{\theta}^2 + \hat{\alpha}^2 - \frac{4\hat{\alpha} \hat{\theta} \lambda_j}{\lambda_i}} = \bar{s}
\]

Note that the second of these conditions holds only if

\[
\hat{\lambda}_j = \frac{\hat{\lambda}_i}{4\hat{\alpha} \hat{\theta}} \left( 2\hat{\alpha} \bar{s} + 2\hat{\theta} \bar{s} - \bar{s}^2 - 2\hat{\alpha} \hat{\theta} \right).
\]

Thus, the lower bound (13) is achieved only if \((\hat{\alpha}, \hat{\theta}, \hat{\lambda}_i, \hat{\lambda}_j) \in \tilde{Q}_T^*\).

Let \(\delta > 0\) and take a selection \((\tilde{\alpha}, \tilde{\theta}, \tilde{\lambda}_i, \tilde{\lambda}_j) \in \tilde{Q}_T^*\). We have seen that \(\bar{s} \overset{p}{\to} \theta + \alpha - \sqrt{\theta^2 + \alpha^2 - 4\alpha \theta \lambda_j/\lambda_i}\) and that \(\tilde{\theta} + \tilde{\alpha} \overset{p}{\to} \theta + \alpha\). Thus, \(\tilde{\theta} + \tilde{\alpha} - \bar{s} \overset{p}{\to} \sqrt{\theta^2 + \alpha^2 - 4\alpha \theta \lambda_j/\lambda_i}\). By
Lemma 1(iv), this limit is strictly positive. There thus exists some $T'$ such that if $T \geq T'$, then $\Pr(\bar{s} \leq \tilde{\theta} + \hat{\alpha}) > 1 - \delta$. In such circumstances,

$$\tilde{\theta} + \hat{\alpha} - \sqrt{\hat{\beta}^2 + 4\hat{\alpha} \lambda_j \lambda_i} = \bar{s}.$$ 

Since we also have

$$(\tilde{\alpha}, \tilde{\theta}, \tilde{\lambda}_i) \in \arg\min_{\alpha, \theta, \lambda_i} \tilde{Q}_T(\alpha, \theta, \lambda_i),$$

$(\tilde{\alpha}, \tilde{\theta}, \tilde{\lambda}_i, \tilde{\lambda}_j)$ achieves the lower bound (13). To summarize: in such circumstances, the lower bound (13) is achievable, and so any selection $(\hat{\alpha}, \hat{\theta}, \hat{\lambda}_i, \hat{\lambda}_j) \in \arg\min_{\alpha, \theta, \lambda_i, \lambda_j} Q_T(\alpha, \theta, \lambda_i, \lambda_j)$ must achieve it and must therefore be contained in $\tilde{Q}_T^\ast$.

\section*{B.E Estimation}

**Estimation procedure.** Estimation is conducted by minimizing the NLS objective function (11), as described in section VI.A. This minimization was performed using SNOPT (Gill, Wong, Murray and Saunders, 2015). To evade the possibility of identifying a local minimum that is not the global minimum, we repeat the optimization for 200 different randomly chosen starting values. During estimation we impose non-negativity constraints on the parameters.

**Standard errors.** We use a bootstrap procedure to compute standard errors. To allow for temporal dependence, we use a block bootstrap. The asymptotically optimal block length grows with the sample size $T$ at a rate proportional to $T^{1/3}$ (Hall, Horowitz and Jing, 1995). In our case, $T = 1,584,000$, which gives $T^{1/3} \approx 117$. So as to avoid blocks that span days, which would not correctly capture the dependence in the data, we use non-overlapping blocks and round to a block length of 120 seconds. Thus, each of the 80 trading days in the sample is divided into 165 blocks. For each bootstrap replication we draw $165 \times 80$ blocks with replacement. Standard errors are computed based on 200 bootstrap replications.

**Discussion of estimation approach.** GMM is a popular class of estimators, which has been used to estimate other models of limit order book trading (e.g. Sandás, 2001; Biais, Bisière and Spatt, 2010). Our estimation procedure is also encompassed by the GMM framework, with the sample moment conditions being the first order conditions of equation (11) with respect to the parameters.\footnote{Establishing that uses the fact that the error terms in equations (8), (9), and (10) enter additively (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 168).}

In addition, others have used MLE to estimate models of limit order book trading (e.g. Glosten and Harris, 1988; Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman, 1996; Easley, Engle, O’Hara and Wu, 2008). In principle, we could have done the same, but this would require parametrizing the error terms in equations (8), (9), and (10). Since our sample is large, it seems unlikely that the efficiency gains brought by MLE would be sufficient to justify additional distribu-
tional assumptions.

B.F Control Group Selection

In this appendix we provide details about the selection of the control group that we have used in the analysis of the Chi-X shutdown in section VII, where the results of that analysis are reported in column (5) of table 6. The control group consists of eight securities that are similar to STW in that they are also ETFs with exposure to Australian equities. However, unlike STW, they were not traded on Chi-X in June 2014.

To construct the control group, we start from a list of all 17 ETFs traded on ASX with exposure to Australian equity securities as of February 2017 (ASX, 2017). One of these ETFs is STW, the focus of our analysis. Six of these ETFs were admitted only after June 2014, and are therefore discarded. Another two were also traded on Chi-X as of June 2014, so they are discarded as well, which leaves us with the remaining eight ETFs that constitute the control group for our analysis. Table 8 summarizes them.

Table 8: Australian Equity ETFs, June 2014

The control group is selected from the set of ETFs with exposure to Australian equities provided by ASX (2017). Such an ETF is selected into the control group if (i) it existed in June 2014; and (ii) it was traded on ASX but not on Chi-X as of May 30, 2014. An ETF’s admission date refers to when it was first admitted for trading at ASX.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Benchmark</th>
<th>Admission Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Control Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOZ</td>
<td>S&amp;P/ASX 200</td>
<td>Dec 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISO</td>
<td>S&amp;P/ASX Small Ordinaries</td>
<td>Dec 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MVW</td>
<td>MVIS Australia Equal Weight Index</td>
<td>Mar 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QOZ</td>
<td>FTSE RAFI Australia 200</td>
<td>Jul 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSO</td>
<td>S&amp;P/ASX Small Ordinaries</td>
<td>Apr 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAS</td>
<td>S&amp;P/ASX 300</td>
<td>May 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VLC</td>
<td>MSCI Large Cap Index</td>
<td>May 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSO</td>
<td>MSCI Small Cap Index</td>
<td>May 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Treatment Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STW</td>
<td>S&amp;P/ASX 200</td>
<td>Aug 2001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C Additional Counterfactuals

Appendix C.A investigates the consequences of replacing the limit order book with either of two counterfactual trading mechanisms: frequent batch auctions or non-cancellation delays. Appendix C.B investigates the counterfactual in which an order protection rule is applied to the Australian market.
C.A Alternative Trading Mechanisms

A current debate among policy makers, industry participants, and researchers concerns whether alternative trading mechanisms can improve upon the prevailing limit order book. In this section, we consider the counterfactual of the model under two of those alternatives: frequent batch auctions and non-cancellation delays.

The frequent batch auction mechanism would replace the limit order book with sealed-bid, uniform price double auctions conducted at discrete intervals. Frequent batch auctions are the focus of Budish et al. (2015), who show that they improve upon the limit order book by eliminating stale-quote sniping on the basis of public news, and the same remains true in our extension of their framework. The intuition is as follows. Frequent batch auctions delay the processing of all orders received during a batch interval until the end of that interval, which ensures that orders submitted at the same time are processed together. This effectively allows liquidity providers to update their stale quotes before they can be sniped, thereby eliminating this source of adverse selection.

The non-cancellation delay mechanism would modify the limit order book by adding a small, possibly random, delay to all orders except cancellations. It is considered by Baldauf and Mollner (forthcoming), who show that it also eliminates what they refer to as “aggressive-side order anticipation.” But, more relevant to the model considered in this paper, it also eliminates stale-quote sniping on the basis of public news. The intuition is as follows. When the liquidity provider submits an order to cancel a mispriced quote at the same time that a sniper submits an order to trade against that mispriced quote, either could be processed first under the limit order book mechanism. In contrast, under non-cancellation delays, the cancellation is guaranteed to be processed first.

In this model, stale-quote sniping is the only source of adverse selection. Thus, the consequences of eliminating it are mathematically equivalent to what would transpire if there were never any jumps in the fundamental value of the security (i.e., \( \lambda_j = 0 \)). While this can be established formally, we omit the derivation in the interest of brevity. Given this, immediate corollaries of propositions 1 and 2 are the following characterizations of the spread that prevails under either frequent batch auctions or non-cancellation delays.

**Corollary 6.** With a single exchange \((X = 1)\) that uses either frequent batch auctions or non-cancellation delays, there exists a SPNE with spread

\[
s_{FBA}^* = s_{ND}^* = \theta.
\]

**Corollary 7.** With multiple exchanges \((X \geq 2)\) that use either frequent batch auctions or non-cancellation delays, there exists a SPNE with spread

\[
s_{FBA}^* = s_{ND}^* = \theta + 2\alpha X - \sqrt{\theta^2 + \frac{4\alpha^2}{X^2}}.
\]

In addition, an immediate corollary of proposition 4 is that frequent batch auctions and non-cancellation delays result in a spread that is guaranteed to be smaller than that which
prevails under the limit order book. The intuition is that, by eliminating stale-quote sniping, these alternative trading mechanisms eliminate the portion of the spread stemming from adverse selection, leaving only the portion stemming from the market power of exchanges.

**Corollary 8.** $s^*_{FBA} = s^*_{ND} \leq s^*$.

Theory therefore dictates that either frequent batch auctions or non-cancellation delays would improve outcomes by reducing transaction costs. What is more, our empirical approach can quantify this reduction. Evaluating the expressions from corollaries 6 and 7 at the estimated parameters, we find that in the counterfactual of frequent batch auctions or non-cancellation delays, the duopoly spread is 52.4% lower relative to the spread in the prevailing limit order book duopoly (cf. column 2 in table 9).

Moreover, since frequent batch auctions and non-cancellation delays eliminate all adverse selection from the model, they also shut down the exposure channel. Thus, fragmentation unambiguously lowers spreads under the regimes of frequent batch auctions and non-cancellation delays. This reverses the ranking of the duopoly and monopoly spreads relative to what prevailed under the limit order book. Under these alternative mechanisms, moving from duopoly to monopoly raises spreads by 11.5%, from 1.37 to 1.53¢. Furthermore, a triopoly is not only feasible, but also would feature spreads that are still lower.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9: Cum-Fee Spreads Under Various Counterfactuals (Cents)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The counterfactual spreads are based on the parameter estimates in table 4. Rows refer to trading mechanisms, and columns refer to the number of exchanges. At the parameter estimates, an equilibrium with three exchanges actively operating limit order books is inconsistent with A2 and A3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of exchanges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>limit order book</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>frequent batch auctions/non-cancellation delays</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**C.B Order Protection Rule**

One of the stipulations of Reg NMS in the U.S. is the order protection rule (also known as Rule 611, or the trade-through rule). It requires trading venues to maintain and enforce procedures that limit the possibility of a trade occurring on that venue when a better price is available elsewhere. In contrast, the legal framework governing trading in Australia does not currently incorporate an order protection rule. In this appendix, we use the estimated model to shed some light on the counterfactual in which Australia were to adopt such a rule.

The most natural way to interpret an order protection rule within the model would be as a reduction in $\alpha$, the magnitude of the frictions that prevent investors from filling their orders at the best price. Proposition 4 implies that such a reduction in $\alpha$ would lead to a reduction of the spread. The remainder of this appendix is dedicated to quantifying the extent of this reduction.
It is unclear what the precise magnitude of the reduction in $\alpha$ would be. In particular, we likely would not expect a complete eradication of market frictions (i.e., a full reduction of $\alpha$ to zero). Rather, some residual frictions would likely remain, due, for example, to (i) difficulties with monitoring prices in real time, (ii) imperfect enforcement of the rule, or (iii) discrete prices.

Moreover, the value of $\alpha$ cannot be reduced arbitrarily without violating A3, evaluated in the case of a duopoly. If the effect of the rule were to reduce $\alpha$ below this threshold, then competition among exchanges would be intensified to such an extent that it would be impossible for both ASX and Chi-X to operate profitably, and we might expect a reduction in the number of exchanges in the long run. In such cases, the relevant counterfactual would be the monopoly case. On the other hand, if $\alpha$ remains above this threshold, then exchange profitability would be reduced but might not be completely eliminated. The precise value of this threshold depends upon $\sigma$. While our procedure does not produce an estimate of $\sigma$, a lower bound for it is given by A2. Evaluating at that lower bound, we obtain a corresponding lower bound for the threshold: $\bar{\alpha} = 2.772$ is the smallest value of $\alpha$ that is consistent with the model assumptions at the parameter estimates, such that a duopoly remains feasible.

Figure 3 illustrates the counterfactual analysis. The solid line represents the spread that would prevail in a duopoly for values of $\alpha$ below that estimated in the data, yet above $\bar{\alpha}$. This is the relevant counterfactual if A3 remains satisfied given the new value of $\alpha$ and given the value of $\sigma$. The dashed line depicts the monopoly spread. It is the relevant counterfactual if A3 is violated given the new value of $\alpha$ and given the value of $\sigma$. Interestingly, this analysis suggests that the effects of an order protection rule would be fairly minimal, except for the case in which the rule induces the exit of an exchange. The reason for this is that the estimated model indicates that existing competition between ASX and Chi-X is such that their profit margins are already fairly thin. There is therefore not much scope for intensifying this competition without eliminating exchange profitability altogether.
Figure 3: Counterfactual Spreads with Order Protection

The figure plots the counterfactual spreads for monopoly (dashed line) and duopoly (solid line) for values of $\alpha$ below the estimate of the parameter (cf. table 4), yet large enough to be consistent with the estimates of the other parameters and the assumptions of the model (viz. A2 and A3).

D Robustness of Estimates

In appendix D.A, we demonstrate that the results of our estimation procedure are robust to alternative choices of the cutoff that is used to distinguish between isolated and clustered trades. In appendix D.B, we demonstrate that our results are also robust to using only buys or only sells as the basis for estimation, and we also show that we fail to reject an overidentifying restriction. Finally, in appendix D.C, we also demonstrate robustness with respect to the timeframe of the sample.

D.A Robustness to Classification Error

For the empirical analysis in the main text, we use a one second cutoff for distinguishing between isolated and clustered trades: a lit book trade is classified as isolated if no other such trade occurs in the same direction within one second on either exchange, and it is classified as clustered otherwise. This appendix demonstrates that the main results are robust to changes in this cutoff.

Column (3) of table 10 contains the baseline results reported in the main text. To construct the remaining columns, we repeat our estimation procedure for four alternative choices of this cutoff, ranging from 0.1 seconds to 5 seconds. The table reveals that the precise definition of what separates an isolated trade from a clustered trade—at least within this range—has very little impact on the parameter estimates and, consequently, does not change the results qualitatively. Over these different robustness checks, the counterfactual
monopoly spread is never smaller than 2.19¢ and never larger than 2.28¢.

Table 10: Estimates for Different Definitions of Isolated/Clustered Trades

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>value of cutoff (seconds)</th>
<th>0.1</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. parameter estimates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>α</td>
<td>9.64338***</td>
<td>4.92955***</td>
<td>7.33504***</td>
<td>12.10799***</td>
<td>5.48684***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.45972)</td>
<td>(0.71493)</td>
<td>(1.06129)</td>
<td>(1.77839)</td>
<td>(0.76835)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>θ</td>
<td>1.6213***</td>
<td>1.57209***</td>
<td>1.52817***</td>
<td>1.54993***</td>
<td>1.48682***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16318)</td>
<td>(0.17743)</td>
<td>(0.15127)</td>
<td>(0.14898)</td>
<td>(0.16159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>λ_i</td>
<td>0.00184***</td>
<td>0.00176***</td>
<td>0.00172***</td>
<td>0.00166***</td>
<td>0.00164***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00024)</td>
<td>(0.00024)</td>
<td>(0.00022)</td>
<td>(0.00022)</td>
<td>(0.00023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>λ_j</td>
<td>0.00074***</td>
<td>0.00077***</td>
<td>0.00078***</td>
<td>0.00072***</td>
<td>0.00078***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00012)</td>
<td>(0.00012)</td>
<td>(0.00012)</td>
<td>(0.00012)</td>
<td>(0.00011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. counterfactual spreads</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monopoly</td>
<td>2.27722***</td>
<td>2.26421***</td>
<td>2.22093***</td>
<td>2.22753***</td>
<td>2.19527***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1065)</td>
<td>(0.14064)</td>
<td>(0.10647)</td>
<td>(0.09287)</td>
<td>(0.12471)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>duopoly</td>
<td>2.87885***</td>
<td>2.87885***</td>
<td>2.87885***</td>
<td>2.87885***</td>
<td>2.87885***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00476)</td>
<td>(0.00457)</td>
<td>(0.0048)</td>
<td>(0.00497)</td>
<td>(0.0046)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D.B Robustness: Side of the Book

In the main text, we report parameter estimates based on an estimation procedure that leverages both buys and sells. In this appendix, we first demonstrate that we obtain similar results from estimation procedures that leverage only buys or only sells. We then use this framework as the basis for testing an overidentifying restriction implied by the model.

Column (3) of table 11 contains the baseline results reported in the main text. Columns (1) and (2) report the results obtained from analogous estimation procedures that are based on only buys or only sells, respectively. To describe those estimation procedures in more
detail, consider the following estimating equations:

\[(14)\]
\[
\text{buy}_{x,t} = \lambda_B^2 \left[ \frac{1}{2} + \frac{a_{x,t} - a_{x,t}}{\alpha_B} \right] \left[ 1 - \frac{a_{x,t} - v_t}{\theta_B^2} \right]_0 + \varepsilon_{x,t} \]

\[(15)\]
\[
\text{sell}_{x,t} = \lambda_S^2 \left[ \frac{1}{2} + \frac{b_{x,t} - b_{x,t}}{\alpha_S} \right] \left[ 1 - \frac{b_{x,t} - v_t}{\theta_S} \right]_0 + \varepsilon_{x,t} \]

\[
s_{x,t} = \theta_B + \alpha_B - \sqrt{(\theta_B)^2 + (\alpha_B)^2 - \frac{4\alpha_B \theta_B \lambda_B}{\lambda_B^2}} + \varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{spread, buy}} \]

\[
s_{x,t} = \theta_S + \alpha_S - \sqrt{(\theta_S)^2 + (\alpha_S)^2 - \frac{4\alpha_S \theta_S \lambda_S}{\lambda_S^2}} + \varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{spread, sell}} \]

As before, \(t\) indexes the seconds in the sample and \(x\) indexes the exchanges \{ASX, Chi-X\}. And as before, we proxy for \(v_t\) with the average mid price \((b_{\text{ASX, } t} + b_{\text{Chi-X, } t} + a_{\text{ASX, } t} + a_{\text{Chi-X, } t})/4\) in both (14) and (15).

The estimation procedure for buys is to minimize the objective

\[
Q_T^B(\alpha_B, \theta_B, \lambda_B^2, \lambda_B^2) = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{x \in \{\text{ASX, Chi-X}\}} (\varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{buy}})^2 + \frac{1}{2} (\varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{spread, buy}})^2
\]

Likewise, the estimation procedure for sells is to minimize the objective

\[
Q_T^S(\alpha_S, \theta_S, \lambda_S^2, \lambda_S^2) = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{x \in \{\text{ASX, Chi-X}\}} (\varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{sell}})^2 + \frac{1}{2} (\varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{spread, sell}})^2
\]

Comparing across the columns of table 11, the point estimates do differ somewhat depending on the estimation procedure. However, the counterfactual monopoly spreads are remarkably similar.

Note that we can perform the buy and sell estimation procedures jointly by minimizing the objective

\[
Q_T^J(\alpha_B, \theta_B, \lambda_B^2, \alpha_S, \theta_S, \lambda_S^2, \lambda_S^2) = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{x \in \{\text{ASX, Chi-X}\}} \sum_{i \in \{\text{buy, sell}\}} (\varepsilon_{x,t}^i)^2 + \frac{1}{2} (\varepsilon_{x,t}^{\text{spread, } i})^2
\]

Doing so allows us to test the restriction that the parameters in the buy and sell equations are equal: \(\alpha_B = \alpha_S, \theta_B = \theta_S, \lambda_B^2 = \lambda_S^2, \lambda_B^2 = \lambda_S^2\). To do so, we perform a standard Wald test of this joint restriction using the bootstrapped variance-covariance matrix. We compute a test statistic of 6.75, based on which we conclude that we fail to reject the Null of parameter equality, even at the ten percent level.\(^{53}\)

Finally, note that the baseline estimation is equivalent to performing the above joint

\(^{53}\)The critical values of the \(\chi^2\) distribution with four degrees of freedom are 13.28, 9.49, and 7.78, for a 1%, 5%, or 10% test, respectively.
estimation with the restrictions in place. As a result, the aforementioned test can also be interpreted as a test of an overidentifying restriction for our estimation procedure.

Table 11: Estimates Based on Buys and Sells

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Point estimates are computed to minimize the objective (11). Standard errors are based on 200 block bootstrap replications. Columns refer to different objective functions. Column (3) is based on minimizing the objective $Q_T$, as described in section VI.A. Columns (1) and (2) are based on minimizing the objectives $Q_B^T$ and $Q_S^T$, respectively, as described in this appendix. Panel B shows the corresponding counterfactual monopoly and duopoly spreads (calculated from propositions 1 and 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Buy</th>
<th>Sell</th>
<th>Joint</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. parameter estimates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>8.73269***</td>
<td>4.92870***</td>
<td>7.33504***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.25134)</td>
<td>(0.70999)</td>
<td>(1.06129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta$</td>
<td>1.52424***</td>
<td>1.56523***</td>
<td>1.52817***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15689)</td>
<td>(0.18383)</td>
<td>(0.15127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_i$</td>
<td>0.00162***</td>
<td>0.00173***</td>
<td>0.00172***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00023)</td>
<td>(0.00022)</td>
<td>(0.00022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_j$</td>
<td>0.00073***</td>
<td>0.00077***</td>
<td>0.00078***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00011)</td>
<td>(0.00013)</td>
<td>(0.00012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. counterfactual spreads</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monopoly</td>
<td>2.21552***</td>
<td>2.25878***</td>
<td>2.22093***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10531)</td>
<td>(0.14853)</td>
<td>(0.10647)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>duopoly</td>
<td>2.87885***</td>
<td>2.87885***</td>
<td>2.87885***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00478)</td>
<td>(0.00480)</td>
<td>(0.00480)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D.C Robustness: Timeframe

In table 12 we investigate whether the parameter estimates are constant over time. Column (5) of the table contains the baseline results reported in the main text. To construct the remaining columns, we repeat our estimation procedure for subsamples of trading days pertaining to February, March, April, and May of 2014. Although some of the point estimates differ, the monopoly spread, which is our key counterfactual, remains quite stable across subsamples.
Table 12: Estimates for Different Months

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Point estimates are computed to minimize the objective (11). Standard errors are based on 200 block bootstrap replications. Columns refer to different samples. Panel B shows the corresponding counterfactual monopoly and duopoly spreads (calculated from propositions 1 and 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Full</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. parameter estimates</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>7.33507***</td>
<td>9.64332***</td>
<td>4.92913***</td>
<td>12.108***</td>
<td>7.33504***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.05744)</td>
<td>(1.429)</td>
<td>(0.69578)</td>
<td>(1.73488)</td>
<td>(1.06129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta$</td>
<td>1.52989***</td>
<td>1.62702***</td>
<td>1.56615***</td>
<td>1.5516***</td>
<td>1.52817***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15613)</td>
<td>(0.16883)</td>
<td>(0.16855)</td>
<td>(0.16920)</td>
<td>(0.15127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_i$</td>
<td>0.00172***</td>
<td>0.00184***</td>
<td>0.00177***</td>
<td>0.00166***</td>
<td>0.00172***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00023)</td>
<td>(0.00025)</td>
<td>(0.00023)</td>
<td>(0.00023)</td>
<td>(0.00022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_j$</td>
<td>0.00078***</td>
<td>0.00075***</td>
<td>0.00076***</td>
<td>0.00073***</td>
<td>0.00078***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00013)</td>
<td>(0.00013)</td>
<td>(0.00012)</td>
<td>(0.00012)</td>
<td>(0.00012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. counterfactual spreads</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monopoly</td>
<td>2.22558***</td>
<td>2.29256***</td>
<td>2.24185***</td>
<td>2.23249***</td>
<td>2.22092***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11048)</td>
<td>(0.11138)</td>
<td>(0.13515)</td>
<td>(0.10489)</td>
<td>(0.10647)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>duopoly</td>
<td>2.88732***</td>
<td>2.906***</td>
<td>2.83104***</td>
<td>2.88767***</td>
<td>2.87884***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01248)</td>
<td>(0.00932)</td>
<td>(0.00911)</td>
<td>(0.01032)</td>
<td>(0.00480)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E Additional Evidence

Appendix E.A provides a graph to compare the distribution of the ASX spread on the day of the Chi-X shutdown to the corresponding distribution on the surrounding days. Appendix E.B demonstrates that the results we obtain in our analysis of the Chi-X shutdown (cf. section VII.B) survive even if we control for traded volume in various ways. Appendix E.C presents reduced form evidence of the own-price and cross-price elasticities, which are at the heart of the demand system for investors that is postulated by the model. Finally, appendix E.D demonstrates that clustered trades predict subsequent price movements better than isolated trades, which supports our use of isolated trades as a proxy for trades that are precipitated by liquidity-motivated investors and clustered trades as a proxy for trades that are precipitated by information-motived snipers.

E.A Natural Experiment: Distribution of ASX Spread

Figure 4 displays the probability mass function of the empirical distribution of the quoted spread on ASX for each of the trading days of June 2014. In the figure, the day of the Chi-X shutdown is labeled “monopoly,” and remaining days are labeled “duopoly.” Consistent with the analysis of section VII.B, the figure illustrates that quoted spreads are on average lower
on the monopoly day than on the surrounding duopoly days. In particular, the right tail of 
the spread distribution is much thinner on the monopoly day.

Figure 4: Distribution of ASX Quoted Spread of STW, June 2014

Probability mass functions of the empirical distribution of quoted bid-ask spreads (cents) of STW on ASX 
for each of the 20 trading days of June 2014. For each day, the sample comprises all seconds between 11:08 
and 16:00.

E.B Natural Experiment: Controlling for Volume

In terms of total volume, the monopoly day is in the bottom quartile of the trading days 
in June 2014. A potential concern is therefore that our findings are driven not by the Chi-X 
shutdown but by alternative factors that are correlated with low volume. Table 13 addresses 
this concern in two ways. First, we show that our results survive even if we restrict our 
analysis to samples of low-volume days. Columns (1) and (2) replicate columns (1) and (5) 
of table 6 for days in the bottom quartile with respect to total volume. Columns (3) and (4) 
do the same for days in the bottom half. Second, we show that our results survive even if 
volume is added as a control variable. Column (5) adds volume as a control but otherwise 
replicates column (1) of table 6.
Table 13: ASX spreads, Australian Equity ETFs, June 2014
(Controlling for Volume)

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The dependent variable is the cum-fee spread in cents prevailing on ASX at the beginning of the second. An observation is a pair: a second between 11:08 and 16:00 in June 2014 and a security traded on ASX. STW × Monopoly is an indicator for June 16, 2014 and STW. Volume is total STW volume for Australia, as obtained from Bloomberg. Samples for the respective columns are: (1) trading days on which total STW volume was in the bottom quartile of June 2014 and STW, (2) trading days on which total STW volume was in the bottom half of June 2014 and STW, (3) trading days on which total STW volume was in the bottom half of June 2014 and the securities STW, IOZ, ISO, MVW, QOZ, SSO, VAS, VLC, and VSO, (4) trading days on which total STW volume was in the bottom half of June 2014 and the securities STW, IOZ, ISO, MVW, QOZ, SSO, VAS, VLC, and VSO, (5) all trading days in June 2014 and STW. Coefficients are estimated by ordinary least squares. Standard errors are clustered by 120 second blocks on each trading day. STW Duopoly Mean is the average of the dependent variable for STW, non-monopoly observations. Change (Percent) is the estimate relative to the STW duopoly mean.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) [Volume: bottom quartile]</th>
<th>(2) [Volume: bottom half]</th>
<th>(3) [Volume: bottom half]</th>
<th>(4) [Volume: bottom half]</th>
<th>(5) Full sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STW × Monopoly</td>
<td>-0.482***</td>
<td>-0.376***</td>
<td>-0.695***</td>
<td>-0.561***</td>
<td>-0.824***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0642)</td>
<td>(0.0725)</td>
<td>(0.0607)</td>
<td>(0.0671)</td>
<td>(0.0601)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volume</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00410***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000487)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STW Duopoly Mean</td>
<td>3.378</td>
<td>3.378</td>
<td>3.590</td>
<td>3.590</td>
<td>4.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change (Percent)</td>
<td>-14.27</td>
<td>-11.12</td>
<td>-19.35</td>
<td>-15.63</td>
<td>-20.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day × Hour Fixed Effects</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Fixed Effects</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Group</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>87600</td>
<td>788400</td>
<td>175200</td>
<td>1576800</td>
<td>350400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E.C Reduced Form Evidence of Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities

The driving force of the model is a demand system that governs the exchange choice of investors. In particular, the model predicts an own-price elasticity (i.e., fewer investors trade at an exchange when its prices become less favorable) as well as a cross-price elasticity (i.e., more investors trade at an exchange when prices at other exchanges become less favorable). In this appendix, we present reduced form evidence for the existence of these elasticities in the data.

Table 14 displays the coefficients of regressions that explain variation in the occurrence of isolated buys and sells at ASX and Chi-X in terms of the prices prevailing at the two exchanges. For column (2), we perform the regression

$$buy_{x,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(a_{-x,t} - a_{x,t}) + \beta_2(a_{x,t} - v_t) + \varepsilon_{x,t},$$

and similarly, for column (3), we perform the regression

$$sell_{x,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(b_{x,t} - b_{-x,t}) + \beta_2(v_t - b_{x,t}) + \varepsilon_{x,t}.$$
In both cases, the sample consists of all exchanges \( x \in \{ \text{ASX}, \text{Chi-X} \} \) and all seconds \( t \) between 10:30 and 16:00 in the 80 trading days of the sample. Moreover, because we do not observe \( v_t \), we proxy with the average cum-fee mid price \((b_{\text{ASX},t} + b_{\text{Chi-X},t} + a_{\text{ASX},t} + a_{\text{Chi-X},t})/4\) in both cases. In the table, we refer to the difference in the own and other cum-fee asks (or the own and other cum-fee bids) as the “price difference,” and we refer to the difference between the own cum-fee ask and \( v_t \) (or the own cum-fee bid and \( v_t \)) as the “half spread.”

In addition, column (1) of the table reports the results of combining both regressions and estimating them together. Formally, we index the sides of the trade by \( i \in \{ \text{buy}, \text{sell} \} \). We then define \( iso_{\text{buy},x,t} = \text{buy}_{x,t} \) and \( iso_{\text{sell},x,t} = \text{sell}_{x,t} \). Likewise, we define \( price\_difference_{\text{buy},x,t} = a_{-x,t} - a_{x,t} \) and \( price\_difference_{\text{sell},x,t} = b_{x,t} - b_{-x,t} \). Finally, we define \( half\_spread_{\text{buy},x,t} = a_{x,t} - v_t \) and \( half\_spread_{\text{sell},x,t} = v_t - b_{x,t} \). Given these definitions, column (1) reports the results of the regression

\[
iso_{i,x,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 price\_difference_{i,x,t} + \beta_2 half\_spread_{i,x,t} + \varepsilon_{i,x,t},
\]

where the sample consists of both sides \( i \in \{ \text{buy}, \text{sell} \} \), all exchanges \( x \in \{ \text{ASX}, \text{Chi-X} \} \), and all seconds \( t \) between 10:30 and 16:00 in the 80 trading days of the sample. Moreover, we proxy for \( v_t \) with the average cum-fee mid price, as before.

Focusing on the estimates in column (1), we find that a one cent increase (decrease) in the ask (bid) on an exchange is associated with a decrease in the number of isolated buys (sells) on that exchange of approximately 1.5 per hour, as well as an increase in the number of isolated buys (sells) at the other exchange of approximately 2.3 per hour. Qualitatively similar results are found in column (2), where the focus is only on isolated buys, and in column (3), where the focus is only on isolated sells.
Table 14: Isolated Trades as Function of Quotes

* $ p < 0.1$, ** $ p < 0.05$, *** $ p < 0.01$. For columns (2) and (3), an observation is an exchange-second pair, where the exchange is either ASX or Chi-X, and the second is between 10:30 and 16:00 in one of the 80 trading days in the sample. The dependent variables are, respectively, indicators for the occurrence of an isolated buy or an isolated sell on that exchange in that second. For column (1), the estimation combines buys and sells. The independent variable “price difference” is defined as the difference between the own and other cum-fee bids or asks (see appendix E.C). The independent variable “half spread” is defined as the difference between the own cum-fee bid or ask and the mid price (see appendix E.C). Coefficients are estimated by ordinary least squares. Standard errors are clustered by 120 second blocks on each trading day.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) BUY or SELL</th>
<th>(2) BUY</th>
<th>(3) SELL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>price difference</td>
<td>0.000638***</td>
<td>0.000548***</td>
<td>0.000737***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0000566)</td>
<td>(0.0000657)</td>
<td>(0.0000772)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>half spread</td>
<td>-0.000405***</td>
<td>-0.000379***</td>
<td>-0.000431***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000103)</td>
<td>(0.000111)</td>
<td>(0.000133)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.00291***</td>
<td>0.00293***</td>
<td>0.00290***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000149)</td>
<td>(0.000163)</td>
<td>(0.000193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>6336000</td>
<td>3168000</td>
<td>3168000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E.D Trade Clustering and Price Changes

Our estimation strategy relies upon using isolated trades as a proxy for the liquidity-motivated investor trades of the model. Conversely, clustered trades are interpreted as the information-motivated sniper trades of the model. If this approach is valid, then we should expect clustered trades to be better predictors of subsequent price movements than their isolated counterparts. In this appendix, we present evidence to show that this relationship is indeed borne out in the data.

To that end, we define $R(\Delta)_t = (m_{t+\Delta} - m_t)/m_t$ to be the return over a time interval of length $\Delta$, where $m_t$ is the NBBO mid price. We define indicators $clusterBuy_t$ and $clusterSell_t$ for, respectively, whether a clustered buy or a clustered sell occurs on either exchange in second $t$. We also define $B_t = buy_{ASX,t} + buy_{Chi-X,t} + clusterBuy_t$ and $S_t = sell_{ASX,t} + sell_{Chi-X,t} + clusterSell_t$ to be indicators for, respectively, whether a buy or a sell (in each case, either clustered or isolated) occurs on either exchange in second $t$.

Then, for each value of $\Delta$, we run the regression

\[ R(\Delta)_t = \alpha_\Delta + \beta_{1,\Delta}B_t + \beta_{2,\Delta}clusterBuy_t + \gamma_{1,\Delta}S_t + \gamma_{2,\Delta}clusterSell_t + \varepsilon_t. \]

In each case, the sample consists of all seconds $t$ in the 80 trading days of the sample that are between (i) 10:30 and (ii) $\Delta$ seconds before 16:00.

In Figure 5, we plot point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for $\beta_{2,\Delta}$ and $\gamma_{2,\Delta}$ for
values of $\Delta$ up to one minute. As expected, we find that clustered trades are more predictive of price movements. The occurrence of a clustered buy (sell) in second $t$ is associated with a 30-second return of $0.23 \text{ bps} \ (-0.21 \text{ bps})$ more than an isolated buy (sell). Qualitatively, the result is robust to the choice of time horizon.

These findings are also consistent with those of Menkveld (2018), who similarly finds that trades arriving in clusters exert a disproportionately high amount of adverse selection.

Figure 5: Predicting Price Changes Using Trade Clustering

The graphs plot point estimates for $\beta_{2,\Delta}$ and $\gamma_{2,\Delta}$ from the regression defined in the text for $\Delta$ ranging from 1 to 60 seconds. An observation is a second between (i) 10:30 and (ii) $\Delta$ seconds before 16:00 in one of the 80 trading days in the sample. 95% confidence intervals as based on standard errors clustered by 120 second blocks on each trading day.

(a) Aggressive BUY

(b) Aggressive SELL

F Extensions of the Model

Several of the assumptions embedded in the baseline model are only for ease of exposition. This appendix discusses seven extensions of the model, under each of which all our main results extend. In appendix F.A, we allow for the possibility that each HFT faces a constraint on its net inventory. In appendix F.B, we add costs of operation for exchanges and liquidity providers. In appendix F.C, we consider an extension of the model in which the process governing the evolution of the value of the security is enriched to include heterogeneous jump sizes and a Brownian component. In appendix F.D, we relax the indivisibility constraint on investor demand, allowing them to split orders across exchanges. In appendix F.E, we allow for some agents who acquire and trade on short-lived private information. In appendix F.F, we allow for the possibility that liquidity providers win an exogenous fraction of races to respond to jumps in the value of the security. Finally, in appendix F.G, we allow the horizon $T$ to be stochastic. None of these extensions affects the expressions for the equilibrium spread. Consequently, our empirical findings remain valid under each.

Lastly, in appendix F.H, we explain how an imperfect ability to monitor prices in real
time might produce market frictions of the nature assumed in the baseline model.

F.A  Inventory Constraints

In the baseline model, HFTs face no limits on the amount of inventory that they are able to take on. This is admittedly somewhat unrealistic. In contrast, due to capital controls and a desire to limit their risk, HFTs typically limit the extent to which they allow themselves to build up large inventories.

While a rich literature in market microstructure theory studies market maker inventory management, most of those papers feature a monopolistic market maker (Stoll, 1978; Amihud and Mendelson, 1980; Ho and Stoll, 1981). In contrast, our model features an infinite number of HFTs, any one of which can provide liquidity. As we argue here, inventory management is a less important determinant of the equilibrium spread when market making is competitive in this way. Under the additional assumption that any HFT can take on a small amount of inventory without cost, the equilibrium spread remains unchanged.

Suppose that each HFT faces inventory constraints that prohibit its net position from exceeding $K \geq 1$ shares long or short at any point in time. Given this modification of the model, it is relatively straightforward to adapt the proofs of propositions 1 and 2 to show that the equilibrium spread remains unchanged. The strategies of HFTs adjust so that they become inactive if their net inventory ever reaches $\pm(K - 1)$ shares long or short. And if the liquidity provider ever becomes inactive, then one of the snipers abandons its original strategy to assume the liquidity provider’s role.

F.B  Cost of Operation

In the baseline model, neither exchanges nor traders must pay a cost of operation. In this extension, we add per-time costs of operation for exchanges and liquidity providers. Although one might have suspected that these operating costs would be an additional source of a spread, they affect neither the equilibrium spread nor therefore our empirical findings.

Formally, suppose that an HFT who has active limit orders on $x$ exchanges must pay a monitoring cost of $xc_1$. Suppose also that an operation cost of $c_2$ must be paid by any active exchange. Also, amend A3 to read:

\[
A3'. \quad \lambda_i \left(1 - \frac{1}{\theta} \frac{\Sigma}{2}\right) \geq \lambda_j X \left(\sigma - \frac{\Sigma}{2}\right) + X(c_1 + c_2)
\]

Given the modified assumption, it is relatively straightforward to extend the proofs of propositions 1 and 2 to show that the equilibrium spread remains unchanged. The strategies of the liquidity providers adjust to accommodate the inclusion of $c_1$ in their zero-profit conditions. Working backwards from this, it can be shown that the profits of each exchange,

---

54 This specification can be thought of as a special case of a model in which HFTs face a cost of inventory that is a function of their net position (which in itself can be thought of as reduced form for a model in which HFTs are risk averse). Specifically, this corresponds to the special case in which the inventory cost is zero on $[-K, K]$ and prohibitively high outside that interval.
as a function of the cum-fee spreads, are \( c_1 + c_2 \) less than before. These additive constants fall out of the optimization problem, and the same spreads arise in equilibrium.

There are other costs (e.g., order processing costs and inventory costs) for which the analysis is less clean. Nevertheless, the findings discussed above provide us with some confidence that our empirical findings would not necessarily be diluted or reversed by enriching the model to include various costs, even those commonly interpreted as components of the spread.

F.C Enriched Information Arrival Processes

In the baseline model, \( v_t \) is affected by jumps of only one size, \( \sigma \), which arrive at the rate \( \lambda_j \). While this is a quite simple model of price movement, the main conclusions remain unchanged even if the process is enriched in various ways.

In particular, the findings remain intact if the baseline jump process is augmented with a Brownian motion, possibly with time-varying volatility. Equilibrium strategies change only slightly under this extension: liquidity providers update their stale quotes not only after jumps, but also in a continuous fashion that tracks the Brownian motion. Snipers, on the other hand, attempt to trade only upon jumps. Given this, it is relatively straightforward to establish that the equilibrium spread continues to be as described by propositions 1 and 2.

Furthermore, the findings would also remain unchanged if the size of each discrete jump were drawn independently from a distribution, \( F \) that satisfies the following modifications of A2 and A3:

\[
A2''. \quad \theta < \min \text{supp}(F).
\]

\[
A3''. \quad \lambda_i \left(1 - \frac{1}{\theta} \right) \frac{\Sigma}{2} \geq \lambda_j X \left( \int \sigma dF(\sigma) - \frac{\Sigma}{2} \right),
\]

where \( \Sigma \), as before, is defined in terms of the underlying parameters as follows:

\[
\Sigma \equiv \begin{cases} 
\theta \left( 1 + \frac{\lambda_j}{\lambda_i} \right) & \text{ if } X = 1 \\
\theta + \frac{4\alpha}{X^2} \sqrt{\theta^2 + \frac{16\alpha^2}{X^4} - \frac{8\alpha \theta \lambda_j}{X \lambda_i}} & \text{ if } X \geq 2 
\end{cases}
\]

In words, A2 is modified to apply to the minimum jump size, and A3 is modified to apply to the expected jump size.

F.D Order Splitting

In the baseline model, investor demand is indivisible: each investor is limited to buying or selling a single share at a single exchange. In this extension, we allow investors to split orders across exchanges in such a way that they buy or sell one share in total. The baseline equilibrium survives unchanged even if this form of order splitting is allowed.\(^{55}\)

Suppose that an investor arriving at time \( t \) has the following available actions: (i) submit

\(^{55}\)However, we have not ruled out the possibility that this modification might introduce new equilibria.
a profile of market orders \( y = (y_1, \ldots, y_X) \), where \( y_x \geq 0 \) for each exchange \( x \) and \( \sum_{x=1}^{X} y_x = 1 \); (ii) submit a profile of market orders \( y = (y_1, \ldots, y_X) \), where \( y_x \leq 0 \) for each exchange \( x \) and \( \sum_{x=1}^{X} y_x = -1 \); or (iii) submit a profile of market orders \( y = (y_1, \ldots, y_X) \), where \( y_x = 0 \) for each exchange \( x \).

Supposing that liquidity providers continue to quote one share at the bid and one share at the ask, then an investor who arrives at time \( t \) and submits the orders \( y \) obtains utility

\[
    u_t(y) = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
        v_t + \tilde{\theta} - \sum_{x=1}^{X} y_x a_{x,t} & \text{if } \sum_{x=1}^{X} y_x = 1 \\
        \sum_{x=1}^{X} |y_x| b_{x,t} - v_t - \tilde{\theta} & \text{if } \sum_{x=1}^{X} y_x = -1 \\
        0 & \text{if } \sum_{x=1}^{X} y_x = 0
    \end{array} \right.
\]

As in the baseline model, investors do not necessarily act to maximize their utility. Instead, an investor who arrives at time \( t \) chooses orders \( y \) to maximize

\[
    \hat{u}_t(y|\tilde{l}, \tilde{\theta}) = u_t(y|\tilde{\theta}) - 2\alpha \cdot \sum_{x=1}^{X} |y_x| d(\tilde{l}, l_x)^2.
\]

Note that conditional on choosing \( y \) so that \( \sum_{x=1}^{X} y_x = 1 \), it is optimal under \( \hat{u} \) to trade the entire quantity at the exchange \( x \) that maximizes \( -a_{x,t} - 2\alpha d(\tilde{l}, l_x)^2 \). Likewise, conditional on choosing \( y \) so that \( \sum_{x=1}^{X} y_x = -1 \), it is optimal under \( \hat{u} \) to trade the entire quantity at the exchange \( x \) that maximizes \( b_{x,t} - 2\alpha d(\tilde{l}, l_x)^2 \). In other words, the investor does not avail himself of the opportunity to split orders, as a result of the linear way in which \( |y_x| \) enters \( \hat{u} \), and his behavior remains as in the baseline model.

To show that the baseline equilibrium remains intact under this modification, it remains only to verify that no liquidity provider can profitably deviate by quoting less than one share of depth. Reducing depth in this way would reduce the volume of trade with snipers, but it would also induce investors who would have traded at that exchange to reduce their demand by a proportionate amount. This leaves the liquidity provider’s zero-profit condition unchanged, and so the deviation would not be profitable.

F.E Private Information

In the baseline model, information is purely public. Nevertheless, the main conclusions remain unchanged even if short-lived private information is incorporated in a particular way.

In this extension, we augment the model by adding a trader (“the analyst”) who may acquire private information. Jumps in the value of the asset continue to be of size \( \sigma \) and arrive at the rate \( \lambda_j \). A fraction \( \eta \) of the jumps are, as in the baseline model, revealed publicly when they occur. The remaining \( 1 - \eta \) fraction of the jumps are revealed publicly only after an infinitesimal delay. But the analyst observes every jump when it occurs, and obtains short-lived private information in the latter cases. The analyst may trade at as many exchanges as he wishes, but is restricted to immediate-or-cancel orders.

In the equilibrium of this extension, the analyst submits immediate-or-cancel orders to
each exchange to buy (sell) one share immediately after observing an upward (downward) jump. Equilibrium strategies of the liquidity providers change only slightly in this extension: after a trade against one of their orders, they wait for an infinitesimal length of time before replenishing the limit order book, updating the price if information arrives in the interim. Equilibrium strategies of investors and snipers remain unchanged. Given this, it is relatively straightforward to show that the expressions for the equilibrium spreads prevailing under the limit order book remain as before.

There would, however, be changes to the expressions for the spreads prevailing under frequent batch auctions and non-cancellation delays (cf. appendix C.A). Intuitively, these alternative trading mechanisms remove the adverse selection due to stale-quote sniping on the basis of public information, but not the adverse selection due to the analyst’s private information. Thus, while these mechanisms would continue to improve upon the limit order book in the presence of private information of this nature, the reduction in transaction costs would be less dramatic.

F.F Incorporating Quote Fade

In the baseline model, jumps in the value of the security set off races between the liquidity providers, attempting to cancel their mispriced quotes, and snipers, attempting to exploit them. For the reason that each liquidity provider races against an infinite number of snipers, the liquidity providers lose their races with probability one.

In contrast, liquidity providers are sometimes successful in cancelling mispriced quotes in practice, a phenomenon that is sometimes referred to as quote fade. This might be for a number of unmodelled reasons, including: (i) there are only a finite number of snipers in practice, (ii) snipers might be less strongly incentivized to monitor the market and/or invest in speed technology than liquidity providers, or (iii) snipers might require stronger signals to react than liquidity providers do.\textsuperscript{56}

Without formally modeling any of the aforementioned reasons, one way to modify our model so as to feature quote fade would be to assume that an exogenous fraction $\phi \in [0, 1)$ of the races are won by liquidity providers. All our findings would remain unchanged. Formally, we would reinterpret the parameter $\lambda_j$ as $(1 - \phi)\lambda'_j$, where $\lambda'_j$ now denotes the underlying arrival rate of jumps in the value of the security. And $\lambda_j$, instead of representing the arrival rate of jumps, now represents that rate scaled by the fraction of races that the liquidity provider loses. Given this reinterpretation, it is straightforward to show that the expressions for the equilibrium spreads remain as before.

Moreover, with this modification our model seems to us a reasonably close approximation of alternate versions of the model that would capture—in a more formal way—the aforementioned explanations for quote fade. We therefore speculate that such versions of the model would produce results that would be qualitatively similar to our current conclusions (although perhaps not exactly the same).

\textsuperscript{56}In Baldauf and Mollner (forthcoming), we formally demonstrate how this can arise (albeit with a model in which adverse selection originates from private as opposed to public information).
F.G  Stochastic Terminal Time

The baseline model assumes a deterministic, finite horizon. However, this is only for simplicity of exposition. Our analysis immediately generalizes to cases in which the terminal time $T$ is stochastic. The reason is that, although the model is set in continuous time, dynamics play no role: equilibrium trading behavior is stationary, just as in Budish et al. (2015).

F.H  Market Friction Microfoundation

A key aspect of the model is that it allows for market frictions that distort the exchange choices of investors. In the main text, we are deliberately agnostic as to the precise source of these frictions. Nevertheless, we do suggest a number of potential sources, one of which is that it is inherently difficult to monitor prices in real time with perfect accuracy. In this appendix, we develop this explanation in greater detail.

For the purposes of this appendix, we focus on the case in which $X = 2$. As in the main text, denote the private transaction motive of an investor by $\tilde{\theta}$. Ignore, for the purposes of this appendix, the other component of the investor’s type, $\tilde{l}$, which had designated the investor’s location on the unit circle. For expositional ease, we focus the following discussion on investors with an inclination to buy (i.e., for whom $\tilde{\theta} \geq 0$) and, correspondingly, the ask-side of the book. Denote the asks at the two exchanges at time $t$ by $a_{1,t}$ and $a_{2,t}$. Suppose, however, that investors are limited in their capacity to monitor these prices. This could be the case if their information comes from some lagged feed (such as that of the Securities Information Processor, often abbreviated as “the SIP”), or if so-called “fleeting orders” prevent investors from obtaining a clear view of the market.

As a stylized model of these limitations, suppose that rather than observing the two asks, an investor who arrives at time $t$ observes only the noisy signals $\hat{a}_{1,t} = a_{1,t} + \epsilon_t$ and $\hat{a}_{2,t} = a_{2,t} - \epsilon_t$, where $\epsilon_t \sim U[-\alpha, \alpha]$. Suppose that the investor routes an immediate-or-cancel order with limit price $v_t + \tilde{\theta}$ to the exchange with best (i.e., lowest) signal.57

This behavior induces the same trading probabilities as would be obtained if investors of every type $(\tilde{l}, \tilde{\theta})$ were to optimize $\hat{u}_t(x, y|\tilde{l}, \tilde{\theta})$ as described in the main text, and we were then to integrate over $\tilde{l}$. In particular, conditioning on the true quotes $(a_{1,t}, a_{2,t})$, the investor routes to exchange 1 with probability $\left[\frac{1}{2} + \frac{a_{2,t} - a_{1,t}}{\alpha}\right]_0^1$. Then, given the limit price that the investor sets, this means that the investor trades at exchange 1 with probability $\left[\frac{1}{2} + \frac{a_{2,t} - a_{1,t}}{\alpha}\right]_0^1 \{v_t + \tilde{\theta} \geq a_{1,t}\}$. And we obtain a symmetric expression for exchange 2.

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57Such behavior is optimal for the investor if he is constrained to send orders only at time $t$ and if he possesses prior beliefs about ask prices that are symmetric about $a_{1,t}$ and $a_{2,t}$. 333
G Notation and Variables

Table 15: List of Mathematical Notation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parameters</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \alpha )</td>
<td>strength of frictions distorting exchange choice of investors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \theta )</td>
<td>maximum investor private transaction motive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \lambda_i )</td>
<td>Poisson arrival rate of investors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \lambda_j )</td>
<td>Poisson arrival rate of jumps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sigma )</td>
<td>jump size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( X )</td>
<td>number of exchanges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Notation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( v )</td>
<td>fundamental value of security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( s )</td>
<td>cum-fee spread*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( a )</td>
<td>cum-fee ask*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( b )</td>
<td>cum-fee bid*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \tau_{\text{make}} )</td>
<td>make fee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \tau_{\text{take}} )</td>
<td>take fee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( l )</td>
<td>location on unit circle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We also use \( \hat{s}, \hat{a}, \) and \( \hat{b} \) for the quoted spread, ask, and bid, respectively.

Table 16: Variables Used in Main Estimation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( s_{x,t} )</td>
<td>cum-fee spread of STW on exchange ( x ) in second ( t ) (cents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( a_{x,t} )</td>
<td>cum-fee ask of STW on exchange ( x ) in second ( t ) (cents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( b_{x,t} )</td>
<td>cum-fee bid of STW on exchange ( x ) in second ( t ) (cents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( v_t )</td>
<td>fundamental value of security*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( buy_{x,t} )</td>
<td>indicator for an isolated buy of STW on exchange ( x ) in second ( t )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( sell_{x,t} )</td>
<td>indicator for an isolated sell of STW on exchange ( x ) in second ( t )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( clustered_{x,t} )</td>
<td>indicator for a clustered trade of STW on exchange ( x ) in second ( t )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Proxied by \((a_{\text{ASX},t} + b_{\text{ASX},t} + a_{\text{Chi-X},t} + b_{\text{Chi-X},t})/4\).

References for Internet Appendix


